Sampoor Unveiled: Military Campaigns and Civilian Carnage (1985–2009)

Tracing the Convergence of State, Rebel, and Foreign Forces in Trincomalee’s Most Contested Territory

⚖️ Disclaimer

This article is intended solely for scholarly, educational, and humanitarian purposes. The views expressed herein belong to the author and are offered in good faith to contribute to ongoing dialogue and advocacy in the field of human rights and transitional justice. No part of this work is meant to injure or malign any individual, group, institution, ethnicity, faith, or political entity.

The information provided draws from historical records, survivor accounts, and public domain sources, and is presented with the intent to further investigation, accountability, and the protection of human dignity. Readers are encouraged to verify, critique, and expand upon this content to promote informed advocacy, rigorous scholarship, and justice for communities affected by conflict and displacement.

In solidarity,

Wimal Navaratnam

Human Rights Advocate | ABC Tamil Oli (ECOSOC)

Email: tamilolicanada@gmail.com

✍️ Editor’s Note: A Call to the Conscience of the Global Human Rights Community

In regions like Sampoor, truth lies buried—sometimes literally—and silence has long served as a shield for impunity. This report is not an academic exercise in recounting historical conflict. It is a living appeal to practitioners, scholars, and institutions in the human rights ecosystem to act decisively in support of victims whose voices have been marginalized for decades.

We urge readers—particularly those engaged in international law, forensic justice, humanitarian work, and transitional governance—to treat this documentation as an urgent invitation to engage. The recent discovery of mass graves and persistent patterns of violence underscore the need to activate mechanisms within the International Criminal Justice System, and to push for the swift deployment of independent investigations, transparent prosecutions, and survivor-centered reparations.

The pursuit of justice is not linear—it demands the convergence of facts, advocacy, moral clarity, and legal teeth. Let this publication serve as a catalyst, not a conclusion. In the face of structural denial and historical neglect, the global human rights community must stand not just as observers but as architects of justice.

Let us commit not only to documenting truth—but to defending it.

Chronology of Conflict: Sri Lankan, IPKF, and Paramilitary Actions in Trincomalee

Sampoor (also spelled Sampur) and its surrounding region in Trincomalee District was a focal point of Sri Lanka’s civil war, witnessing intense military operations and communal violence. Its strategic location near Trincomalee harbour made it a battleground involving the Sri Lankan security forces, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), Tamil militant and paramilitary groups (notably the LTTE and breakaway factions), and Muslim paramilitary home guards. The following report details each group’s involvement, key events in the area, and identifies suspected perpetrators of major wartime incidents, culminating in a timeline of significant events.

Sri Lankan Forces’ Involvement in Sampoor

The Sri Lankan military and police played a central role in the conflict around Sampoor. In the mid-1980s, amid rising Tamil militancy, government forces launched brutal crackdowns in Trincomalee District, aiming to secure Sinhalese settlements and suppress Tamil insurgents. In 1985, troops and state-backed Home Guards (village militia) carried out pogrom-style attacks on Tamil villages. Over two months, dozens of Tamil villages in areas south of Muttur (Kottiyar Pattu) – including Eechchilampattu, Kattaiparichchan, Sampoor, Chenaiyur, and others – were systematically attacked. Houses were looted and burned, and hundreds of Tamil civilians were killed or disappeared as part of what observers described as ethnic cleansing. For example, on June 13, 1985, roughly 900 homes in Kattaiparichchan, Sampoor, Chenaiyur, and Muttur were torched by Sri Lankan security forces. This campaign drove tens of thousands of Tamils into displacement.

Sri Lankan forces remained active in the region through each phase of the war. After the IPKF period (1987–1990), the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) re-established control and engaged in frequent clashes with the LTTE around Trincomalee. The military also faced allegations of targeting civilians. One notorious incident was the Kumarapuram massacre on February 11, 1996, when Sri Lankan soldiers, joined by local Home Guards, opened fire on Tamil villagers in southern Trincomalee District, killing 26 civilians (including 13 women and 7 children). This reprisal attack, carried out after two soldiers died in an LTTE ambush, saw troops from Dehiwatte Army Camp shouting “death to Tamils” and shooting villagers; even children as young as 3 were hacked with axes. The perpetrators – six army corporals – were later arrested but ultimately acquitted decades later, underscoring impunity for abuses.

In the mid-2000s, the Sri Lankan military launched major offensives to wrest control of LTTE-held areas in Trincomalee, culminating in the Battle of Sampoor (Aug–Sept 2006). After the collapse of a ceasefire, President Mahinda Rajapaksa ordered an assault on Sampoor – an LTTE stronghold across the bay from the vital Trincomalee naval base. Beginning 28 August 2006, the Army advanced on Sampoor, capturing the town by 4 September 2006. This marked the first major territorial shift since the 2002 ceasefire. The government celebrated the victory, but it came at a humanitarian cost – by the LTTE’s account, 97 Tamil civilians were killed, over 215 injured, and 46,000 displaced during the offensive. Many displaced families from Sampoor could not return for years; the area was declared a High Security Zone after its capture and was occupied by the military.

Sri Lankan forces have also been implicated in targeted killings. On August 4, 2006, days after the battle in Muttur town, 17 humanitarian aid workers (16 Tamils and 1 Muslim) with Action Contre la Faim (ACF) were found executed at their compound in Muttur. Independent monitors suspected Army involvement, noting only government-aligned armed personnel were present in the area at the time. A 2008 investigative report named a Sri Lankan Home Guard and two police constables (based in Muttur) as perpetrators, aided by naval special forces who stood by during the massacre. This Muttur massacre of aid workers is considered one of the worst war crimes against humanitarian staff globally. Earlier that year in Trincomalee town, on January 2, 2006, five Tamil students had also been summarily shot dead, allegedly by the elite Police Special Task Force (an incident known as the “Trinco 5” killings). These events deepened local mistrust of the security forces.

Overall, the Sri Lankan security forces’ role in Sampoor oscillated between conventional military campaigns against the LTTE and involvement (direct or indirect) in atrocities against civilians. Key suspected perpetrators from the state side include Sri Lankan Army units (and Navy in support) in the 1985 scorched-earth operations, Army soldiers and Sinhalese Home Guards in massacres like Kumarapuram, and Army/police personnel (potentially with allied paramilitaries) in incidents such as the ACF aid-worker killings. Their actions shaped Sampoor’s wartime fate, at tremendous cost to the civilian population.

Indian Forces (IPKF) Involvement

Indian forces were drawn into the Sampoor/Trincomalee conflict during 1987–1990 as part of the Indo–Lanka Accord. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was deployed to the Eastern Province (including Trincomalee) in July 1987, initially as a neutral force to enforce a truce between Colombo and Tamil militants. However, the IPKF soon found itself entangled in the war. In Trincomalee, Indian troops took over security duties from the Sri Lankan military, which had to confine itself to barracks per the Accord. This power vacuum and shifting authority led to chaotic violence.

Shortly after the IPKF’s arrival, long-simmering ethnic tensions flared into the 1987 Eastern Province massacres, a series of mob attacks largely targeting Sinhalese residents. From late September to early October 1987, over 200 Sinhalese civilians were killed and some 20,000 fled as refugees. Tamil mobs and LTTE fighters attacked Sinhalese villages and neighborhoods in Trincomalee and Batticaloa, burning homes, buses, and even attacking a train in a pogrom-like campaign. Indian forces were widely criticized for failing to stop the carnage and even appearing complicit. According to survivors, the IPKF did little to prevent Tamil militant violence and in some cases actively blocked Sri Lankan troops from intervening. Notably, Sinhalese witnesses accused a Tamil-majority “Madrasi” regiment of the IPKF of siding with Tamil rioters, supplying them with gasoline for arson and looting Sinhalese properties.

There were also instances of direct IPKF violence against civilians in the area. On October 4, 1987, Indian soldiers enforcing order in Trincomalee fired on a crowd of Sinhalese protestors, killing a Buddhist monk. The same day, IPKF troops attacked the Sinhalese colony of Abeypura near Trincomalee, committing assault, arson, and murder of Sinhalese villagers. These actions inflamed local sentiments – President J.R. Jayewardene had to urge the IPKF to restore order or risk being asked to leave, given rising anger that Indian forces were overstepping their peacekeeping role.

By 1988–89, the IPKF was openly at war with the LTTE across Sri Lanka’s northeast. In the Trincomalee region (including Sampoor), they conducted counter-insurgency operations to root out Tigers. Alongside conventional battles, the IPKF’s tenure was marred by human rights abuses. Amnesty International documented torture, extrajudicial killings, and 43 enforced disappearances in the north and east during the IPKF period. While many abuses occurred in Jaffna during major offensives, Tamil civilians in the East also fell victim to harsh crackdowns as the Indians tried to eliminate LTTE fighters.

Indian forces eventually withdrew by March 1990, having lost over 1,000 soldiers in the ill-fated mission. Their involvement in Sampoor’s wartime history is remembered with ambivalence and bitterness. On one hand, the IPKF checked some LTTE expansion and helped form a short-lived provincial administration with moderate Tamil groups. On the other, Indian troops were suspected perpetrators of violence against both Sinhalese and Tamil civilians: complicity in the 1987 anti-Sinhalese pogrom, and heavy-handed tactics that mirrored the counter-insurgency brutality of the Sri Lankan Army. This legacy earned the IPKF nicknames like “Innocent People Killing Force” among locals. Their departure set the stage for Sri Lankan forces to reassert control – and for the civil war in the East to enter a new, even bloodier phase in the 1990s.

