Colombo in Revolt (July 2025): Unrest, Austerity, and the Return of People Power

By Wimal Navaratnam, Human Rights Activist

Tariff Hikes and Persistent Injustice Are Igniting Sri Lanka’s July 2025 Protests


Colombo in Revolt: Unrest, Austerity, and the Return of People Power

July 18, 2025, Brampton, Ontario, Canada.

Economic Hardship & Austerity: Sri Lanka’s ongoing economic crisis since 2019 has been a major catalyst for public unrest. Despite a change in government, economic mismanagement and austerity remain pressing issues in mid-2025. Public services, especially healthcare, have deteriorated sharply. The new Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)-led administration’s budget cuts (in line with IMF austerity directives) have slashed funding for essential services like health, leading to shortages of medicines and critical supplies. These cuts have undermined citizens’ welfare, fueling anger among the public and professionals (e.g., doctors staging protests over lack of medicines). Rising cost-of-living – higher taxes, tariff hikes (notably electricity rates raised by ~15% in June 2025), and sustained inflation – have continued to spark demonstrations. The JVP/NPP government, despite coming to power on an anti-crisis mandate, faces growing disillusionment for not alleviating everyday economic pain.

Electricity Sector Reforms & Tariffs: A specific flashpoint has been proposed reforms to the electricity sector. In early July 2025, trade unions of the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) threatened massive protests over a new Electricity Amendment Bill they see as harmful to the industry and workers. Atop this, the June tariff hike (15%, effective June 12) – allegedly to meet IMF cost-covering targets – has angered consumers and unions alike. The JVP-linked “Jana Aragalaya” (People’s Struggle) movement organized demonstrations in various regions against these electricity price increases, underscoring public resentment over austerity-driven policies. The unions accuse the government of a “conspiracy to hand over Sri Lanka’s energy sector to India,” reflecting nationalist concerns about sovereignty in public utilities.

Legacy of the Aragalaya (People’s Uprising): The period around July 9, 2025 marks the third anniversary of the historic 2022 Aragalaya protests that toppled President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. This date has symbolic significance, and groups planned commemorative protests. The public sees parallels between 2022 and 2025: back then, severe shortages and corruption led to a united citizen movement. Today, despite a new government, many root problems persist (debt burdens, corruption probes, stalled reforms). The media noted “9 July remains a turning point in Sri Lanka’s socio-political history”, as it showed that “failing the nation will result in public outcry”. By July 2025, frustration grows that the promises of that uprising – economic stability, reduced corruption, and accountability – remain unfulfilled, nudging people back to the streets.

Human Rights and Ethnic Issues: Underlying social grievances also drive protests. The Tamil minority’s demands have resurfaced prominently this month. On July 15, 2025, over 100 Tamil landowners from Valikamam North (Jaffna) traveled to Colombo and staged a peaceful protest outside the Presidential Secretariat. They called for return of ancestral lands still occupied by the military since the civil war, holding signs like “Release our ancestral lands back to us.” These lands were seized decades ago during the war as “high security zones,” yet remain under military control 16+ years after the conflict ended. The protest reflects mounting frustration among war-affected Tamil civilians over delayed justice and unkept promises of land restitution. Similarly, Muslim groups protested earlier (January 2025) against the government’s plan to deport rescued Rohingya refugees. These events show that ethnic and religious grievances – perceived discrimination, unresolved war legacies, and crackdowns on minorities – are feeding Colombo’s protest scene alongside economic issues.

Opposition to Repressive Laws: There is also a democratic dissent dimension. Activists and students have been protesting what they view as the government’s authoritarian turn: continued use of draconian laws (like the Prevention of Terrorism Act, PTA), and new bills (e.g., an Online Safety Act) to stifle dissent. Incidents such as the arrest of student leaders (e.g., 27 students including the IUSF convener in March 2025) and the summoning of activists (e.g., a women’s rights activist interrogated in May) have triggered public demonstrations. The civic space in Sri Lanka is rated “repressed,” and each crackdown or controversial arrest (e.g., detaining youth under PTA for peaceful activism) has sparked protest backlash. Thus, defending civil liberties and opposing what is seen as state repression under the new government are additional causes galvanizing protests.

