"UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk Set to Visit Sri Lanka in 2025 to Address Key Issues"


History Repeats: Vigilance Against Betrayal in 2025



Caution to the Tamil Community Ahead of UN Rights Chief’s 2025 Sri Lanka Visit

Abstract

This report examines the planned 2025 visit of Volker Türk, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, to Sri Lanka. The visit marks a pivotal moment in Sri Lanka’s human rights trajectory, as it follows years of unresolved accountability for war crimes, enforced disappearances, and political repression. With a newly elected government in office, UNHRC High Commissioner Volker Türk’s mission seeks to engage Sri Lankan leadership, civil society, and victims’ groups to assess ongoing challenges, push for meaningful reforms, and reinforce international scrutiny on human rights violations.

The report outlines UNHRC High Commissioner Volker Türk’s core objectives, including justice for past atrocities, legal and institutional reforms, protection of civic space, reconciliation efforts, and ensuring economic justice. Special attention is given to Tamil advocacy groups, who must UNHRC High Commissioner Volker Türk’s strategically engage with HR High Commissioner Volker Türk to prevent a repeat of the “Fox Tactic” of 2015, when promises of domestic accountability led to diplomatic delays and stalled justice efforts. The risks of ineffective engagement, government resistance, and Sinhala nationalist pushback are analyzed alongside expected outcomes, ranging from renewed commitments and legal revisions to intensified international pressure and potential universal jurisdiction cases.

Ultimately, this report underscores the critical importance of UNHRC High Commissioner Volker Türk’s visit in shaping Sri Lanka’s future human rights policies, reinforcing UN oversight, and determining whether the country moves toward true accountability or continues its legacy of impunity. The findings emphasize the urgency for Tamil human rights organizations and activists to act decisively, ensuring their demands are heard at the highest levels to safeguard international justice for Sri Lanka’s war victims.

Introduction: A Critical Visit in a Familiar Context 

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk is expected to visit Sri Lanka in mid-2025 – the first visit by a UN human rights chief in nine years. This comes under the newly formed government of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake (often called “Anura’s government”). The Tamil community must welcome international scrutiny but also remain extremely vigilant. We have seen similar moments before a change of government in 2015 brought hopes for justice and reconciliation yet ultimately led to broken promises and painful betrayals. Eelam Tamils cannot afford a repeat of the 2015–2019 experience. As Volker UNHRC High Commissioner Volker Türk’s visit approaches, Tamils worldwide are urged to be watchful and prepared – aware of history’s lessons, alert to potential pitfalls, and ready to assert the truth. This statement provides historical context and a call to action, emphasizing the need for vigilance against betrayals and co-option, and stressing that Tamil human rights organizations, politicians, activists, and professionals must unite to present concrete evidence to the High Commissioner. (Ambika Satkunanathan aptly noted that “betrayal is a common theme running through the history of Tamil politics” Learnt](https://groundviews.org/2015/03/08/heroes-traitors-and-tamil-politics-lessons-un-learnt/) – a caution we must heed.)

Lessons from 2015–2019: Promises and Betrayals 

Historical Background: In 2015, Sri Lanka’s regime change – the defeat of Mahinda Rajapaksa and the rise of a “good governance” coalition under President Maithripala Sirisena – was met with optimism. The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) took up Sri Lanka’s post-war accountability that year, and many expected genuine progress on justice for wartime atrocities. Tamil political leaders and diaspora organizations initially embraced the new government’s conciliatory tone. However, the events of 2015–2019 proved to be a cautionary tale for Eelam Tamils: lofty international resolutions and local promises yielded little real change, and Tamils’ trust was misused.

UNHRC Resolution 30/1 (2015) – A Compromise on Justice:

In October 2015, the UNHRC unanimously adopted a resolution on Sri Lanka, co-sponsored by the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government. Instead of mandating an international war-crimes inquiry as Tamils had long demanded, the resolution endorsed a domestic accountability mechanism with only a possibility of foreign participation. Key recommendations from the UN’s own investigative report (the OISL report) – such as establishing a hybrid special court – were watered down or removed. The new resolution added insult to injury, handing over complete control of any investigation to Sri Lanka’s political elite, who were complicit in the slaughter of Tamils". In short, the Sri Lankan government secured what it always wanted: a façade of justice under its sole authority, devoid of any binding international oversight. This was heralded as a diplomatic success in Colombo, but for Tamil victims, it was a grave betrayal of hope. As one analysis bluntly observed at the time, the UN has [once again] betrayed the Tamils (Tamil Solidarity, 2015).

Sri Lankan Government Tactics in 2015:

The new Sirisena government deftly leveraged international goodwill to avoid real concessions. It portrayed itself as a reformist regime and courted global powers, who in turn eased pressure on accountability for war crimes. Western governments were eager to support Sri Lanka’s pivot away from the previous regime’s China-leaning stance, and according to observers, they were willing to “push for accountability only so far as doing so will not weaken the country’s fledgling pro-Western government”. This geopolitical calculation meant that justice for Tamils became a secondary concern. The UN High Commissioner’s office itself changed tone, treating the change in Sri Lankan leadership as an excuse to soften its stance. The result was an UNHRC process long on diplomacy and short on justice. Sri Lanka’s leaders masterfully stalled for time: they agreed to inquiries “with foreign participation” merely on their terms and delayed any tangible progress. Crucially, Colombo co-opted some Tamil voices in this effort, inviting Tamil political leaders into dialogue and making token gestures that created an appearance of reconciliation, all while the security state remained intact. In the words of a human rights expert, the 2015 transitional justice agenda “took a couple early steps in the right direction, yet it was mostly a road to nowhere,” as the coalition government was “never sincere about transitional justice or addressing the root cause” of the ethnic conflict (Dibbert, 2019). The Tamils’ legitimate quest for accountability was effectively defanged by delaying tactics and empty rhetoric.