Tamil Militant and Paramilitary Groups

Tamil armed groups – both insurgents and pro-government paramilitaries – were deeply involved in the conflict around Sampoor. The most powerful was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who viewed Trincomalee (and its natural harbour) as part of the Tamil Eelam homeland. The LTTE established a significant presence in Muttur East (including Sampoor), especially after 1990 when Sri Lankan forces retreated to town centers. Sampoor became an LTTE stronghold, used to launch attacks on government-held Trincomalee and to menace the naval base with artillery. LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran even envisioned Trincomalee as the capital of Tamil Eelam, highlighting the region’s symbolic importance.

During the war, Tamil militants carried out deadly offensives and reprisals in the region. In the mid-1980s, following state-aided colonization and anti-Tamil violence, the LTTE hit back at Sinhalese targets. For instance, on April 17, 1987, LTTE cadres ambushed a bus near Trincomalee (at Aluth Oya), massacring over 100 Sinhalese civilians. Later that year, amid IPKF deployment, LTTE and other Tamil fighters led coordinated attacks that killed dozens of Sinhalese villagers across Trincomalee and Batticaloa. The LTTE also turned against Muslim civilians in the East during the 1990s. Though Sampoor itself was predominantly Tamil, nearby Muttur town was mostly Muslim. In the “Black August” of 1990, LTTE units infamously massacred Muslim worshippers in the Eastern Province – e.g. the Kattankudy mosque massacre (3 August 1990) where 147 men and boys were gunned down during prayers. Around the same time, Muslim villagers in the Muttur area were attacked and killed, contributing to a climate of terror and communal rupture (scores of Muslims in Trincomalee District were murdered or expelled by LTTE operations in 1990). The Tigers justified some of these as retaliation or to pre-empt alleged “traitors,” but human rights groups condemned them as ethnic cleansing.

Even as the LTTE terrorized civilians of other communities, internal rifts produced Tamil-on-Tamil violence. Several Tamil paramilitary groups operated in Trincomalee with covert or open support from the Sri Lankan state, often composed of former Tamil militants. During the IPKF era, India backed groups like the EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Left Front) to form a provincial administration; when the LTTE refused to join, these groups and the Tigers clashed. After the IPKF’s exit, most moderate Tamil militants were suppressed by the LTTE or fled. However, by the early 2000s, a new schism emerged: Colonel Karuna (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan), the LTTE’s Eastern commander, broke away in 2004 along with a cadre of Eastern fighters. Karuna’s faction, later formalized as the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), became the main Army-aligned Tamil paramilitary in the East. Assisted by military intelligence, the Karuna Group engaged in a “shadow war” against the LTTE and their supporters, particularly in Batticaloa and Trincomalee. They supplied valuable local intelligence to the Army during operations like Sampoor (2006), and in return the Army tolerated their running of rackets. The TMVP was notorious for extortion, kidnappings, and assassinations – targeting Tamil civilians suspected of LTTE links and even Muslim and Sinhalese businessmen for ransom. Their presence sowed fear in Eastern communities; for example, around Trincomalee, Karuna’s men (later led by his deputy Pillayan) abducted and killed Tamil civilians in the chaos of 2006, often operating jointly with Army patrols.

Other paramilitary groups included remnants of older militias: the EPRLF (Razeek group), PLOTE, and EPDP all had small armed units that collaborated with the Army in the 1990s. In Trincomalee, the EPRLF’s Razeek Brigade – named after a rebel-turned-government militia leader – acted as an auxiliary force, manning checkpoints and striking at LTTE operatives. These groups were implicated in reprisal killings. For instance, Tamil paramilitaries working with Sri Lankan forces are believed to have aided the Army in massacres like the 17 ACF aid workers in 2006, by identifying victims or participating directly.

Suspected perpetrators among Tamil groups in the Sampoor theatre thus fall into two broad categories: LTTE fighters, responsible for guerrilla attacks and atrocities (e.g. massacres of Sinhalese villagers in 1987 and of Muslim civilians in the 1990s); and Tamil paramilitaries aligned with Colombo, who assisted or executed operations against the LTTE and were linked to abductions and killings of Tamil non-combatants (such as the TMVP’s campaign of assassinations in 2005–2007). Both contributed significantly to the violence that wracked the Sampoor region.

Muslim Paramilitary Groups’ Role

The Muslim community in eastern Trincomalee was caught in the middle of the Tamil–Sinhalese conflict and at times drawn into its own armed mobilization. As LTTE-Muslim relations deteriorated sharply around 1990, the government saw an opportunity to cultivate Muslim militias as a buffer against Tamil rebels. President Premadasa (1989–1993) authorized the arming of Muslim home guards in the East. By the early 1990s, around 500 Muslim youth were trained at the Konduwattuwan Army camp in Ampara and deployed as Home Guard units (village defense forces) in Muslim-majority areas. These Muslim paramilitaries were ostensibly to protect Muslim villages from LTTE attacks – a necessity after horrific massacres like at Kattankudy. However, they often became embroiled in revenge violence, targeting Tamil civilians in retaliation. As one analysis noted, once armed and encouraged by the state, some Muslim home guards “ended up committing atrocities against innocent Tamil civilians, following in the footsteps of their masters”. This tit-for-tat bloodshed deepened the rift between Tamil and Muslim communities.

Notable incidents involving Muslim paramilitaries include the Alanchipothana massacre of April 1992, where LTTE guerillas killed 69 Muslims in a village raid. In response, Muslim home guards allegedly attacked the Tamil village of Muthugala, killing 49 Tamil civilians in revenge. Such cycle killings were tragically frequent in the Trincomalee-Batticaloa region. Another infamous case was the Palliyagodella massacre (Oct 1992) in the Polonnaruwa border area, when LTTE cadres slaughtered 187 Muslim villagers. Surviving Muslims formed vigilante groups (often labeled “Jihad” by the LTTE) to counter the Tigers. The so-called “Jihad” units were essentially ad hoc Muslim militias tacitly backed by elements of the military in the early 1990s. The LTTE, in turn, cited the existence of these Muslim paramilitary groups as justification for further expulsions and attacks, accusing Muslims of colluding with the army against Tamil interests.

In the Sampoor vicinity, Muttur town and nearby Muslim villages became bases for armed Muslim home guards. These units coordinated with the Army during security operations and manned roadblocks. However, tensions remained high. In 2006, when the LTTE briefly laid siege to Muttur and surrounding areas, Muslim civilians and home guards fought back alongside the Army. Fears of LTTE retaliation led to thousands of Muslims fleeing, showing how volatile the situation was. High-ranking Muslim politicians (like M.H.M. Ashraff of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress) had earlier lobbied for better protection – even suggesting a dedicated Muslim Regiment in the Sri Lankan Army in the 1980s. Though an official “Muslim Battalion” only materialized in 2007 (as the Civil Defence Force), in practice Muslim paramilitary presence had been felt since the 1980s.

Suspected perpetrators on the Muslim side primarily involve Home Guard militias engaging in reprisal killings of Tamil civilians. The 1992 Muthugala incident is one example where Muslim guards are believed to have massacred Tamil villagers after an LTTE attack. Earlier, in 1985’s violence, some Muslim individuals joined Sinhalese mobs in attacking Tamils in Trincomalee, though the home guard system then was mostly Sinhalese. By the mid-’90s, Muslim paramilitaries were effectively part of the counter-insurgency apparatus. For instance, during the Kumarapuram massacre (1996), Army soldiers were “accompanied by Home Guards from Dehiwatte” – those home guards in that area were largely Sinhalese, but it illustrates how militia fighters operated alongside troops. In predominantly Muslim areas like Kinniya and Muttur, Muslim home guards were reportedly involved in detaining or identifying Tamil suspects for the Army, blurring lines between self-defense and vigilantism.

Thus, Muslim paramilitary groups played a dual role in the Sampoor conflict theater: as victims and targets of LTTE ethnic violence, and as agents of retributive violence against Tamil civilians (often under state sanction). This dynamic contributed to mutual atrocities and the fragmentation of Eastern Sri Lanka’s social fabric during the war.

Timeline of Major Events and Suspected Perpetrators

Below is a chronological timeline highlighting key wartime events in the Sampoor/Trincomalee region, along with the groups believed to be responsible:

May–Sept 1985 – Anti-Tamil Pogrom:

Sri Lankan security forces and Sinhalese home guards attack Tamil villages across Trincomalee District. In late May, dozens of Tamil civilians are massacred in places like Dehiwatte, Mahindapura, and Echchilampattu. By June, entire Tamil settlements (Kilivetti, Sampoor, Kattaiparichchan, etc.) are looted and burned, with hundreds killed or missing. Perpetrators: Sri Lankan Army, police, and Sinhalese militia.