In summary, the Colombo protests of July 2025 are multi-faceted in origin: driven by economic hardships (austerity, tariff hikes, inflation), disillusionment with unrelieved crisis, symbolic anniversaries of past struggles, minority rights and post-war justice issues, and resistance to any authoritarian clampdown on dissent.

Groups Involved in the Protests

Ordinary Citizens & Aragalaya Veterans: As in 2022, a cross-section of civil society is involved. The protests draw ordinary Sri Lankans burdened by the cost-of-living crisis – from working-class communities to middle-class families who feel their economic situation has not improved. Some are veterans of the 2022 “Aragalaya” movement. The spirit of Aragalaya lives on in 2025: activists who helped occupy Galle Face Green and forced Rajapaksa’s resignation are still advocating for systemic change. These individuals bring experience in peaceful mass mobilization, maintaining multi-ethnic unity, and pushing non-partisan demands (like anti-corruption, economic justice, and government accountability).

Trade Unions and Professional Bodies: Organized labor has taken a leading role. The Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) trade unions are at the forefront of one wave of protest, planning large rallies against the Electricity Bill and tariff hikes. They represent thousands of electrical workers worried about job security and national control of resources. Other unions – for example, in the health sector – have also shown activism. The Government Medical Officers’ Association (GMOA) and the Association of Medical Specialists have decried health budget cuts. Allied health graduates held satyagraha campaigns against changes in recruitment, leading to clashes with police in March and May 2025. These groups (students, health workers) coordinate via bodies like the Inter-University Students’ Federation (IUSF) and professional associations, giving the protests structure and leadership.

Political Opposition & Leftist Groups: Elements of the political opposition – though not officially leading – are certainly involved or sympathetic. The Frontline Socialist Party (FSP), a leftist opposition group, planned protests in early 2025 which the police tried to block via court orders. Senior FSP activists (e.g., Duminda Nagamuwa and Pubudu Jayagoda) were specifically targeted by bans forbidding their entry to protest sites. The Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), the main opposition party, organized demonstrations against delayed local elections in February 2024. While in 2025 the opposition’s direct involvement in July protests is not always overt (given that the ruling party itself is the JVP which was formerly opposition), the SJB and others tacitly support anti-government rallies, especially on issues like cost of living and repression.

The JVP/NPP and Left-wing Activists: An interesting dynamic is that the ruling party (JVP/National People’s Power) was once the leader of street protests against the previous regime. Some protests now are led by factions within or formerly allied with the JVP who feel the government is betraying its promises. For instance, JVP’s own mass protest rally earlier in 2025 signaled internal pressure – they protested to demand their government reduce people’s tax burden and living costs. This indicates a faction of JVP activists aligning with public discontent. The broader “Jana Aragalaya” movement, which is loosely associated with leftist and youth activism, continues to mobilize at grassroots levels (e.g., staging decentralized demos against electricity hikes). Thus, there is a complex overlap where activists who helped elect the NPP government are now protesting some of its policies, reflecting ideological commitment to the people over party line.

Ethnic Minority Civil Groups: Tamil civil society organizations have strongly participated in recent Colombo protests. The Valikamam land protest was organized by local groups such as the Mannar Social and Economic Development Organization (MSEDO) and other community associations. They coordinated logistics to bring northern residents to the capital, showing significant mobilization capacity. Tamil diaspora media (e.g., Tamil Guardian) and rights groups also amplified these efforts. Similarly, Muslim organizations (like the North-East Coordination Committee, Muslim Left Front) led the January demonstrations against Rohingya deportations. Women activists from these communities (e.g., Thanseema Dhalan for Rohingya issue) have been notable leaders. These minority-led protests in Colombo indicate the involvement of religious and ethnic rights groups, bringing regional grievances to national attention.