Diaspora and Tamil Leadership’s Experience:

In 2015, many Tamil leaders – both on the island and in the diaspora – opted to give the new government a chance, fearing that pressing too hard might jeopardize a rare opening. The largest Tamil party, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), took the controversial step of endorsing the watered-down UNHRC resolution, praising it as a “genuine opportunity” and expressing gratitude to the Sri Lankan government for engaging with them. This compromise by the TNA leadership, including dropping demands for demilitarization and robust international oversight, was later seen as a grave mistake that strengthened the Sri Lankan state’s hand at the expense of Tamil justice. Tamil diaspora organizations, for their part, largely aligned with this cautious optimism in the early years. For example, the London-based Global Tamil Forum (GTF) signaled a willingness to work constructively with President Sirisena. GTF’s President, Rev. S.J. Emmanuel, said the diaspora was “not pushing for Sri Lanka to be punished… but only [cry] for truth, justice and accountability,” urging at least a credible local mechanism with international collaboration. Diaspora activists focused on lobbying governments and UN officials, trusting that quiet diplomacy would yield results.

Government Outreach vs. Ground Reality:

The Sirisena administration also rolled out tactical gestures to win over Tamils and the international community. It lifted bans on several Tamil diaspora groups and individuals (originally blacklisted as “terrorist” by the previous regime) to encourage diaspora engagement. Sri Lanka’s leaders met diaspora representatives abroad for the first time; for instance, Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera held unprecedented talks with the GTF in London in 2015. These moves were hailed by some as a *“paradigm shift”* in Colombo’s approach to the Tamil diaspora, replacing confrontation with co-operation. Diaspora communities were urged to invest in Sri Lanka’s development and “become part of [the] larger Sri Lankan community” in a new spirit of reconciliation. On the surface, relations between the state and Tamils improved: the climate of fear slightly abated, Tamil refugees returned home, and Tamils felt more included symbolically (for example, the national anthem was sung in Tamil on Independence Day 2016, a meaningful gesture of respect). However, these surface-level changes masked an unyielding security establishment. Even during the so-called reformist period of 2015–19, the Sri Lankan state never ceased seeing Tamils (especially the diaspora and activists) as a security threat. Behind the scenes, the security forces continued to surveil, intimidate, and even eliminate Tamil activists. Notably, some diaspora members who returned to Sri Lanka in this period faced harassment, detention, and even enforced disappearance, particularly those who had been involved in anti-government protests abroad. The continuation of such repression amidst reconciliation rhetoric confirmed the fears of skeptics who warned that Colombo’s outreach was skin-deep. Indeed, while Tamil groups engaged in good faith, the Government of Sri Lanka quietly maintained its “long arm” of control; as one scholarly study put it, Tamil diaspora activists were “evidently not safe from the long arm of the Sri Lankan state,” which targeted them with slander, threats and worse.

Outcome by 2019 – Broken Trust:

By the end of 2019, the optimistic narrative had unravelled. The coalition government had failed to deliver on virtually all key promises of accountability and reconciliation. There were no prosecutions of those responsible for mass atrocities; the promised special court never materialized, nor did any credible hybrid mechanism. Mechanisms that were established, such as the Office on Missing Persons, lacked political will and yielded scant results. Land seized by the military was only partially returned. Grieving families still had no answers about their disappeared loved ones. In the North-East, the Sri Lankan military remained an oppressive presence, and memorialization of Tamil martyrs was still largely banned. International patience wore thin as deadline after deadline for Sri Lanka’s UNHRC commitments passed unmet. A sense of betrayal took hold among Tamils, who saw that even a friendly government and a supportive international climate had not led to justice. The window of opportunity closed with the election of Gotabaya Rajapaksa (brother of Mahinda) as President in November 2019. Gotabaya’s victory – propelled by a hardline Sinhala nationalist platform – extinguished any remaining hope that Sri Lanka would, of its own accord, reckon with the past. As feared, the new Rajapaksa administration promptly repudiated the already-dormant UNHRC commitments. But it must be stressed: the reconciliation process was largely moribund even before Gotabaya took office.An expert observer noted that Sirisena’s government “wasn’t meaningfully engaging with those commitments anyway; that was a big, missed opportunity”. In other words, Tamils were strung along from 2015 to 2019, only to end up back at square one. This painful experience – investing hope in Sri Lanka’s promises and international processes, only to see four years wasted and the cycle of denial resume – left the Tamil community feeling deeply cheated. It stands as a stark lesson in political reality. (Indeed, in 2021, just two years after praising diaspora engagement, Sri Lanka’s government once again banned Tamil diaspora groups, reinstating the very proscriptions that had been lifted in 2015. Such reversals underscored the fragility of progress when rooted in the goodwill of a state that had not truly changed its ideology.)

Learning from this chapter (2015–2019) is imperative. The core lesson is that Tamils must not place blind trust in the Sri Lankan government’s gestures or in international intermediaries without concrete action. Hopes must be tempered with realism. Every promise must be met with verification and pressure, not gratitude and complacency. In 2015, Tamils – both local and diaspora – gave their trust freely, only to be let down. In 2025, we must not be so trusting without evidence of sincere change.

The Current Context in 2025: New Government, Old Tactics? 