April 1987 – Guerrilla Massacres:

In retaliation for state violence, the LTTE targets Sinhalese civilians. On 17 April 1987, an LTTE unit ambushes a bus near Aluth Oya, killing over 100 Sinhalese (including Buddhist monks). Subsequent attacks in Kantale and other border villages kill dozens more. Perpetrators: LTTE.

July 1987 – Indian Intervention:

India deploys the IPKF in Trincomalee under the Indo-Lanka Accord. Sri Lankan forces pull back. Tamil militants initially observe a truce.

Sept–Oct 1987 – Eastern Province Massacres:

After a political dispute (LTTE hunger strike and IPKF-LTTE tensions), anti-Sinhalese riots erupt in Trincomalee. 29 Sept – 8 Oct 1987: Tamil mobs and LTTE fighters kill over 200 Sinhalese civilians in Trincomalee and Batticaloa. Villages are burned and residents butchered. The IPKF is accused of inaction and collusion – on 4 Oct, Indian soldiers even shoot dead a Sinhalese monk and attack Sinhalese homes in Abeypura. Perpetrators: LTTE and allied Tamil militants; IPKF (for some killings and for abetting riots).

June 1990 – War Resumes:

With the IPKF gone, the LTTE returns to war against Colombo. They overrun police stations in the East; hundreds of surrendered Sinhalese and Muslim policemen are executed (countrywide). Perpetrators: LTTE.

Aug 1990 – Massacres of Muslims:

Amid renewed war, the LTTE conducts ethnic massacres against Muslims in Eastern Province. On 3 Aug, LTTE gunmen massacre 147 worshippers at Kattankudy Mosque (Batticaloa). Around this time, smaller attacks occur in Muttur area: Muslim villagers are killed or threatened by LTTE, prompting mass displacement. Perpetrators: LTTE.

1990–1992 – Tit-for-Tat Killings:

Communal bloodletting peaks. Sept 1990: The LTTE expels tens of thousands of Muslims from Jaffna and parts of the East (ethnic cleansing). April 1992: LTTE kills 69 Muslims at Alanchipothana (Trincomalee District); in revenge, Muslim Home Guard units massacre 49 Tamils in Muthugala. 15 Oct 1992: LTTE raids Palliyagodella (bordering Trinco), murdering 187 Muslims. Perpetrators: LTTE on Muslim civilians; Muslim paramilitaries on Tamil civilians.

11 Feb 1996 – Kumarapuram Massacre:

Following an LTTE ambush, Sri Lankan Army troops (from 58 Mile Post Camp), joined by Sinhalese Home Guards, rampage through Kumarapuram village (near Kilivetti). 26 Tamil civilians (women and children included) are killed, some shot at point-blank and others hacked with axes. A 15-year-old girl is gang-raped and murdered. Perpetrators: SLA soldiers (6 later charged) and local Home Guards.

2 Jan 2006 – “Trinco 5” Killings:

Amid a tense ceasefire, Sri Lankan Special Task Force (allegedly) kills five Tamil students on a beach in Trincomalee town, staging it as a grenade accident. Victims are found with execution-style bullet wounds. Perpetrators: Sri Lankan security forces (STF police suspected).

April 2006 – Trinco Riots:

A Claymore mine kills a Sri Lankan soldier in Trincomalee, sparking riots. Sinhalese mobs, reportedly backed by security forces, attack Tamil neighborhoods and shops*, burning dozens of Tamil properties. Curfew is imposed as Tamils flee. Perpetrators: Sinhalese mobs (allegedly with Army complicity).

Aug 2006 – Battle of Muttur & ACF Massacre:

The LTTE launches a major assault on Muttur town (1–3 Aug), briefly seizing parts of the town. The Army regains control after heavy fighting. During the chaos on 4 Aug 2006, 17 ACF aid workers (16 Tamils, 1 Muslim) are executed at their compound in Muttur. Independent inquiries blame Sri Lankan security forces for rounding up and murdering the unarmed volunteers. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission concluded no group other than government forces could have done it. Perpetrators: SLA soldiers and police (one Home Guard and two policemen identified by later investigation).

28 Aug – 4 Sep 2006 – Battle of Sampoor:

The Sri Lankan Army mounts Operation to capture LTTE-held Sampoor. After a week of fighting involving infantry, artillery, and air strikes, Sampoor town falls to the Army on 4 September. The LTTE retreats, and the government declares a major victory. Civilian toll: ~97 killed and 46,000 displaced (LTTE figures). Perpetrators: Sri Lankan military (civilian deaths largely due to shelling); LTTE (for using the area as a military launchpad, drawing the battle to a populated zone).

Late 2006 – Paramilitary Violence:

In the aftermath of Sampoor’s fall, Army-backed Tamil paramilitaries (TMVP/Karuna Group) step up operations in Trincomalee district. There are numerous abductions and assassinations of Tamil civilians suspected of LTTE loyalties. Perpetrators: TMVP cadres, often with tacit Army support.

2007 – Eastern War and Conclusion:

By mid-2007, the Sri Lankan military clears the remaining LTTE pockets in the Eastern Province (e.g., Thoppigala in Batticaloa). Sampoor and environs remain militarized as a High Security Zone. War shifts primarily to the Northern front, culminating in the LTTE’s defeat in 2009.

Each of these events scarred the Sampoor region’s history. The cross-cutting pattern of violence – Sri Lankan state forces and allied militias targeting Tamil civilians, the LTTE targeting Sinhalese and Muslims, and Muslim paramilitaries retaliating against Tamils – defined the region’s wartime experience. Identifying the suspected perpetrators of these incidents (as summarized above) is crucial for truth and accountability in post-war Sri Lanka. The legacy of the conflict in Sampoor is one of strategic military battles intertwined with ethnic and sectarian bloodshed, leaving deep grievances among all communities.

Military Operations in Sampoor Region (1980s–2009)

Timeline of Major Operations (1980s–2009)

Nov 1985 – Attack on Muttur:】

In one of the earliest operations near Sampoor, Sri Lankan forces launched a three-day assault on Muttur (Trincomalee District) by land, sea, and air. At least 30 Tamil civilians were killed (possibly over 100) and many houses burned. This crackdown aimed to root out militants but resulted in significant civilian casualties, marking a dark chapter in the region’s conflict.

July 1987 – Indo–Lanka Accord & IPKF Deployment:】

India and Sri Lanka signed an accord to end the civil war. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was deployed in Sri Lanka’s north and east (including Trincomalee) to disarm Tamil militant groups and enforce peace.

Oct 1987 – Operation Pawan (IPKF):】

After the LTTE refused to disarm, the IPKF launched a massive offensive (Operation Pawan) primarily in Jaffna. Though centered in the north, this set the stage for broader IPKF operations across the island. By late 1987 the IPKF was engaged in heavy fighting against the LTTE, with Trincomalee region serving as a strategic base but seeing fewer major battles.

1988–1989 – IPKF Counter-Insurgency:】

The IPKF conducted widespread anti-LTTE campaigns in jungles and villages. While most large battles occurred in the north (e.g., Jaffna, Mullaitivu), intermittent clashes also happened in Trincomalee District. The IPKF’s presence in Sampoor and surrounding areas involved patrols and clearing operations, providing security in towns like Trincomalee and Muttur. Interaction with Sri Lankan troops in Trincomalee even led to occasional tensions between the forces.

March 1990 – IPKF Withdrawal:】

Facing rising casualties and local hostility, India withdrew the IPKF by March 1990 without fully pacifying the LTTE. The LTTE quickly reasserted control over many eastern localities, including Sampoor region, as Sri Lankan forces re-deployed to fill the vacuum.

June 1990 – Outbreak of Eelam War II:】

Within months of the IPKF’s exit, the LTTE launched coordinated attacks on Sri Lankan forces. In the Eastern Province, hundreds of police and soldiers were killed in surprise assaults. The LTTE overran police stations and outposts; for example, at least 600 police officers who surrendered in the east were executed. Government-held pockets around Trincomalee town became isolated as the LTTE seized territory in Muttur, Sampoor, and surrounding villages. This eruption of violence triggered mass displacement and inter-ethnic massacres. Dozens of Sinhalese villagers around Trincomalee (e.g., 9 killed at Wan Ela on July 25, 1990) were massacred by LTTE units, while Tamil civilians faced deadly reprisals by government-aligned forces (e.g., 10 Tamil civilians killed in Kantalai area on July 31, 1990 under unclear circumstances). The multi-ethnic Trincomalee region descended into chaos, and thousands of civilians (Tamils, Muslims, and Sinhalese alike) fled their homes.

1990–1994 – Army Operations to Secure Trincomalee:】

Throughout the early 1990s, the Sri Lankan Army fought to regain control of the Eastern Province. Large Sri Lankan military formations were deployed in Trincomalee District, and gradual advances were made to re-establish supply routes and garrisons. By 1993–94 the Army had secured major towns (Trincomalee, Muttur) and critical infrastructure (e.g. the Trincomalee naval base and China Bay air force base, which had come under LTTE attack in the early ’90s). However, vast rural areas including Sampoor and adjacent coastal jungles remained a guerrilla battleground. No single named operation fully cleared these zones in this period; instead, the Army engaged in prolonged counter-insurgency sweeps and defensive actions, while Sea Tiger boats harassed navy ships off Trincomalee’s coast. The civilian impact was severe: continuous skirmishes and shelling impeded farming and fishing, creating frequent displacements. Both the LTTE and government forces were accused of abuses during this time, contributing to a “no-war-no-peace” misery for local communities.