Student Unions & Youth: University students remain a potent force. The IUSF (Inter-University Students’ Federation) continues to spearhead protests on campuses and in Colombo. The arrest of IUSF convener Madushan Chandrajith during a March health-ministry protest sparked outrage. Student groups demand education rights, fair hiring practices, and oppose repression of dissenting youth. Youth activists have also led issue-specific protests – for example, solidarity rallies in Colombo opposing global injustices (e.g., against Israeli actions in Gaza) which have occasionally landed them under PTA detention. These youth networks are savvy, connected to social media (#GoHomeGota was a trend in 2022, continued activism online), and often coordinate with civil society (teachers, lawyers, clergy) to sustain momentum.

Civil Society & NGOs: Broader civil society groups, including human rights NGOs, journalists’ unions, and lawyers, are indirectly part of the mix. Entities like CIVICUS and Amnesty International have highlighted and supported protesters’ causes, condemning crackdowns. Local NGOs (like INFORM) document violations and help mobilize legal support (e.g., challenging protest bans in court). Journalists have also protested restrictions; media organizations decry harassment under the Online Safety Act proposals. While these civil society actors might not pack the streets in large numbers, they play a crucial role via advocacy, raising public awareness, and providing moral legitimacy to the protest movement.

In essence, the groups involved in Colombo’s July 2025 protests are diverse and span society: from trade unionists and students to minority community groups and opposition activists. This multi-sector coalition mirrors the cross-cutting unity seen in 2022’s people’s uprising, albeit now directed at ensuring the new government lives up to its promises and respects rights. The protest coalition remains largely leaderless and citizen-driven, though various organized blocs (unions, student federations, community organizations) coordinate specific events.

Government Response to the Protests

Preventive Measures & Restrictions: The Sri Lankan authorities under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government have often resorted to pre-emptive legal actions to thwart protests. Police frequently seek court orders preventing demonstrations in key areas. For example, ahead of a planned April 2025 rally by the FSP and IUSF, the police obtained a Fort Magistrate’s Court order barring activists from entering Colombo Fort and Galle Face – traditional protest sites. This order explicitly named protest organizers to keep them away. Similarly, during opposition SJB rallies in early 2024, courts issued prohibitory orders (citing public order concerns) to limit protests. These actions illustrate the government’s legal clampdown on assembly rights, often justified as necessary for public safety or “preventing inconvenience to the public.”

Heavy Police Deployment & Surveillance: When protests do occur, the police presence in Colombo has been heavy, with riot squads, Special Task Force (STF) units, and military sometimes on standby. Leaked documents around the July 9 anniversaries show detailed security plans: “07 water cannons, 09 riot police units, roadblocks manned by tri-forces and STF” were prepared to obstruct demonstrators. Police set up surveillance, including filming protest leaders for later identification. Ahead of the July 2022 anniversary, intelligence units closely monitored activists (e.g., WhatsApp groups dedicated to intelligence updates). In July 2025, similar preventative surveillance was likely, given authorities’ wariness of any large gathering. This approach signals a stance of zero tolerance for mass protests near sensitive zones (President’s House, Secretariat).

Use of Force – Tear Gas, Water Cannons, Arrests: The government’s response has involved frequent use of force to disperse crowds. The police have tear-gassed and water-cannoned demonstrations, even when largely peaceful. During student and union protests in Colombo, it’s reported that police fired tear gas at close range, injuring some protesters. Notably, investigative reports revealed that expired tear gas (20 years past expiry) was used extensively during 2022 protests, causing severe health issues for protesters. Arrests are common: in late March 2025, 27 student activists were arrested in a midnight raid on a peaceful sit-in outside the Health Ministry. Protest leaders such as IUSF’s Chandrajith have been detained multiple times. The pretext for arrests often cites violations of court orders or minor infractions (blocking roads, etc.), but rights groups view it as harassment meant to deter dissent. At times, arrests have turned tragically excessive – e.g., a crackdown on an NPP protest in Feb 2023 led to a civilian death, illustrating force escalation.