Fast-forward to 2025:

Sri Lanka once again has a new government being lauded as an agent of change. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake came to power (after the dramatic collapse of the Rajapaksa regime amid economic crisis) promising a break from the past. Many parallels with 2015 are evident. There is renewed international interest in Sri Lanka’s trajectory, and cautious optimism in some quarters that this leadership could address Tamil grievances. Anura’s government has made overtures that sound conciliatory – yet on closer inspection, many of the fundamental positions of the Sri Lankan state remain unchanged. This section examines the current situation, highlighting why Tamils should approach the 2025 scenario with their eyes open and guard up, not down.

Anura Government’s Promises vs. Positions:

President Anura Dissanayake and his National People’s Power (NPP) movement campaigned on a platform of anti-corruption, social justice, and inclusivity. Upon election (in late 2024), Anura received congratulations from Tamil representatives and diaspora groups, including the GTF, which greeted his victory as an inspiring change. Tamil leaders cautiously welcomed his pledges of a “new political direction” for the country. There have been symbolic gestures reminiscent of 2015 – for instance, calls inviting diaspora Tamils to return and invest in rebuilding the nation (Nalinda Jayatissa, a prominent NPP figure, publicly urged expatriate Tamils to contribute to the economy, extending an olive branch to the diaspora (Tamilwin, 2025)). The government has also allowed space for some memorial events and appeared with Tamil politicians in conciliatory settings more often than the Rajapaksas did. On the surface, these moves echo the outreach of the previous reformist government.

Yet, when it comes to the *hard questions of accountability and minority rights*, the new administration’s stance so far does not indicate a meaningful shift from past Sinhala-nationalist policies. In Geneva and other international forums, Anura’s officials have maintained a firm line against external involvement in justice processes. In March 2025, Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath told the UNHRC that Sri Lanka *“will ensure domestic mechanisms… continue their work”* and flatly rejected the UN’s evidence-gathering mechanism on Sri Lanka. He insisted there was no need for international or foreign legal initiatives, mirroring the standard position of all Sri Lankan governments since the war’s end. This was a clear signal that, despite the change in faces, Colombo still prioritizes protecting the military and political leaders from international scrutiny – the very attitude that derailed justice in 2015–19. High Commissioner Volker Türk himself noted, in an update last year, that any new government in Sri Lanka should *“undertake fundamental reforms to address the accountability gap”*, such as replacing the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and pursuing truth for war-era crimes. However, since taking office, Anura’s administration has not taken concrete steps on these fronts. The PTA remains in force (with only promises of review), and domestic accountability mechanisms show no new progress.

Continuity of Policy on Accountability:

Despite President Anura’s reputation as a leftist reformer, his government’s early actions suggest a continuity of state interests rather than a break. Notably, Colombo continues to reject the UN Human Rights Council’s evidence “repository” and investigative role on Sri Lanka. (This repository, established by the UN Office of the High Commissioner in 2021, holds over *96,000 items of evidence* from 470 sources regarding Sri Lankan human rights abuses. Yet the government remains hostile to it, fearing it could be used in future international trials.) Instead, the new regime touts a “credible domestic process” – a claim met with deep skepticism by Tamils given the utter failure of past domestic initiatives. Indeed, by early 2025, international observers were already voicing *“mixed expectations”* about Sri Lanka’s direction, recalling how previous leaderships made commitments that later evaporated. On the ground in the Tamil homeland, little has changed in terms of demilitarization or political power-sharing. Reports indicate that despite Anura’s talk of a fresh start, militarisation in the north-east continues unabated, and Tamil activists still face surveillance and intimidation. The Tamil Guardian reported that even as recently as March 2025, Tamil protesters in Geneva highlighted *“ongoing failures to address accountability”* and noted that *“despite [President] Dissanayake’s claims of a new direction, Colombo has continued… its rejection of international accountability and its persistent persecution of Tamil activists.”* These realities point to structural and ideological continuities that no change in government has yet undone.

Government’s Engagement with Tamils and Diaspora:

Similar to 2015, the current government has been engaging with Tamil representatives and sections of the diaspora, which can be both an opportunity and a strategy to manage Tamil demands. There have been high-profile meetings – for instance, Tamil political leaders (including opposition TNA members) recently met visiting Indian Prime Minister Modi alongside President Anura, discussing Tamil rights and devolution. President Anura’s administration also emphasizes a message of unity, urging Tamils abroad to see themselves as stakeholders in Sri Lanka’s future. However, there is a fine line between genuine inclusion and co-optation. Opposition voices in Sri Lanka have accused the Anura government of merely trying to appease Tamil interests superficially. In February 2025, an MP from the Rajapaksa-aligned SLPP charged that the government was “acting with the aim of satisfying the [LTTE] Tigers and diaspora organizations,” suggesting that steps like revisiting war crime accusations and reducing the military security for ex-president Mahinda Rajapaksa were done to *“please the diaspora”*. While this accusation comes from a political rival (and is laden with the usual majoritarian cynicism), it interestingly highlights a perception that the government’s outreach may be more cosmetic or tactical than substantive. Indeed, if Colombo’s few gestures (like potentially investigating a former regime figure or two) are motivated by a desire to mollify international critics or Tamil groups, rather than by a principled commitment to justice, then we are witnessing a repeat of the 2015 playbook. Tamil activists must therefore scrutinize each “goodwill” move for actual depth. For example, if the government were serious about justice, it would empower independent prosecutions of wartime abuses; instead, we hear of  committees and reassurances much like in the past.