April 1995 – Eelam War III and Continued Strife:】

A brief 1994 ceasefire collapsed in April 1995. The LTTE dramatically announced the return to war with attacks in Trincomalee: rebel frogmen infiltrated the Trincomalee Harbour and sank several Sri Lankan navy vessels. Throughout the late 1990s, heavy fighting shifted mostly to the northern provinces (with Sri Lankan offensives like Operation Riviresa and LTTE counter-attacks). In the east, the LTTE maintained entrenched positions in the Sampoor–Muttur area and in the Thoppigala (Baron’s Cap) jungles further south. The military held the towns and main roads, but insurgent ambushes and bombings persisted. Civilians in the Sampoor region continued to suffer indiscriminate violence. For instance, the LTTE frequently shelled Trincomalee town and nearby villages from its Sampoor camps, while government forces carried out cordon-and-search operations that sometimes led to civilian deaths or “disappearances”. The war in the east during this period was characterized by a grim stalemate, punctured by atrocities on all sides.

Feb 2002 – Ceasefire Agreement:】

A Norwegian-brokered ceasefire halted open hostilities. The Sampoor area came under de facto LTTE control as an “uncleared” area accessible to the rebels under the truce. Normalcy partly returned: checkpoints relaxed and displaced families began considering resettlement. However, tensions simmered. In April 2004, the LTTE’s Eastern commander, Vinayagamoorthy “Karuna”, broke away from the LTTE. This internal split led to infighting: Karuna’s faction, based largely in Batticaloa and parts of Trincomalee, briefly controlled territory before being overwhelmed by the LTTE’s northern cadres. Karuna’s defection significantly weakened the LTTE in the east, as many experienced fighters abandoned the main rebel force. The scene was set for the government to exploit these divisions if war resumed.

July 2006 – Mavil Aru Operation:】

In mid-2006, the ceasefire unraveled. The LTTE blocked the Mavil Aru sluice gates on July 26, 2006, cutting water supplies to over 15,000 villagers in government-held areas. This act was a strategic provocation at the edge of Sampoor region, and it marked the formal resumption of hostilities (Eelam War IV). The Sri Lankan military launched an offensive to capture the Mavil Aru irrigation canal and restore water flow – an operation code-named “Watershed.” Led by Army Commander Sarath Fonseka, the objective was twofold: lift the water blockade and deliver a decisive blow to LTTE positions in Trincomalee District. Outcome: After intense fighting, security forces regained control of the sluice gates by August 11, 2006, effectively ending the water blockade. The operation was successful militarily, reopening water to thousands of civilians and depriving the LTTE of a bargaining chip. Impact on Locals: The battles around Mavil Aru caused the displacement of hundreds of families from nearby Tamil and Muslim villages. The initial water cut itself had put communities at risk of drought and ruined crops. As fighting spread, civilians fled from the Muttur East and Sampoor areas, foreshadowing a larger humanitarian crisis. The Mavil Aru clash is widely seen as the trigger that plunged the region back into all-out war.

August 2006 – Siege of Muttur:】

Even as the Army fought at Mavil Aru, the LTTE opened a new front by attacking the strategic port town of Muttur, just north of Sampoor. On August 2, 2006, hundreds of LTTE fighters infiltrated Muttur under cover of artillery, in an apparent attempt to divert the military’s attention. Objective (LTTE): Capture Muttur town (which housed a Muslim majority population and an important naval detachment) to ease pressure on Sampoor and gain a bargaining position. Battle and Outcome: Fierce fighting raged for four days in the streets of Muttur between the LTTE and Sri Lankan security forces. The rebels managed to occupy parts of the town briefly, but the military encircled them and launched counter-attacks from the Trincomalee side. By August 5–6, 2006, Sri Lankan troops re-established full control over Muttur, driving the LTTE back across the lagoon to Sampoor. The seizure and re-capture of Muttur unfolded rapidly, resulting in dozens of combatant deaths on both sides. Impact on Local Population: Virtually the entire civilian population of Muttur (over 30,000 people, mostly Muslim) was uprooted during the battle. Residents fled in panic – many crowded onto boats seeking refuge in Trincomalee city. Those who remained were caught in crossfire and shelling; civilian casualties were reported as mortar rounds hit residential areas. In the chaotic aftermath, a heinous war crime took place: on August 4, after Muttur was retaken, 17 humanitarian aid workers (local staff of Action Against Hunger) were found executed at their office compound. Investigations and eyewitnesses later indicated that Sri Lankan security forces had summarily murdered these unarmed Tamil aid workers, an atrocity that shocked international observers. This Muttur massacre underscored the extreme dangers facing civilians and aid providers in the Sampoor theatre. The town itself was left devastated, with mosques, churches, and homes damaged. It took weeks for displaced families to return, and years later the perpetrators of the aid worker massacre have still not been held accountable.

August–September 2006 – Battle of Sampoor:】

With Mavil Aru secured and the LTTE repelled from Muttur, the Sri Lankan military turned to Sampoor (also spelled Sampur) – the main LTTE stronghold south of Trincomalee Harbor. Objective: Eliminate the LTTE’s coastal bases in Sampoor which had long threatened Trincomalee’s naval facilities. From these positions, the LTTE had been able to shell the Trincomalee navy dockyard and even targeted naval vessels and an oil tank farm. Capturing Sampoor was deemed essential to neutralize this threat and secure the Trincomalee bay. Starting August 27, 2006, the Army’s 5th Brigade and other Eastern Command units, backed by artillery and air strikes, launched a ground assault on Sampoor and adjacent LTTE-held villages (Kirimeran, Kaddaparichchan, etc.). The fighting was intense, with the military advancing from multiple directions and the Sri Lankan Navy blockading the coast to prevent any rebel evacuation or re-supply. Outcome: After a week of heavy combat, government forces captured Sampoor on September 4, 2006. The LTTE fighters, facing overwhelming force, withdrew deeper south; some reportedly escaped by sea despite naval presence. The fall of Sampoor marked the first significant territorial loss for the LTTE in Eelam War IV. The Army declared that Trincomalee’s hinterland was secured as the Tiger artillery positions were silenced. Impact on Local Population: The Sampoor offensive caused a massive displacement of civilians. Entire Tamil villages in the Sampoor region were emptied, as residents fled the bombardment; thousands sought shelter in refugee camps north of Trincomalee or further south in LTTE-held territory. The LTTE had heavily fortified and mined the area, so after the battle the military designated Sampoor a High Security Zone, barring immediate resettlement. For local people, this meant prolonged exile: many families remained in camps for years, unable to return to their lands which were now littered with landmines and unexploded ordnance. The government later cleared the mines and, by late 2000s, began plans to use parts of Sampoor for strategic projects (like a power plant), further delaying civilian resettlement. Despite the short-term humanitarian fallout, the capture of Sampoor was hailed by Sri Lankan authorities as a decisive victory that removed the rebel artillery threat to Trincomalee and paved the way for clearing the entire Eastern Province of insurgents.

Oct 2006 – Jan 2007 – Battle of Vakarai:】

After losing Sampoor, surviving LTTE units regrouped further south in Vakarai, a coastal area at the Trincomalee–Batticaloa district border. Vakarai and the adjoining jungles became the next stronghold for LTTE cadres in the East, hosting thousands of displaced civilians under their control. The Sri Lankan forces pursued the Tigers in a continuing campaign. Objective: Capture Vakarai town and its hinterland, destroying the LTTE’s last coastal foothold in the Eastern Province. Military Operation: Fighting in Vakarai escalated from October 2006 onward as the Army and Special Task Force (STF) advanced from multiple directions. The LTTE fiercely resisted, using dense forests for cover and holding tens of thousands of civilians as a buffer in the enclave. Government artillery and multi-barrel rocket launchers shelled rebel positions heavily, at times hitting civilian sites. By late 2006, the military had surrounded Vakarai, cutting off supplies. Outcome: In January 2007, after months of siege, LTTE fighters abandoned Vakarai under pressure. On January 19, 2007, Sri Lankan troops marched into Vakarai town, officially bringing it under government control. This victory effectively wiped out organized LTTE presence along the eastern coastline. Impact on Local Population: The Vakarai battle created a dire humanitarian crisis. Over 20,000 civilians were trapped inside the besieged pocket with dwindling food and medical care. Many took shelter in churches, schools, and improvised bunkers. As government forces tightened the noose, desperate civilians escaped in waves—thousands braved jungle paths or crossed front lines to reach government camps. Civilian casualties mounted from relentless shelling; local hospitals were overwhelmed. International agencies voiced concern over indiscriminate fire and the plight of the displaced. Still, a large-scale bloodbath was averted when the LTTE, sensing imminent defeat, withdrew and allowed the population to flee with them or surrender to the Army. The fall of Vakarai was a turning point: for the first time in over a decade, the eastern seaboard was free of Tiger control, giving the government a strong propaganda boost and raising morale. However, the scars on civilians were deep – many families had lost members during the fighting, and entire communities had to be rehabilitated from scratch after months in refugee camps.