Demonizing and Intimidating Activists: The administration and police spokesmen also attempt to delegitimize protesters. Officials describe protests as being driven by “narrow political agendas” or label them “extremist” if they involve minority rights or leftist groups. There have been instances of activists being summoned or questioned after protests – e.g., the CID summoning a Muslim activist (Jesumaney Figurado) simply for organizing a rally against Rohingya deportation. Such investigative harassment implies protesters may face surveillance and legal inquiry even after demonstrations, creating a chilling effect. The government has also sustained long-term reprisals against the Aragalaya participants: thousands of cases from 2022 remain pending, meaning many who took part in the earlier uprising are fighting legal battles, which implicitly pressures them to stay off the streets in 2025.

Legislative and Policy Crackdown: Beyond immediate policing, the government has pursued legislative tools to silence dissent. In the first half of 2025, the Dissanayake administration passed new laws restricting protests – for instance, regulations under the Official Secrets Act were broadened in late 2022 to curb demonstrations. Moreover, rather than repealing the draconian PTA as promised, they have continued using it to detain activists (notably, young Muslims pasting Palestine solidarity stickers were held under PTA). A proposed Anti-Terrorism Act and the enacted Online Safety Act are seen by civil rights monitors as means to further suppress free expression and organizing. In May 2025, Amnesty International criticized Sri Lanka for “draconian legislation and crackdowns on freedom of expression and association” under this government. So, the state response is not just reactive, but also proactive via lawmaking: defining stricter frameworks to preclude protests or punish participants more severely.

Selective Concessions and Dialogue Attempts: Despite the hard stance, there have been a few instances of the government engaging with protesters or offering negotiations, especially on non-political grievances. For example, after the Jaffna Tamil landowners protested on July 15, some representatives were invited to discussions at the Presidential Secretariat. While the outcome is unknown, it indicates a willingness to talk in the face of persistent protest. Similarly, faced with nationwide discontent on tariffs, there were statements from officials defending their stance (like Deputy Ministers justifying the US tariff issues as a positive challenge). On certain issues (e.g., electricity reforms), ministers have publicly said they’d listen to concerns, though no major policy reversal has occurred yet. These limited concessions seem aimed at diffusing tension without ceding core policies. The overall pattern, however, skews toward security-first responses rather than dialogue.

International Scrutiny and Government Reaction: The government is mindful of its international image. As global rights bodies and some foreign governments (UK, Canada, etc.) criticize the crackdown, Sri Lanka’s leaders at forums like the UNHRC pledge improvements. President Dissanayake initially promised to address human rights concerns, but progress is minimal. The authorities often dismiss foreign critiques as interference, doubling down on national security justifications. Nonetheless, fear of jeopardizing foreign aid or IMF deals means the regime calibrates force to some degree – e.g., avoiding mass bloodshed, using curfews when expecting big protests (as done in 2022), and quickly containing unrest to reassure stability.

Summary of Government Response: It has been characterized by a firm stance against public demonstrations, employing legal barriers, strong police action (tear gas, water cannons, arrests), and intimidation of organizers. The approach is consistent with the “repressed” civic space rating Sri Lanka holds. While occasional dialogue or minor concessions occur, the overarching response seeks to prevent protests from gaining momentum – a stark contrast to the free rein protesters had in early 2022. Ironically, the current government’s methods mirror the Rajapaksa and Wickremesinghe administrations they once opposed, suggesting a continuity of state machinery prioritizing order over protest freedoms. This has drawn sharp criticism from rights organizations, which urge the government to “end the fierce clampdown and demonization of protesters”.