The Return of the UN High Commissioner:

It is against this complex backdrop that High Commissioner Volker UNHRC High Commissioner Volker Türk’s mid-2025 visit will take place. The last UN rights chief to visit, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein in 2016, came under similar circumstances – a new government that he hoped to encourage along a reform path. Zeid’s visit saw mixed reactions: Tamil victims urged him to ensure promises were kept, while Sinhala nationalists accused him of overstepping. This time, Mr. UNHRC High Commissioner Volker Türk’s challenge is to cut through official narratives and see the ground truth. He has already called on Sri Lanka to address “root causes of conflict” and the “accountability gap” in his reports. But Sri Lanka’s strategy will likely be to showcase just enough progress to claim credit, while denying him any concrete commitments on international involvement. For instance, the government may highlight the establishment of some commission or the initiation of a new domestic investigation (as it often does ahead of UN meetings), or it might showcase improved humanitarian indicators in the north. We recall how in 2016, international observers noted both improvements and backtracking: Human Rights Watch praised some strides but warned that Sri Lanka was already questioning its own commitments. Likewise in 2025, we expect split narratives – the government will say “we are doing our best, give us time”, whereas Tamil civil society will point out that “little to nothing has changed for us.” It is crucial that Mr. Türk receive the unvarnished perspective of the Tamil people, not just the curated version from Colombo’s officials.

Bottom Line:

The Tamil community in 2025 stands at a crossroads very much like the one in 2015. A change in leadership has brought a measure of hope and tactical relief, but the structural injustices and evasions remain. We cannot assume that this government, by virtue of being new or different, will automatically deliver justice. Its early actions suggest caution is warranted. The atmosphere might be less openly hostile than under the Rajapaksa regime, but subtle dilutions of our demands can be just as damaging in the long run. Therefore, as the UN High Commissioner’s visit approaches, Tamil stakeholders must draw on the memory of 2015–19: we were optimistic then and felt betrayed later. This time, we must be proactive and clear-eyed in pressing our case, and guard against any attempts to replay the same old tactics.

Vigilance Against Repeated Betrayals 

With this context in mind, the Tamil community – both in the homeland and the diaspora – must exercise utmost vigilance. We know from painful history that betrayals can come in many forms: from international bodies prioritizing political compromises over justice, from Sri Lankan leaders making empty promises, and even from within our own ranks when individuals or groups stray from the cause or collude with the powers that be. “Once bitten, twice shy” should be our guiding principle now. Below are key areas where vigilance is needed, along with historical parallels that inform our caution:

Scrutinize Every Assurance:

Do not take any statement by the Sri Lankan government or international diplomats at face value. For example, if the government announces a new Truth and Reconciliation Commission or a plan to implement the 13th Amendment (regional devolution), we must ask: Is this genuine or a stalling tactic? In 2015, many Tamils wanted to believe that a new constitution or a hybrid court was coming; by 2019 those hopes were dashed. Every commitment made during Volker UNHRC High Commissioner Volker Türk’s visit must be documented and followed up relentlessly. If Mr. Türk issues a statement praising some government initiative, Tamil civil society should politely but firmly set the record straight if that praise is undeserved. We cannot allow our issue to be papered over by diplomatic niceties as happened with the 2015 UNHRC resolution. Remember that even UN officials operate under political pressures – they need to hear our critical voices to balance the narrative. As Tamil Solidarity warned in 2015, we cannot put *“complete faith in outside agencies… to deliver justice for the Tamils”*. We must rely on our persistent advocacy.

Unmask Tactics of Co-option and Division:

A major threat to any liberation or justice movement is the divide-and-rule strategy. The Sri Lankan state is adept at sowing discord among Tamils and between Tamils and potential allies. We should be vigilant of attempts to co-opt Tamil figures into supporting half-baked government efforts. In 2015, we saw how the TNA leadership was co-opted into supporting a diluted resolution, which neutralized Tamil demands. Today, there may be attempts to co-opt Tamil activists through inclusion in governmental committees, offers of development projects, or flattery and recognition. While engagement with the state is sometimes necessary, it must not come at the cost of silencing our fundamental calls for accountability. Likewise, the government may attempt to divide the diaspora by engaging with selected “moderate” diaspora groups and isolating “hardliners.” We must not let these labels divide us: all Tamils ultimately want justice and equality, even if our approaches differ. It is important to maintain unity in purpose. Any diaspora organization or Tamil politician seen excessively praising the government without results to show should be questioned constructively. We have learned that critical solidarity is more valuable than blind support. At the same time, avoid internecine witch-hunts – not every dissenter is a traitor, but neither is every smiling interlocutor innocent. We need a balanced vigilance that neither shuns good-faith cooperation nor tolerates bad-faith collusion.

Watch for Infiltrators and Informants:

It is a sad reality that Tamil movements have been infiltrated before by those who work to undermine from within. Sri Lankan intelligence agencies have, over the years, cultivated informants even among the Tamil diaspora (as documented by human rights researchers). Be cautious of individuals who discourage legitimate protest or who mysteriously echo Colombo’s talking points in our community forums. Sometimes, disinformation is spread to confuse and demoralize Tamils – for example, rumours that “the UN will never help” or that “Tamils are too divided to succeed” can erode our resolve. Counter such narratives with facts and determination. Encourage transparency within Tamil organizations: whether it’s a community association or a victims’ collective, insist on clear communication and democratic decision-making to minimize the risk of sabotage from within. *If something feels off, trust your instincts and verify.*

Hold Our Representatives Accountable:

Perhaps the most difficult vigilance is that towards our community leaders – yet it is necessary. We have seen instances where those claiming to represent Tamil interests have made deals or gestures that shocked the community. A recent example is the Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) and GTF delegation’s ill-advised meeting with former President Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2023. For years, these organizations had championed international accountability for Rajapaksa’s atrocities; however, suddenly seeing photos of their leaders in cordial talks and handshakes with him was, as one Tamil activist described, *“a betrayal beyond belief”. This move was widely condemned by Tamils around the world – a Canadian MP called it “deplorable”, saying such engagement *“undermined the confidence in [those] organizations and their claims to represent the Tamil Diaspora”*. Diaspora members felt “stabbed in the back” by their community leaders, and were rightfully angered that private meetings with an alleged war criminal took place *without consulting the survivor community*. The lesson here is stark: even Tamil organizations can falter or be led astray, intentionally or unintentionally, and we must not follow like sheep. We must demand that our representatives act with integrity and in line with our community’s core demands (truth, justice, security, self-determination). If they don’t, we must voice our dissent and organize independently if needed. Importantly, this vigilance is not to sew division, but to ensure our struggle isn’t hijacked or diluted. As Ambika Satkunanathan observed, Tamil politics has long oscillated between branding people heroes or traitors Learnt](https://groundviews.org/2015/03/08/heroes-traitors-and-tamil-politics-lessons-un-learnt/ ); we should avoid knee-jerk labelling, but *we do need to call out clear betrayals*. Those who collaborate with the oppressor against the oppressed for personal gain or prestige must be exposed and isolated through non-violent means such as public accountability and debate.

Stay Alert to Security Risks:

Whenever a high-profile international visit like Volker UNHRC High Commissioner Volker Türk’s happens, there is also the risk of security clampdowns or surveillance by the state. Tamils planning to testify or meet with the High Commissioner (e.g. families of the disappeared, human rights activists in the North-East) might face intimidation attempts. There were reports back in 2016 of intelligence officers shadowing Tamil civil society meetings during Zeid’s visit, and we may see similar tactics now. We urge community members to use secure channels to communicate and to report any harassment immediately to trusted human rights groups, and even to Mr. UNHRC High Commissioner Volker Türk’s team directly if possible. Diaspora activists organizing around the visit should also be prudent – assume that online meetings are monitored by Colombo’s agents. This is not to induce paranoia, but a healthy caution so that evidence and testimonies are not compromised and individuals are kept safe. Our movement has survived severe repression; we will not be cowed by a few watchful eyes, but we must nonetheless take precautions.

In summary, vigilance means *being informed, critical, and united*. It means remembering the adage *“once burned, twice shy.”* Tamils have been burned before by trusting words over deeds. This time, we will gauge everyone – the UN, the Sri Lankan government, and our own community leaders – by their actions and outcomes. The stakes are too high for complacency. As a people who endured genocide and decades of injustice, we owe it to our martyrs and survivors to ensure that *no one manipulates or betrays our quest for justice ever again*. This vigilant mindset is not cynicism; it is wisdom earned through sacrifice.

Presenting a United Case with Concrete Evidence 

While we remain vigilant against potential betrayals, we must simultaneously go on the offensive in the realm of truth. Volker UNHRC High Commissioner Volker Türk’s visit is a crucial chance for Tamils to present our case powerfully to the international community. This opportunity must not be wasted. Tamil human rights organizations, political representatives, activists, journalists, and professionals should coordinate closely in the coming weeks to prepare a comprehensive, evidence-backed presentation for the High Commissioner. The goal is to ensure that Mr. Türk leaves Sri Lanka with an unambiguous understanding of the Tamil nation’s plight, our demands, and the Sri Lankan state’s record. Here’s how we can achieve that:

Compile and Curate Evidence:

Tamils have been meticulously documenting human rights abuses for years. Now is the time to bring the most compelling evidence to the forefront. This includes evidence of war crimes (e.g. videos, photographs, survivor testimonies from the final war phase in 2009), documentation of post-war abuses (such as abduction of Tamil youths, torture cases, land occupation records), and data on ongoing issues like political prisoners and militarization. Organizations like the International Truth and Justice Project (ITJP), People for Equality and Relief in Lanka (PEARL), ABC Tamil Oli (ECOSOC), and local groups like the Tamil Civil Society Forum and Adayaalam Centre have vast archives. We should select key pieces – for instance, authenticated massacre reports, lists of disappeared persons with case references, and forensic reports of torture – to hand over directly to the High Commissioner’s team. By doing so, we reinforce the existing UN evidence repository with our community’s voice. (The OHCHR’s Sri Lanka accountability project already holds over 96,000 items of information from hundreds of sources; we must make sure the human stories behind those numbers are heard loud and clear.) When Mr. Türk is in the North-East, families of the disappeared should be prepared to give him files of information – many such families maintain detailed dossiers about their missing loved ones, including letters sent to authorities, DNA evidence from mass graves, etc. These should be organized and ready. Similarly, Tamil professionals and academics can prepare briefing papers: for example, a legal analysis on why domestic mechanisms have failed, or a report on the militarization of Tamil areas and its impacts, or psychiatric experts highlighting the trauma prevalent in Tamil society due to a lack of closure. Hard copies (with translations where necessary) should be given to the UN delegation for the record. The idea is to overwhelm the visit with facts that cannot be ignored or glossed over.

Coordinate Our Messaging:

It is essential that Tamil voices – whether from politicians, civil society, or diaspora – deliver a consistent core message during this visit. We may have different emphases (one group might stress genocide recognition, another might focus on ongoing militarization, another on political rights), which is fine. But all should underscore a few non-negotiable points: accountability for mass atrocities, protection of Tamil human rights, and recognition of Tamils’ political aspirations. If every Tamil stakeholder Mr. Türk meets echoes these themes, it creates a powerful chorus that is hard to dismiss. Tamil parliamentarians and provincial politicians must also rise to the occasion – they should not soften their stance out of politeness or under pressure from Colombo. Instead, they should speak truth to power, backed by their mandate from the people. It would be wise for Tamil MPs, especially the TNA and others, to hold a joint session or press conference with Mr. Türk if possible, or to at least submit a joint memorandum. Unity in messaging will show that *the Tamil question is not a fringe issue but a collective national issue*. We urge our leaders: set aside smaller disputes among yourselves and present a united front in this international forum.