June–July 2007 – Fall of Thoppigala:】

Following Vakarai, the last remaining LTTE refuge in the East was the Thoppigala (Baron’s Cap) jungle in western Batticaloa District. Small bands of rebels retreated into this dense forest and rocky outcrop, carrying out guerrilla attacks. The Sri Lankan military initiated final clearing operations in mid-2007. Objective: Eliminate the residual LTTE fighters in Thoppigala and declare the Eastern Province fully liberated. The Army’s 2nd Division, alongside STF units familiar with jungle warfare, slowly advanced through booby-trapped forest paths. Outcome: On July 11, 2007, troops captured the Thoppigala massif, hoisting the national flag on the iconic rocky peak. Dozens of rebels were killed or surrendered, though some may have slipped away. This date marked the official “liberation of the East”, as celebrated by the government. Impact on Local Population: Compared to earlier battles, Thoppigala’s operations occurred in a sparsely inhabited jungle, so direct civilian casualties were fewer. Nonetheless, for the people of the broader Trincomalee-Batticaloa region, July 2007 brought an end to nearly 20 years of continuous conflict on their soil. Eastern communities had endured repeated displacement since the late 1980s; after Thoppigala’s fall, many war-weary families could finally hope to return home. The government launched “eastern revival” programs to rebuild infrastructure and resettle the displaced. However, peace remained fragile – thousands of troops stayed on in the region and emergency laws persisted. Some displaced, especially from high-security zones like parts of Sampoor, were still waiting for permission to resettle even as the active fighting ceased.

2008–2009 – Aftermath and Conclusion:】

While the Eastern Province was declared cleared in 2007, the civil war continued in the Northern Province until May 2009. During this final phase, Sampoor region remained under tight military control as the government concentrated on defeating the LTTE in the north. Displaced civilians from Sampoor and Muttur spent years in welfare camps or relocated settlements. Reports emerged of land being appropriated for military or economic projects, delaying the return of original inhabitants. By May 2009, the LTTE was militarily defeated nationwide. The war’s end gradually allowed for the relaxation of security restrictions in the east. In subsequent years, some Sampoor families were eventually allowed to return and rebuild their war-torn villages, though the process was slow. The legacy of the 1980s–2009 conflict in the Sampoor/Muttur region is profound: thousands killed or maimed, a once-diverse community scarred by ethnic polarization, and an enduring need for reconciliation. Yet the cessation of hostilities in 2009 finally opened space for recovery, with former battlefields being cleared of mines and reconstruction projects underway. The people of Sampoor, after decades of upheaval, began the long journey of reclaiming their lives on a land that had witnessed nearly every chapter of Sri Lanka’s civil war.

Key Operations and Their Impacts (Detailed Overview)

Indo-Lanka Accord and IPKF Peacekeeping (1987–1990)

Objective: In July 1987, the Indo–Sri Lanka Peace Accord was signed to end Sri Lanka’s civil war by devolving power to Tamils and disarming militant groups. As part of this accord, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was deployed in Sri Lanka’s North and East (including Trincomalee District). The IPKF’s mission was to facilitate the disarming of the LTTE and other armed groups, enforce a ceasefire, and assist the Sri Lankan government in restoring civil administration. Initially, the Tamil population, war-weary after years of violence, welcomed the IPKF with relief, hoping it would bring peace.

Operations and Outcome:

The peace was short-lived. By October 1987, the LTTE refused to fully disarm and clashes erupted between the Tigers and the IPKF. The conflict swiftly escalated; India launched Operation Pawan in the north, a massive assault to capture the LTTE stronghold of Jaffna. While Operation Pawan was outside Sampoor, it was a pivotal IPKF operation that shaped dynamics across the island. Following that, the IPKF undertook widespread counter-insurgency sweeps against the LTTE, including in Eastern Province. In Trincomalee and its environs, the IPKF set up bases (e.g., using Trincomalee’s Fort Frederick as a garrison) and conducted patrols, though no large set-piece battle occurred in the town. The LTTE largely retreated from Trincomalee city when the IPKF arrived, but remained active in rural pockets. Through 1988–89, the IPKF engaged in numerous skirmishes and jungle operations against remaining LTTE units in the East. They attempted to secure supply routes and protect villages of all ethnicities from Tiger attacks. However, progress was limited – the LTTE resorted to guerrilla tactics, melting into the jungles around Trincomalee (and Batticaloa) where the IPKF often struggled to pin them down. By 1989, India’s military had suffered significant casualties (over 1,000 killed island-wide) and the operation had become politically unpopular both in Sri Lanka and India. In March 1990, under a new Sri Lankan government’s demand, the IPKF withdrew completely, leaving the war unresolved. The outcome was seen as a strategic failure for India – the LTTE was battered but not defeated, and the Sri Lankan military had to reassert control as soon as the Indians left.

Impact on Local Population:

The IPKF period had a mixed impact on Sampoor’s local communities. On one hand, the presence of a large peacekeeping force briefly reduced open fighting in places like Trincomalee town, allowing some normalcy. Tamil civilians initially hoped the Indians would protect them from the Sri Lankan military and Sinhala nationalist mobs, while Sinhalese and Muslim civilians expected the IPKF to curb Tamil militants. Indeed, the IPKF did conduct civic actions, distributing food and medical aid in certain villages. On the other hand, as hostilities grew, the IPKF itself was accused of brutalities. Numerous civilian deaths and human rights violations by IPKF troops were reported, souring the local sentiment. For example, in the north, indiscriminate shelling during Operation Pawan killed hundreds of non-combatants. In the Eastern Province, there were allegations of rapes and massacres committed by Indian soldiers against Tamil villagers suspected of aiding the LTTE. Such incidents turned many Tamils against the IPKF, who they now saw as an occupying force rather than liberators. Clashes even occurred between the IPKF and other Tamil militant factions, and at times between IPKF and Sri Lankan forces (notably a tense confrontation in Trincomalee town in 1988). By the time of withdrawal, the local population’s initial optimism had largely given way to resentment and fear. As one analysis noted, “numerous civilian massacres and rapes were committed by the IPKF” during its campaign, leaving deep wounds in communities like those around Sampoor. The IPKF episode thus ended without a lasting peace, and civilians braced themselves for the next phase of the war.

Renewed War in the East (1990–1995)

Objective:

After the IPKF’s exit, the LTTE aimed to re-establish its control over Tamil-majority areas, while the Sri Lankan government sought to reassert its sovereignty. In June 1990, the fragile truce between Colombo and the LTTE collapsed, igniting Eelam War II. The LTTE’s immediate objective in the east was to expel government presence from as many areas as possible, effectively creating a Tamil-held zone. For the Sri Lankan military, the goal was to hold strategic towns (like Trincomalee, Muttur) and vital routes, then launch counter-offensives to recapture lost ground.

Operations and Outcome:

The war’s resumption in the East was brutal and swift. The LTTE launched surprise attacks on June 11, 1990, overrunning remote Army camps and police stations across Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts. In one notorious incident, they massacred over 600 surrendering police officers who had run out of ammunition, mostly in Eastern Province posts. LTTE fighters also laid siege to Sri Lankan military detachments. Government forces, caught off-guard, pulled back to strongpoints such as Trincomalee naval base and Fort Fredrick. Within weeks, the Tigers seized control of virtually the entire rural expanse of Trincomalee District, including the Sampoor–Muttur region. The strategic port of Trincomalee itself remained under Army/Navy control, but it was isolated by rebel-held surrounding territory. The Army responded by dispatching reinforcements to break LTTE sieges and protect civilians. Through mid-1990 and 1991, several local offensives were launched by the Sri Lankan forces to regain the initiative in Trincomalee. These included operations to reopen roads (e.g., the supply route to Muttur) and to relieve besieged outposts. By late 1990, the military had re-secured Muttur town and a corridor along the Trincomalee–Kantale road, pushing the LTTE slightly back. Still, large swathes like Sampoor, Eachchilampathu, and the jungles south of Trincomalee stayed under rebel influence, serving as LTTE transit routes between the Eastern and Northern war zones.

By 1993–1994, the intensity of battles in the east had somewhat abated, partly because the warfront shifted to the northern provinces and partly due to attrition on both sides. The Sri Lankan Army, under “Operation Balavegaya” and other maneuvers, concentrated on the north (relieving Elephant Pass in 1991, etc.), which meant fewer major Eastern operations during that time. However, the government did methodically strengthen its hold on Trincomalee District: new paramilitary Home Guard units (largely Muslim and Sinhalese villagers) were raised to protect border villages from rebel raids, and the security forces fortified key bases. On the LTTE side, their Eastern commander, Karuna, maintained guerrilla pressure, occasionally ambushing military convoys or attacking isolated police posts. Notably, the China Bay Air Force base in Trincomalee came under a daring LTTE attack in the early 1990s, during which rebel infiltrators destroyed aircraft on the tarmac. The Tigers also targeted civilian settlements; for example, in 1992–93 they carried out several massacres of Muslim villagers in the region (such as in Palliyagodella and Akbar Mosque incidents, though those were in Polonnaruwa/Batticaloa border). Each of these incidents provoked harsh retaliatory strikes by government troops or allied militias against Tamil communities, creating a cycle of violence.