Broader Implications of the July 2025 Protests

Political Implications – Strain on the Ruling Coalition: The resurgence of protests in Colombo just months after the National People’s Power (NPP) government took office signals a precarious political future. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s administration risks losing legitimacy among the very populace that voted for change. The JVP/NPP came to power riding the wave of Aragalaya’s demands, promising a new style of governance. Now, public unrest over austerity and repression suggests that goodwill is eroding. If the government continues to be seen as failing the people or betraying its platform (e.g., not abolishing PTA, not alleviating hardship), it could face internal rifts and defections. Already, the fact that the JVP had to stage a protest against its own government’s economic policies reveals internal tensions. In the broader spectrum, the opposition SJB might capitalize on this discontent, potentially forming coalitions branding the NPP government as authoritarian (reports mention opposition discussions of a coalition against “suppression”). Thus, these protests could reshape party alliances and narratives heading into future elections. The unrest serves as a barometer of public opinion: if sustained, it could force cabinet reshuffles or policy U-turns, or even an early election push by the opposition, arguing the NPP has lost the people’s trust.

Social Implications – Civic Empowerment vs. Fatigue: On one hand, the continuity of protests indicates Sri Lankan civil society remains mobilized and empowered post-Aragalaya. The multi-ethnic, multi-class nature of demonstrations (from Tamil land rights to CEB workers’ rights) shows that citizens see protest as a legitimate means to press for change, preserving democratic activism gained in 2022. This could embed a culture of accountability – Sri Lankans now expect to hold leaders accountable in the streets if necessary. On the other hand, protest fatigue and frustration could set in if tangible results remain elusive. Nearly three years of crises and protests may lead to disillusionment, especially if the government remains unresponsive. There’s a risk of public apathy or emigration if people lose hope in change through protest or ballot. The outcome may depend on whether these July 2025 protests win any victories (policy changes, release of prisoners, etc.). If yes, it will reinforce the power of peaceful assembly; if no, it could dampen the spirit of civic activism or radicalize segments of protesters into considering more extreme measures.

Economic Implications – Reform Trajectory and Stability: Frequent protests and a government crackdown create an atmosphere of instability that can affect Sri Lanka’s fragile economy. Investor confidence and tourism – both critical for recovery – may falter if Colombo frequently faces unrest or if images of crackdown circulate internationally. The government is trying to implement IMF-mandated reforms (tax hikes, utility pricing, reducing subsidies). Public resistance to these reforms, expressed via protests, puts the government in a bind: relent to protesters and risk derailing the IMF program (and thus economic aid), or push ahead and face escalating social unrest. A prolonged standoff could slow economic recovery by delaying reforms or requiring more security expenditures. Conversely, if the government judiciously adjusts policies in response (perhaps tempering the pace of austerity), it might alleviate social pressures and allow a smoother reform path. Additionally, the US’s new 30% tariff on Sri Lankan exports (effective August 1, 2025) already threatens the economy. If protests expand due to resultant job losses (e.g., apparel sector layoffs), Sri Lanka could face twin crises: economic contraction worsened by political unrest. Thus, these protests serve as an economic warning signal: the populace’s capacity to absorb more economic pain is limited, and mismanagement of dissent could scare off the economic lifelines needed for recovery.

Human Rights & International Relations: The government’s handling of these protests is under scrutiny globally, which can influence Sri Lanka’s international standing. Western nations and UN bodies have Sri Lanka on a human rights watchlist, especially after the civil war and 2022 crackdown. A continued crackdown on peaceful protesters in 2025 could jeopardize trade concessions (like EU’s GSP+ trade preferences tied to rights compliance) and sour relations with partners. The US tariff imposition itself might be partly influenced by concerns beyond pure trade, possibly including governance signals. If Colombo’s streets keep seeing tear gas and arrests, countries championing democratic values might become less inclined to assist Sri Lanka’s financial revival. On the other hand, addressing protesters’ concerns constructively could improve Sri Lanka’s reputation as a reforming democracy. For instance, genuinely engaging Tamil land protesters and making progress on reconciliation would earn goodwill domestically and abroad (especially India, which watches Tamil issues). In summary, the protests are a fork in the road for human rights: the government’s choices will either move Sri Lanka towards a more open society or back towards international pariah status reminiscent of its past.