Involve International Allies:

We are not alone in this struggle. Over the years, various international human rights organizations (like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group) and even some foreign governments have taken an interest in Sri Lanka’s accountability process. Prior to UNHRC High Commissioner Volker Türk’s visit, Tamil advocacy groups in the diaspora should brief these international allies and encourage them to make public statements or send communiqués reinforcing our calls. For example, if Amnesty International issues a timely report or press release highlighting that *“victims in Sri Lanka still await justice”* and urging Türk to press for certain actions, it adds weight to our cause. Similarly, friendly parliamentarians in countries like Canada, the UK, etc., can raise questions or write op-eds around the time of the visit. This creates an external echo chamber that backs Tamils’ on-the-ground advocacy. By the time Mr. Türk lands in Colombo, he should be well aware that the world expects him to prioritize Tamil issues on this trip. Diaspora Tamil experts can also offer private briefings to Mr. UNHRC High Commissioner Volker Türk’s office ahead of the visit (if the channels allow), summarizing key concerns and suggesting questions for him to ask Sri Lankan officials. Essentially, we must leave no stone unturned in making our case compelling.

Highlight Past Commitments and Failures:

One effective strategy when talking to UN officials is to reference Sri Lanka’s own past commitments and demonstrate their breach. Mr. Türk will be familiar with the UNHRC resolutions and the Government’s undertakings from 2015 onward. We should prepare a scorecard: what Sri Lanka promised versus what actually happened. For instance: *Promise:* Establish a judicial mechanism with international participation (from Resolution 30/1) – *Result:* No such mechanism, only domestic commissions that did nothing. *Promise:* Return all military-occupied land – *Result:* Large swathes still under military control in 2025. *Promise:* Investigate war-time sexual violence – *Result:* Not a single prosecution or public report. By documenting these, we make it clear that Sri Lanka’s pattern is to deflect and delay. This will bolster our argument that stronger international action (like referrals to international courts or sanctions) is needed, and that *Mr. Türk must not be swayed by the same empty assurances. We can cite the authoritative statements, such as the observation that “the coalition government was never sincere about transitional justice”, to support our case that any new promises in 2025 should be met with healthy skepticism. Holding up this mirror of failure also honors the truth: it shifts any implication of blame away from victims (“it’s been years, why are Tamils still complaining?”) squarely onto the perpetrator (“it’s been years, why has the government not done what it promised?”).

Articulate the Tamil Aspirations Clearly:

Beyond cataloguing grievances, we must present a positive, concrete vision of what Tamils seek. This includes immediate measures (justice, end of persecution) and long-term political solutions (such as meaningful power-sharing or autonomy so that such abuses never happen again). It is important to convey that our struggle is not just about addressing *past* crimes, but also about ensuring a fair and secure *future* for the Tamil nation in Sri Lanka. When Tamil representatives meet Mr. Türk, they should emphasize how unresolved accountability and unaddressed political issues (like the denial of self-determination) are intertwined – they form the “root causes” of conflict that he himself has mentioned. For example, Tamil families of the disappeared can tell him: *“We need justice for our children, but we also need guarantees it won’t happen to the next generation – that requires changes in how we are governed.”* This holistic narrative is crucial to prevent the visit from focusing only on symbolic reconciliation (which Colombo prefers to showcase) rather than real change. If possible, handing Mr. Türk a unified Tamil memorandum – endorsed by Tamil parties, civil society, and diaspora orgs – would be powerful. This document can list our key asks: e.g., international accountability mechanisms, release of political prisoners, information on the disappeared, demilitarization of Tamil areas, lifting of oppressive laws, and political power-sharing negotiations. By giving such a memo (with all relevant citations and facts), we not only state our case but also create a reference Mr. Türk can use in his official reports. *(Notably, when Zeid Al Hussein visited in 2016, Tamil groups did provide him with similar documents, which later helped shape his reports criticizing Sri Lanka’s slow progress. We should do the same now with even greater precision.)*

In essence, preparation and unity will be our strength. We cannot control what the UN or Sri Lanka will do, but we can control how effectively we present our truth. Concrete evidence, unified messaging, and clear demands will make it harder for anyone to sideline Tamil issues during this visit. Every Tamil activist – whether a mother seeking her missing son, a lawyer gathering affidavits, or a student leader abroad organizing a rally – has a role to play in this collective effort. Let us seize this moment to put forth the unassailable truth of our story, backed by facts and moral conviction.

Call to Action: Tamil Diaspora, Stay Vigilant and Engaged 

To the Tamil diaspora across the world, we issue this urgent call to action. Your role in this struggle has always been pivotal – from rallying international awareness to supporting initiatives on the ground. At this critical juncture, diaspora Tamils must be doubly vigilant and proactive. The diaspora has resources, access, and relative safety that many back home do not; hence, it carries a responsibility to act as the watchful guardian and amplifier of the Tamil nation’s cause. Here are concrete steps and precautions for diaspora Tamils in view of the upcoming visit and the broader 2025 context:

1. Monitor and Expose Internal Saboteurs: As discussed, we must keep a close eye on those within our communities who might collaborate (openly or covertly) with the Sri Lankan government to undermine Tamil interests. If you observe community leaders or organization heads taking inexplicable actions – such as secretly meeting Sri Lankan officials or suddenly advocating lenience towards the Sri Lankan State’s narrative – speak up and question them. Engage in discussions in community forums and on social media, asking for transparency and the rationale behind such actions. Do so respectfully but firmly. If their answers are not convincing or if they dismiss accountability concerns, make it known that the community does not endorse their stance. Diaspora organizations often rely on community support and donations; thus, withhold support from any group that acts against our collective interest. The recent incident with CTC and GTF meeting Rajapaksa is a case in point – the outrage it sparked among Tamil Canadians is exactly the kind of healthy community reaction needed to correct course. Let it be known: *any form of collaboration with war criminals or oppressive regimes will result in public censure*. This will deter would-be collaborators. At the same time, celebrate and encourage those diaspora groups and individuals who consistently champion the Tamil cause. We have many unsung heroes in the diaspora who meticulously document abuses, lobby politicians, and keep the flame of justice alive. Support them and elevate their voices. In short, hold our diaspora leadership accountable – doing so is not divisive, it is essential for integrity. *(As Neethan Shan, a Tamil-Canadian school board member, said regarding the Rajapaksa meeting, “We as a community need to come together to condemn these organizations for collaborating with war criminals”. Such clear condemnation is necessary to maintain the moral clarity of our movement.)*

2. Vigilance in Organizations’ Leadership: If you are part of a Tamil diaspora organization (cultural association, advocacy group, etc.), insist on internal checks to ensure no one is deviating from the organization’s stated mission in dealing with Sri Lankan matters. Many diaspora groups have clauses against engaging with Sri Lankan officials or require consensus before any political move – enforce those. Encourage rotation in leadership to prevent any single individual from having unchecked influence that could be exploited by outside parties. In meetings, promote a policy that any outreach from the Sri Lankan government or other potentially compromising entities must be disclosed to the membership. It’s better to debate an issue openly than for a few to decide behind closed doors. This internal democracy acts as a safeguard against collusion. If you suspect an organization’s leader is compromised (for instance, showing unexplained softening towards the Sri Lankan embassy’s line), you may need to organize within the group to demand answers or a change in leadership. It’s not easy but remember *the stakes*: we cannot have another scenario where our collective advocacy is undermined from within.

3. Amplify the Message Internationally: Diaspora Tamils should capitalize on their positions in various countries to amplify the Tamil cause during this period. Organize demonstrations, seminars, and media campaigns around Volker UNHRC High Commissioner Volker Türk’s visit. For example, Tamil communities in Geneva, London, Toronto, Sydney, etc., can hold rallies coinciding with the visit dates, with slogans like “No More Betrayals – Justice for Eelam Tamils” and “UN: Hold Sri Lanka Accountable”. In March 2025, hundreds of diaspora Tamils protested outside the UN in Geneva, demanding justice; such momentum should continue. These actions not only show solidarity with Tamils on the island but also keep international attention focused. Write op-eds or letters to the editors in your local newspapers about why UNHRC High Commissioner Volker Türk’s visit matters and what Sri Lanka needs to do. Use social media to trend hashtags related to Tamil justice during the visit. Diaspora youth, in particular, are savvy with digital campaigns – perhaps organize a worldwide Twitter storm addressing @UNHumanRights and @volker_turk with key facts (for instance: “96,000 pieces of evidence, yet no justice #SriLanka #TamilGenocide”). The diaspora’s voice can counter the Sri Lankan state’s PR globally. Also, diaspora groups should brief friendly lawmakers in their countries to issue statements. We want a chorus of international concern that Mr. Türk cannot ignore when he is in Colombo.

4. Support Tamil Activists on the Ground: Being vigilant also means being supportive. Those in the homeland who speak up take significant risks. Diaspora can help by providing platforms and protection. For example, if a Tamil activist in Mannar prepares a report for Mr. Türk, a diaspora organization could help get that report translated, printed, and delivered securely. If activists face reprisals, diaspora groups can fund legal help or asylum if it comes to that. Always keep lines open with contacts on the ground – ask them what they need in this time. Something as simple as amplifying their statements can be a shield; when local Tamil groups issue press releases or hold protests, make sure the diaspora shares photos and reports of those widely, so the Sri Lankan authorities know the *world is watching*. This in itself can mitigate risk and is an act of vigilance – it signals to potential perpetrators of repression that any harm to activists will have international repercussions.

5. Stay Informed and Educate the Community: Vigilance requires knowledge. Diaspora Tamils should stay informed about developments in Sri Lanka (through reliable Tamil media like Tamil Guardian, TamilNet, Ground views, etc., and reports from NGOs). Share updates within your community circles. Host webinars or town halls to discuss what Anura’s government is doing and how it compares to 2015. Bring experts or eyewitnesses to speak. The more informed the community, the harder it is for anyone to mislead or placate us with false narratives. Education also means remembering our history: observe the anniversaries of events like Mullivaikkal Remembrance, and link them to current demands for justice. A community that remembers its past clearly will not be easily fooled in the present. Encourage especially the younger generation in the diaspora, many of whom were born after the war or left Sri Lanka as children, to learn about these issues so they can carry the torch and not fall for the Sri Lankan state’s attempts to reframe the story.

6. Solidarity and Self-Care: Lastly, being vigilant and active for a long struggle can be draining. The diaspora must practice solidarity among themselves. Look out for burnout and support one another. Build broad alliances – not only among Tamils but with Sinhala and Muslim progressives who genuinely support justice, and with international human rights peers. Our vigilance is not about insularity; it’s about protecting our community while *welcoming allies who come in good faith*. So remain open to coalition-building, but always anchored by the Tamil people’s core interests. And take care of your well-being – a sustainable movement needs healthy, motivated individuals. Recharge when needed, knowing others will cover and that this is a collective marathon, not a sprint.