Outcome:

By 1994, the front lines in Trincomalee had stabilized. The military firmly held Trincomalee town, the port, and main roads, whereas the LTTE entrenched itself in pockets like Sampoor and the forests. Neither side achieved a decisive victory in the east during this period. The war entered a temporary lull when peace talks were attempted after 1994 elections.

Impact on Local Population:

The early 1990s were devastating for civilians in the Eastern Province. The Sampoor-Muttur region’s multi-ethnic fabric was badly frayed by ethnic killings and displacement. Many Muslim and Sinhalese residents of Trincomalee south (areas near Sampoor) fled or were forcibly expelled by the LTTE, who sought to create a mono-ethnic Tamil zone. Simultaneously, Tamil villagers in army-controlled areas were often viewed with suspicion and sometimes became victims of security force reprisals or “disappearances.” One documented atrocity was the 1990 massacre at Sathurukondan (Batticaloa) where an Army-linked unit killed over 60 Tamil refugees – emblematic of the terror civilians faced. In Trincomalee District, displacement was massive: tens of thousands lived in refugee camps around the town, or in jungle hideouts, depending on which side they fled to. The local economy collapsed; farming and fishing in the Sampoor area halted due to constant danger. Education and healthcare services crumbled as schools were occupied by military forces or turned into shelters for the displaced. The psychological impact was also severe – communities that had coexisted (Tamil, Muslim, Sinhalese) grew increasingly distrustful of each other due to the bloodshed. Thus, the operations and counter-operations of 1990–95, while largely indecisive militarily, inflicted profound and lasting harm on the social fabric of the Sampoor region.

Prolonged Stalemate and Ceasefire (1995–2005)

Objective:

The mid-1990s saw both sides recalibrate their strategies. After 1995, the Sri Lankan government’s primary military focus was on retaking the Northern Province (notably Jaffna Peninsula in Operation Riviresa, late 1995). In the Eastern Province, the objective was to contain the LTTE rather than engage in risky large-scale battles. The LTTE’s goal in the east was to tie down government troops and prevent them from reallocating entirely to the north, by keeping up a low-intensity insurgency in places like Sampoor. Additionally, the LTTE sought to demonstrate its reach by high-profile attacks in the east when possible.

Operations and Outcome:

In April 1995, as the ceasefire broke down, the LTTE kicked off Eelam War III with a bang in Trincomalee: they launched Operation Thunderstrike, a seaborne attack that sank two Sri Lankan naval gunboats in the Trincomalee harbor. This bold operation showed the Tigers’ offensive capability in the east and temporarily shocked the military. Over the next few years, however, direct confrontations in the Sampoor-Trincomalee area were relatively limited. The Army and Navy fortified their positions (e.g., bolstering the defenses of Trincomalee naval yard and Koddiar Bay) to prevent further such raids. Meanwhile, the LTTE in the east operated from jungle bases. Sampoor served as a key transit and artillery point for the LTTE, rather than a site of conventional battles during the late 90s. The Tigers did mount sporadic small-scale operations: ambushing patrols, mining roads, and, notably, using their naval wing (Sea Tigers) to harass navy ships near Trincomalee. Throughout the late 1990s, the Sri Lankan Navy suffered losses to Sea Tiger attacks off the Trincomalee coast, including supply vessels and smaller craft hit by suicide boats.

The government carried out search-and-destroy missions into LTTE-held areas of Trincomalee District sporadically. For example, troops would venture into the Mahaweli River delta and jungles near Sampoor to hit rebel camps, but these were typically short incursions without permanent gains. Not until 2001 did the Army plan a major push in the east, but it was never fully executed due to shifting priorities and attrition. By the late 1990s, the war had ground into a stalemate. In 2001, after a series of bloody battles nationwide (and a devastating LTTE attack on Colombo’s main airport in July 2001), both sides were exhausted and open to a truce. A formal Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) was signed in February 2002.

Under the CFA, the status quo in areas like Sampoor was essentially recognized: the LTTE continued to control certain pockets (termed “uncleared areas”) and the Army held the rest. Sampoor remained an LTTE-administered zone where they could freely move armed cadres, much to the security forces’ frustration. The ceasefire period (2002–2005) saw no major military operations, but it was a tense peace. In Trincomalee town, a disturbing incident foreshadowed future cracks: in January 2006, amid rising political tension, five Tamil students were murdered on Trincomalee beach, widely believed to be killed by Sri Lankan Special Task Force personnel. This event inflamed community anger and hinted that the ceasefire was collapsing even before formal hostilities resumed.

Impact on Local Population:

Between 1995 and 2005, the humanitarian situation in the east oscillated between modest improvement and renewed fear. When fighting lulled (especially after 2002), civilians around Trincomalee and Sampoor enjoyed some reprieve: travel became easier, schools reopened, and limited inter-ethnic trade resumed during the ceasefire. Many displaced families returned tentatively to their villages, though they lived side by side with LTTE bunkers or nearby Army camps depending on location. However, the underlying conflict cast a long shadow. Political killings and abductions were common even in the ceasefire era – the LTTE used the truce to assassinate opponents, and government-linked paramilitaries (like the Tamil Karuna faction after 2004) engaged in their own abuses.

One significant development impacting the local populace was the LTTE split in March 2004. Colonel Karuna Amman, the LTTE’s Eastern commander, broke away with thousands of cadre, citing discrimination by the northern leadership. For civilians, this was a confusing time: some hoped it might reduce LTTE dominance and lead to peace in the East, while others feared a turf war. Indeed, brief clashes between Karuna’s men and LTTE loyalists did occur (including near Welikanda, south of Trincomalee). Eventually, Karuna disbanded his rebels in the face of a northern LTTE offensive, and he later allied with the government as a paramilitary leader. The Karuna split greatly weakened the LTTE’s manpower in the East, setting the stage for the Sri Lankan military’s successful offensives in 2006–07. From a civilian perspective, the split also introduced a new actor – the Karuna group – which was accused of extortion and child soldier recruitment in eastern villages (while enjoying government backing). Thus, even in “peacetime,” civilians had to navigate a minefield of armed groups and uncertain allegiances. The period ended with rising anxiety as killings on both sides resumed by late 2005, signaling that full-scale war would soon return to Sampoor and its surroundings.

Eelam War IV: Eastern Campaign (2006–2007)

Eelam War IV began in mid-2006 and, unlike previous rounds, the Sri Lankan military rapidly took the offensive in the Eastern Province. A series of major operations unfolded in Sampoor and surrounding areas, reversing years of stalemate. Below are the key operations in chronological order:

Mavil Aru Operation (July–August 2006)

Objectives:

The conflict reignited when the LTTE blocked the Mavil Aru sluice gate on July 26, 2006, cutting off water to thousands of mainly Sinhalese and Muslim farmers downstream. The Sri Lankan government’s immediate objective was to reopen the sluice and restore water – a move driven as much by humanitarian concern as by the need to assert state authority. Strategically, the government also saw this as an opportunity to engage the LTTE militarily after months of provocation, effectively ending the ceasefire. Led by Army chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, the plan (dubbed a “Humanitarian Operation”) was to capture the reservoir bund and push the LTTE out of the area, thereby securing the Trincomalee District’s southwest border.

Operations:

Over two weeks, Army units advanced through difficult terrain towards the Mavil Aru dam, meeting stiff LTTE resistance. The Tigers had dug in with bunkers and booby traps, leveraging their knowledge of the local terrain. Fighting was fierce; both sides exchanged artillery fire. On August 1, 2006, commandos finally reached the sluice gates amid heavy fighting. After initial attempts at a negotiated opening failed, the military pressed on with assaults. By August 11, 2006, troops gained full control of the Mavil Aru anicut (sluice) and engineers reopened the water flow.

Outcome:

The mission succeeded in its primary goal – water gushed again to some 15,000 thirsty villagers downstream. Militarily, this victory also served as a morale boost for the armed forces, being the first significant territorial gain from the LTTE since the 2002 truce. The LTTE, for its part, withdrew deeper into the Sampoor region but simultaneously launched diversionary counterattacks (notably the assault on Muttur, described in the next section). The capture of Mavil Aru marked the official resumption of war; soon after, the government openly declared that the ceasefire was void.

Impact on Local Population:

In addition to restoring a vital water supply (thus averting a humanitarian disaster for farmers), the operation had immediate adverse effects on the local population caught in the crossfire. Hundreds of families from Tamil villages like Kathiraveli and Chenaiyoor (north of Mavil Aru) and Muslim communities in south Trincomalee fled their homes during the fighting. The area around Mavil Aru and Mutur East became a conflict zone, with civilians huddling in churches and schools for safety. A U.N. report at the time noted that 30,000 civilians in Trincomalee District fled in late July–early August 2006 due to the escalating battles. Those who remained in LTTE-held villages experienced severe shortages of food and medicine because supply lines were cut. The reopening of Mavil Aru’s gates was celebrated by farmers downstream, but elsewhere, fear escalated as it was clear that a wider war – and more displacement – was just beginning.