Implications for Minority Relations and Reconciliation: The active participation of Tamil and Muslim communities in Colombo protests highlights unresolved ethnic tensions. Their peaceful protests (and the state’s response to them) could significantly impact ethnic reconciliation efforts. If the government addresses issues like land returns or halts the Rohingya deportations due to protests, it could build trust with minorities. However, if it ignores or suppresses these protests, it could deepen ethnic alienation. For example, Tamil protesters having to come to Colombo to beg for their own land is in itself a statement of desperation. How that is resolved will factor into Sri Lanka’s long-term unity. The broader implication is that sustainable peace isn’t achievable without responding to these peaceful campaigns – these protests are a chance for healing or harm. Every baton charge or dismissal of minority grievances in Colombo reinforces the narrative of second-class citizenship, which can have long-term destabilizing effects beyond the capital.

Timeline of Key Events (July 1, 2025 – Present)

Date

Event

Details & Outcome

July 1–3, 2025

Rising Tensions Over Economic Issues

Public frustration grows as electricity tariff hikes (effective June 12) hit bills. Unions begin meetings in Colombo to plan responses. The government stands by IMF-driven increases despite murmurs of discontent.

July 4–8, 2025

Calls to Protest July 9 (Aragalaya Anniversary)

Activist groups circulate calls for a massive anti-government protest on July 9 in Colombo, marking 3 years since the 2022 uprising. Police obtain court bans for key areas (Colombo Fort, Galle Face) to preempt large gatherings. Security deployment plans are drawn up, anticipating crowds.

July 9, 2025

Heightened Security; Minor Clashes

Morning: Colombo under tight security – roadblocks, riot squads on alert. Few manage to gather near Galle Face due to restrictions.<br> Throughout Day: Small-scale commemorative protests occur indoors or in suburbs, chanting “Aragalaya lives.” Heavy police presence discourages a mass rally.<br> Evening: Activists hold a vigil, which ends peacefully but tensely. No repeat of 2022 storming, but the date underscores enduring dissent.

July 10, 2025

Government Justifies Hard Line

In a press briefing, authorities defend preventing the July 9 rally. They cite the need to “maintain public order” and avoid “inconvenience” to the public. Rights groups condemn the stifling of a peaceful anniversary event. Meanwhile, Deputy Minister Arun Hemachandra hails tariff negotiations with the US as a positive amid public concern over looming export losses, trying to assuage economic anxiety.

July 13, 2025

JVP/NPP Internal Rifts Emerge

Colombo: The ruling JVP’s newspaper, “The Morning,” publishes a retrospective op-ed acknowledging 9 July 2022 as a lesson about people’s power. It warns the current government (their own) not to lose sight of that. Hints of division between the NPP government’s actions and JVP’s grassroots expectations become public. Opposition politicians seize on this, urging the government to heed protesters or face collapse.

July 15, 2025

Tamil Landowners’ Protest in Colombo

Over 100 Tamil landowners from Valikamam North (Jaffna) protest outside the Presidential Secretariat, demanding the return of military-occupied lands. They carry banners “Release our ancestral lands.” Police surround them; no violence occurs. Aftermath: A delegation of protesters meets officials, who promise to convey their demands to the President. Protesters vow to continue until concrete action.

July 16, 2025

Addressing Electricity Issues?

Colombo: CEB trade unions announce a date (July 22) for their major protest in front of CEB HQ. Government, sensing scale, invites union leaders for talks. No resolution yet, but media report the planned protest widely. Separately, Verit̩ Research notes Tamil press highlighting the land protest and Sinhala press focusing on economic fears (e.g., apparel industry and US tariffs) Рrevealing a north-south priority split but shared discontent.

July 18, 2025 (Present)

Multi-Issue Protests Continue

Colombo sees a protest by civil society activists decrying “atrocities in the North and South” – joining human rights concerns across communities. Meanwhile, Muslim groups plan renewed demonstrations urging humane treatment of refugees and end to PTA abuses, citing the months-long detention of youth like Mohammad Suhail (recently bailed after 9 months under PTA). The government is under pressure on multiple fronts: economic unions, ethnic rights, and civil liberties advocates, all converging in the capital’s ongoing climate of dissent.