In issuing this call to action, we emphasize: Diaspora Tamils are an integral part of the Tamil nation’s quest for justice and dignity. You are often the first line of defence against international apathy and the first to call out betrayal. Continue that role with renewed commitment. Be the eyes and voice of those who have been silenced in Sri Lanka. Through vigilance, unity, and tireless advocacy, ensure that no betrayal–whether by international bodies, the Sri Lankan state, or misguided actors in our midst–goes unchecked or unchallenged. Together, let us make it clear that the *Tamil struggle is alive*, and we will not be fooled or subdued.

Conclusion: No More Illusions, No More Silence 

As Volker UNHRC High Commissioner Volker Türk’s visit approaches, the Tamil people stand at a decisive moment. We extend a cautious welcome to the High Commissioner – hopeful that he will hear our plea yet determined not to let this become another missed opportunity. The era of blind faith is over. We will engage, but with eyes wide open. The lessons of 2015–2019 have been seared into our collective memory: *never again* will we allow ourselves to be led into a dead-end by pretty words and token gestures.

This time, we take control of the narrative. We will remind the world that Sri Lanka’s democratic change of guards does not automatically equate to justice for Tamils. We will spotlight every broken promise and every ongoing injustice. We will support our advocates who speak truth, and we will call out those who stray or deceive. Our message to the United Nations and the world is simple: *do not underestimate the Tamil people’s resolve.* We have survived genocide, we have weathered betrayals, and we are still fighting for the right to remember our dead, for the freedom of our living, and the dignity of our future generations.

In the words of a protest banner seen in Geneva this March, “Justice delayed is justice denied.” Tamils have been denied justice for far too long, but we will continue to demand it, louder and clearer than ever. Mr. Volker Türk must do his duty by acknowledging these demands and not falling prey to Colombo’s charades. We, for our part, will make sure he is equipped with the truth.

Finally, to every Tamil–be you in Jaffna, Toronto, London, Sydney, Colombo or anywhere else – this is a time for unity and vigilance. Let the spirit of our struggle guide us: the spirit that kept alive the hope for freedom through decades of war and oppression. Let no one dilute that spirit with false promises. Let no one hijack that spirit for their agenda. Each of us is a guardian of our nation’s cause. Stay alert, stay organized, and stay strong.

No more betrayals. The world must know that the Tamil nation remains watchful and steadfast. And one day, with our perseverance, justice and freedom shall prevail.

சிந்தனை புரிந்து செயற்படுவோம். எச்சரிக்கையுடன் எழுச்சி கொள்வோம்”.

Let us think and act. Let us rise with vigilance.

Sources:

1. Tamil Solidarity (2015, October 3). *United Nations 2015 – Tamils: abandoned and betrayed… again (Part 1)*. [Analysis of UNHRC 2015 resolution and its shortcomings, calling it a betrayal of Tamil trust.]

2. Tamil Solidarity (2015, October 14). *United Nations 2015 – Tamils: abandoned and betrayed… again (Part 2)*. [Discussion of Tamil representatives’ positions; notes how TNA’s compromise strengthened the Sri Lankan Government.]

3. Sunday Times (Sri Lanka) (2025, June 1). *“UNHRC chief Türk to visit Lanka this month”*. [News confirming Volker UNHRC High Commissioner Volker Türk’s visit; outlines Sri Lankan Government’s continued opposition to international accountability mechanisms.]

4. Tamil Guardian (2023, Dec 18). *“‘A betrayal beyond belief’ – Tamil Canadians vent their fury at CTC after meeting with Rajapaksa.”*. [Article detailing the backlash against diaspora groups (CTC/GTF) for meeting Mahinda Rajapaksa; includes quotes condemning the collaboration.]

5. Colombo Gazette / Sunday Leader (2016, Feb 7). *“Mixed expectations on Zeid’s visit.”*. [Report during UN High Commissioner Zeid’s 2016 visit, noting both progress and skepticism; includes GTF President Father Emmanuel’s remarks about not punishing Sri Lanka but seeking justice.]

6. Jehan Perera – Colombo Telegraph (2015, March 8). *“Tamil Diaspora Is Becoming Part Of Larger Sri Lankan Community.”*. [Opinion piece describing the Sri Lankan Government’s outreach to the Tamil diaspora in 2015 and its implications.]

7. Academic Journal of Global Security Studies (Craven, 2022). *“Constraining Tamil Transnational Political Action…”*. [Study on how Tamil diaspora activism is surveilled and constrained; mentions diaspora returnees facing oppression and the continuation of security-state practices post-2015.]

8. The Diplomat (2019, Nov 27). *“Human Rights, Reconciliation, and Peace in Sri Lanka Under Gotabaya Rajapaksa.”* (Interview with Taylor Dibbert). [Expert analysis stating the 2015 coalition government was insincere about transitional justice, and describing the failure of that agenda.]

9. Tamil Guardian (2025, Mar 5). *“Tamils protest at UN in Geneva as Sri Lanka is discussed at Human Rights Council.”*. [Report on a diaspora protest in Geneva during UNHRC session 58, highlighting ongoing human rights issues and noting that despite President Anura’s claims, militarization and impunity continue.]

10. IBC Tamil (2025, Feb 7). *“டயஸ்போராவை திருப்திப்படுத்தும் அநுர அரசு : சாடும் எம்.பி”*. [Tamil news article: “Anura government appeasing diaspora: criticizes MP.” Details SLPP MP’s accusation that the new government is acting to satisfy diaspora/Tamil groups by targeting Mahinda Rajapaksa, indicating a view that these actions are cosmetic.]

*(Additional references were used in analysis, including Freedom From Torture (2020) reports on post-2015 torture, but the above sources are the most directly relevant and cited in the statement.)*

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