Siege of Muttur (August 2006)

Objectives:

The LTTE, facing pressure at Mavil Aru, decided to open a second front by striking the government-held town of Muttur (immediately across the Koddiyar Bay from Sampoor). The apparent objective was to draw Sri Lankan forces away from Mavil Aru/Sampoor by forcing them to defend Muttur, thereby relieving pressure on Tiger forces and possibly seizing Muttur as a bargaining chip. Muttur held strategic value: it housed a navy detachment, sat near the Trincomalee harbor entrance, and its capture would be a propaganda win. Moreover, Muttur was a predominantly Muslim town; the LTTE might have calculated that its capture could inflame ethnic tensions, complicating the government’s response.

Operations:

In the pre-dawn hours of August 2, 2006, hundreds of LTTE fighters crossed the inner harbor by boat and jungle paths to assault Muttur. They simultaneously fired artillery from Sampoor into Muttur and the Trincomalee naval base. The town’s garrison and police were caught by surprise but put up resistance. Over August 2–3, intense urban combat ensued: street-by-street gun battles, sniper fire, and shelling. The military rushed elite Special Forces and reinforcements via land and sea to encircle Muttur. By August 4, the Sri Lankan forces mounted a concerted counterattack, pushing into rebel-held neighborhoods. The LTTE, finding themselves outnumbered and low on supplies, began pulling out on August 4 night. By August 5, troops publicly announced Muttur was back under full government control. The battle lasted roughly four days. LTTE casualties were believed to be high as they were exposed during withdrawal; the military also suffered dozens of killed or wounded.

Outcome:

Strategically, the siege failed to achieve lasting LTTE gains – they could not hold Muttur against the determined military response. However, it did temporarily stall the Army’s momentum; some troops and attention were indeed diverted to Muttur from the Mavil Aru/Sampoor front in those critical days. The LTTE’s incursion also had a psychological impact, demonstrating they could still strike deep into government territory despite conventional weaknesses. After retreating to Sampoor, the LTTE claimed the Muttur operation was a tactical success in delaying the enemy, but in reality it cost them fighters and did not prevent the fall of Sampoor shortly thereafter. For the government, retaining Muttur safeguarded Trincomalee’s immediate perimeter. Nonetheless, the military faced international scrutiny following this battle due to the incidents that came to light in its wake (particularly the aid worker killings).

Impact on Local Population:

The siege and firefights turned Muttur into a ghost town. Virtually the entire population of 40,000 (mostly Muslim civilians) fled in terror either during the fighting or immediately after. Over 20,000 Muslims, including women and children, undertook a perilous journey by sea – boarding overcrowded fishing vessels to cross the bay to Trincomalee city to seek refuge in mosques and public buildings. Their flight was one of the largest and swiftest displacements of the war. Those who could not escape in time hunkered down in whatever shelter they could find; many were without food, water, or electricity for days. There were reports of civilians being injured or killed by shellfire as both the LTTE and Army fired heavy weapons into Muttur. One vivid account described families digging shallow trenches in their gardens to survive the shelling. The aftermath revealed a humanitarian crisis: Muttur’s streets were strewn with debris, and basic services had collapsed.

Most shockingly, on August 4, the 17 local staff of Action Against Hunger (ACF) were executed at their office. These humanitarian workers (16 Tamils and 1 Muslim) had been helping refugees and were sheltering in Muttur during the battle. Evidence later indicated that Sri Lankan security personnel had lined them up and shot them at close range, an act described by the University Teachers for Human Rights as “one of the most heinous crimes of the war”. This massacre sent waves of fear through the aid community and cast a long shadow over the military’s victory. In the broader community, Muslim-Tamil relations, already strained by decades of LTTE-Muslim clashes, worsened because of mutual suspicions about collusion during the battle. It took weeks for government agencies to organize returns for the displaced; even by late 2006, many Muttur residents remained in camps around Trincomalee, traumatized by the events. The siege of Muttur thus stands as a grim reminder of how civilian populations bore the brunt of military operations.

Battle of Sampoor (August–September 2006)

Objectives:

Flush with success at Mavil Aru and determined to capitalize on the LTTE’s setbacks, the Sri Lankan high command set its sights on Sampoor – the heart of the Tigers’ Eastern stronghold. The objective of the Battle of Sampoor was clear: capture the entire Sampoor region, thereby eliminating LTTE artillery positions threatening Trincomalee, and secure the southern shore of Trincomalee Harbour. This would not only remove the rebel conventional threat to the Eastern Province’s largest naval base but also deliver a symbolic blow by taking the first major LTTE-held town since the war’s renewal.

Operations:

The operation commenced on August 27, 2006, days after Muttur was secured. Sri Lankan Army infantry battalions advanced southward from Muttur and westward from coastal landing points, in a pincer movement towards Sampoor village. The Sri Lanka Air Force bombed LTTE command and logistic nodes in Sampoor to soften defenses. Meanwhile, the Sri Lanka Navy patrolled offshore to prevent any seaborne escape or reinforcement of LTTE cadres. The LTTE, estimated at 500–600 fighters in the area, dug in to resist the assault. The fighting was intense: the Tigers fired 122mm artillery and mortars, slowing the Army’s progress. At Kaddaparichchan, a strategic hamlet on the approach to Sampoor, the LTTE had a robust defense line; it took the Army several days of bitter combat to overrun these forward defenses. By September 1, troops had breached LTTE’s second line near Nursery Junction (a local road intersection), steadily closing in on Sampoor town. On September 4, 2006, government forces entered Sampoor, finding it largely deserted of civilians and resistance. The remaining LTTE units had pulled back further west or melted away into jungle ravines to attempt guerrilla tactics. The military operation lasted roughly one week.

Outcome:

The capture of Sampoor was a significant triumph for the Sri Lankan forces. They announced that nearly 140 km² of territory (covering Sampoor, Muttur East, and adjacent areas) was brought under government control. The LTTE’s carefully built eastern front was dismantled. Strategically, Trincomalee’s security improved markedly: no longer could LTTE artillery threaten navy ships or the port city, as earlier in the year when they had shelled a navy detachment and killed a dozen sailors. The loss of Sampoor also denied the LTTE a key transit route between northern and eastern zones and disrupted their supply lines (which had allowed movement of weapons from coast to interior). From the Tigers’ perspective, it was a serious setback; they had effectively lost their grip on Trincomalee District after holding out there for over a decade. The LTTE vowed to wage a guerilla campaign for revenge, but many Eastern cadres and resources were already depleted or redeployed to the Northern front by then.

Following the operation, the Sri Lankan military declared Sampoor and surrounding villages a “High Security Zone” (HSZ), citing remaining threats like booby traps and the proximity to strategic installations. No civilian resettlement was allowed initially. The government even explored plans to establish a naval base or a special economic zone there, underlining the area’s newly recognized strategic value.

Impact on Local Population:

Before the battle, Sampoor region was home to roughly 15,000 people, mainly Tamil civilians engaged in fishing and farming. Virtually all of them were displaced by the fighting. Anticipating the offensive, most families had already fled in the weeks around the Mavil Aru and Muttur battles, seeking refuge in LTTE-controlled territory further south (like Vakarai) or in refugee camps near Trincomalee city. Those few who remained in Sampoor during the assault either evacuated by sea (some reportedly ferried by the LTTE) or sheltered in bunkers until the battle passed. As a consequence, civilian casualties within Sampoor town were minimal during the final assault – the area was largely empty when troops arrived. However, in the broader onslaught, there were reports of at least a few civilians killed or injured by shellfire in outlying hamlets.

The more enduring impact was the loss of homes and livelihoods. Villagers from Sampoor, Navaratnapuram, Kaddaiparichchan, and nearby settlements found their areas cordoned off for military use after September 2006. These families languished in displacement camps for years. They also lost an entire harvest season and their fishing boats, which were either destroyed or seized. The land left behind was heavily mined by the retreating LTTE; the Army later discovered and cleared thousands of mines and unexploded ordnance, illustrating the dangerous conditions that prevented any quick return. Psychologically, many Sampoor residents felt a sense of betrayal and despair – some had lived under LTTE administration for a decade and feared retaliation as “Tiger sympathizers” now that the Army was in control. Additionally, the removal of the LTTE’s quasi-government meant the loss of local governance structures; everything from schooling to temple administration had to be reorganized under Sri Lankan state authority, which took time. In sum, while the Battle of Sampoor achieved its military aims efficiently, it left a humanitarian challenge that would linger well past 2009: how to rebuild and resettle a shattered community on a former battlefield.

Battle of Vakarai (October 2006 – January 2007)

Objectives: After losing Sampoor, remaining LTTE forces in the East regrouped in the Vakarai region, a coastal stretch south of Trincomalee District (in northern Batticaloa District). Vakarai had become an important LTTE-held pocket, swelled by thousands of Tamil civilians who fled there from Trincomalee during the previous fighting. The Sri Lankan military’s objective was to capture Vakarai and adjoining coastline, thereby clearing the entire Eastern seaboard of LTTE presence. This would eliminate the last direct LTTE sea access in the East and prevent any possibility of future rebel artillery menacing Trincomalee or nearby Sri Lankan military bases. The LTTE’s objective, conversely, was to hold Vakarai as long as possible, creating a protracted battle that might draw international pressure on the government due to the large civilian population at risk.