(Table: Chronology of notable protest-related events in Colombo from July 1 to July 18, 2025, with emphasis on their cause and immediate outcomes.)



In conclusion, the protests in Colombo since July 1, 2025, reflect deep-seated and unresolved issues in Sri Lanka’s post-crisis trajectory. Their causes span from acute economic grievances and unpopular austerity measures to historic ethnic injustices and democratic rights concerns. The groups involved form a broad coalition reminiscent of the 2022 uprising – including trade unions, students, minority community members, and both opposition and ruling-party grassroots – showcasing remarkable unity in diversity. The government’s response has been wary and forceful: relying on legal barriers, police crackdowns, and surveillance, indicating continuity of a “security state” mindset that risks contradicting the very mandate of change it was elected on.

The broader implications are significant. Politically, these protests are testing the resilience and direction of the new government and could redefine Sri Lanka’s leadership landscape. Socially, they are either cementing a culture of civic participation or risking public despair if unanswered. Economically, the unrest warns policymakers that without social buy-in, recovery efforts may falter. And on the human rights stage, how Sri Lanka navigates this dissent will speak to its democratic character and its reconciliation with all citizens.

In essence, Colombo’s July 2025 protests are both a symptom and a catalyst: a symptom of unmet needs and promises, and potentially a catalyst pressing the nation toward more inclusive and responsive governance. The coming weeks will reveal whether the administration addresses the roots of discontent or suppresses it – a choice that will shape Sri Lanka’s journey from crisis to stability in the aftermath of its 2022 people’s revolution.

Throughout, what remains clear is that the legacy of protest (Aragalaya) in Sri Lanka is alive. As one observer reflected on the movement, “It belonged to everyone: students, vendors, families of the disappeared, and professionals… transcending narrow identities to create a shared civic space”. The events of July 2025 show that this shared civic space is still vibrant – and its voice will continue to demand change in Colombo’s streets until meaningful progress is achieved.


⚖️ Disclaimer

This document presents information gathered from publicly available sources, community reports, and verified eyewitness accounts related to Tamil-led protests in Sri Lanka during July 2025. The purpose is to amplify voices demanding truth, accountability, and justice in the context of human rights and post-conflict reconciliation. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, some events remain under investigation or have limited official documentation. The views expressed herein reflect community advocacy perspectives and do not represent endorsement or political affiliation.

Readers are encouraged to engage critically, verify facts independently where necessary, and approach the content with empathy and an open mind toward those affected by decades of hardship, displacement, and institutional neglect.

🕊️ Editor’s Note: A Call to the Conscience of the World

The cries for justice echo loud in Sri Lanka’s north, east, and now south—but often fall on deaf ears. The peaceful protests documented here reflect not just the plight of Tamils seeking land, recognition, and healing—but a test for global solidarity. When survivors of war carry placards instead of weapons, when children mourn the graves of the unnamed, and when displaced families plead for their homes decades later, it is no longer a domestic matter. It is a human rights emergency cloaked in civilian resilience.

We urge international bodies—rights organizations, foreign governments, diaspora communities, and compassionate citizens—to:

  • Speak truth to power at forums like the UN Human Rights Council
  • Demand transparent investigations into mass graves, enforced disappearances, and militarized land seizures
  • Advocate for demilitarization, restitution, and repeal of repressive laws like the PTA
  • Ensure economic aid and trade concessions are tied to meaningful rights benchmarks
  • Support grassroots Tamil organizations with funding, platforms, and legal resources

Justice deferred is justice denied. These movements are peaceful, poignant, and enduring. The international community must rise beyond platitudes and take action—because silence, history has shown, is the greatest accomplice to oppression.

Let this record not be merely archived. Let it be answered

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     In solidarity,

     Wimal Navaratnam

     Human Rights Advocate | ABC Tamil Oli (ECOSOC)

      Email: tamilolicanada@gmail.com

 

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