Operations: Clashes around Vakarai began in October 2006. The Army approached from the north (Trincomalee side) while the Special Task Force (police commandos) pressed from the south and west. The advancing troops encountered well-prepared LTTE defenses: trenches, earth bunds, and minefields. Progress was slow, often yard by yard through dense jungle and mangrove swamps. The LTTE fought tenaciously, using hit-and-run tactics and exploiting their intimate terrain knowledge. Government forces heavily shelled LTTE positions, but given the intermingling of fighters with civilians, shells often struck civilian areas. In one tragic incident in November 2006, an artillery strike hit a school sheltering displaced people in Kathiraveli near Vakarai, reportedly killing at least 23 civilians (mostly children). Such incidents drew criticism from international observers, but the military maintained that the LTTE was deliberately firing from civilian areas, using people as “human shields.” By December 2006, the government troops had surrounded Vakarai town. The LTTE and approximately 15,000–20,000 civilians were trapped in a shrinking enclave. Short of supplies and facing relentless bombardment, the LTTE leadership in Vakarai decided to pull out. In mid-January 2007, rebel fighters began a secret exodus. On January 19, 2007, Army units entering Vakarai found it largely abandoned; the LTTE had melted away into the jungles further west. The town and its vicinity came under Army control without a final pitched battle.

Outcome: The fall of Vakarai was another major victory for Sri Lankan forces. It effectively meant that from Trincomalee city down to the strategic Batticaloa District coastline, the entire eastern coast was back in government hands. The LTTE’s Eastern fighting force was decimated – some fighters escaped westward to Thoppigala, but many were killed, captured, or simply demoralized and deserted. The psychological impact of Vakarai’s capture was significant. It had been a well-known LTTE stronghold; its loss signaled that the Tigers were on the defensive even in areas they once considered heartland. The government touted this as proof that victory was achievable. Militarily, it allowed the redeployment of some battle-hardened divisions from East to Northern battlefields in later 2007, boosting the campaigns there.

Impact on Local Population: The human cost of the Vakarai operation was steep. From October 2006 to January 2007, about 30,000 civilians were displaced from Vakarai and surrounding villages. Many endured weeks of dire conditions; trapped between front lines, they survived in bunkers eating wild plants or meager rations. Hospitals in the area struggled: due to fighting, seriously injured civilians couldn’t be transported out easily, and some died from treatable wounds. As the siege tightened, famine-like conditions emerged – there were reports of people subsisting on one meal a day. When the LTTE withdrawal became evident, civilians took the opportunity to escape en masse. The Sri Lankan Army facilitated the evacuation of roughly 15,000 civilians in early January 2007, escorting them to government-held Polonnaruwa District where refugee camps were set up. Scenes of long columns of hungry, exhausted civilians – carrying children and a few possessions – were broadcast in Sri Lanka, evoking public sympathy and also underscoring the war’s toll on innocents. Human Rights organizations later documented evidence that both sides had violated humanitarian law: the LTTE by using civilians as shields and conscripting youths in Vakarai; the military by shelling no-go zones like hospitals. After the battle, Vakarai was left heavily damaged: homes had been blown apart, the jungle was scarred with craters, and unexploded ordnance littered the area. The government moved quickly to deliver aid to the newly cleared zone, sending food convoys and starting mine-clearing so that people could return. Nevertheless, many former residents found their villages uninhabitable or their family members missing. The victory at Vakarai came at a great civilian price, illustrating the painful trade-off of the war’s final phase in the east.

Clearing of Thoppigala (April–July 2007)

Objectives: With the coast secured, the final phase of eastern operations targeted Thoppigala (Baron’s Cap), an expansive jungle and rocky area southwest of Batticaloa. This region had historically been an LTTE hideout and training ground. Following Vakarai, perhaps a few hundred remaining LTTE fighters, including some who fled Vakarai and some local guerrilla units, congregated in Thoppigala under the leadership of Tiger commanders like Jeyam and Ram. The objective for Sri Lankan forces was to encircle and eliminate this last pocket of resistance, thereby declaring the Eastern Province completely free of LTTE. For the LTTE, the goal was mere survival – to harass the army and buy time, possibly hoping that a second front in the north or international pressure might force a halt to the offensive.

Operations: The Army’s strategy involved multiple columns advancing slowly through the jungle from different directions (north from Vakarai, east from Batticaloa, and south from Polonnaruwa). Small unit tactics were key: special infantry teams adept at jungle warfare scouted ahead. The LTTE laid numerous mines and improvised traps, which caused casualties and delayed progress. Fighting in Thoppigala was of a different nature – less set-piece battles, more hit-and-run ambushes. It was in many ways a mopping-up operation but a dangerous one due to the terrain. The Air Force occasionally bombed suspected rebel jungle camps, though pinpointing targets under thick canopy was difficult. Meanwhile, Army engineering units had to build/logistics trails in the wilderness to supply the frontline. Through May and June 2007, a war of attrition took place: dozens of soldiers were wounded by snipers or mines, and the Army inched closer to the core LTTE hideouts. Sensing the inevitability of defeat and with no safe haven left, many Tiger fighters attempted to slip out of the encirclement in small groups. Some succeeded, but many were detected by reconnaissance teams and engaged. By early July, troops had reached Baron’s Cap rock, the central landmark of Thoppigala. On July 11, 2007, the Army announced it had captured the “Tiger Headquarters” in Thoppigala and hoisted the national flag atop the rock, signifying victory. Skirmishes continued for a few days as stragglers were hunted down, but effectively the organized LTTE presence in the Eastern Province was over.

Outcome: Thoppigala’s fall marked the first time since the 1980s that the entire Eastern Province was firmly under government control. The Army’s Eastern Commander declared the region “liberated” on July 11, 2007, and a ceremonial re-opening of the main trunk road (A5) through that area soon followed. This outcome allowed the government to trumpet a complete victory in the East and redirect attention and resources to the Northern front, where the LTTE still held substantial territory. The surviving LTTE leadership from the East (like Ramesh, Jeyam, etc.) either perished, went underground, or managed to join the northern ranks. The eastern theater of war officially concluded, ushering in a phase the government termed “humanitarian operations” to rebuild and restore normalcy.

Impact on Local Population: The final Thoppigala battles had limited immediate civilian impact because the area was mostly uninhabited forest. However, for the wider population of Batticaloa and Trincomalee, the end of combat brought relief and new challenges. Families displaced earlier in 2007 from places like Vakarai could now be gradually resettled since the guns fell silent. Indeed, within weeks, the government started returning people to certain cleared villages under military supervision. There was an optimistic buzz about reconstruction – roads were to be repaved, schools reopened. The government launched a high-profile “Nagenahira Navodaya” (Eastern Reawakening) development campaign to invest in infrastructure and livelihood programs, aiming to win the peace after winning the war. Despite these efforts, the deep wounds of conflict were not easily healed. The East remained under de facto military rule for some time; every village committee had an Army liaison, and checkpoints dotted the landscape to snuff out any LTTE resurgence. Civilians, while grateful for peace, lamented militarization and the slow process of returning land seized during the war. In areas like Sampoor, for example, people still waited for clearance to go back even as 2008 and 2009 rolled around. Additionally, a new concern emerged: intra-Tamil tension because the government-backed Karuna faction (now called TMVP) wielded power in the East. Armed TMVP cadres, some integrated into police, reportedly engaged in extortion and settled old scores, which meant that a different kind of insecurity stalked some communities. Nonetheless, by the end of 2007, the guns were largely silent in the East, and that was a source of great relief for war-ravaged communities from Trincomalee to Batticaloa.

Conclusion: Legacy of the Conflict in Sampoor Region

From the 1980s through 2009, the Sampoor region and its environs witnessed relentless military operations that reshaped its history and demography. Starting with Sri Lankan Army crackdowns like the 1985 Muttur attack that terrorized civilians, through the tumultuous IPKF intervention and bloody see-saw battles of the 1990s, and finally the culminating offensives of 2006–2007, the area was transformed into one of Sri Lanka’s most contested battlegrounds. Each operation had distinct objectives and outcomes, but all shared a common feature: the profound impact on the local population.

Years of war led to entire populations being displaced repeatedly, with Sampoor’s people becoming refugees more than once. Communities were split along ethnic lines – many Muslim families never returned to villages south of Trincomalee after being driven out by LTTE threats, just as many Tamils were uprooted and lost property due to military HSZs and land alienation. Civilians endured shelling, starvation, and atrocities; thousands lost their lives in massacres, crossfire, or due to lack of medical care. The social fabric in the Trincomalee – Muttur – Batticaloa belt was severely frayed, exemplified by incidents like the ACF aid worker massacre which eroded trust in the authorities, or the IPKF-era abuses that lingered in collective memory.

On the other hand, the end of major operations by 2007 allowed a chance for recovery. By 2009, as the civil war ended nationwide, attention turned to resettling the displaced in places like Sampoor. In subsequent years, some normalcy did return: fisheries and agriculture slowly revived, schools reopened, and new infrastructure was built. Yet, the legacy of militarization remained evident with continued military presence and delayed justice for war crimes. Sampoor, in particular, became a symbol of both strategic gain and humanitarian controversy – strategic gain for the military achievement in 2006, and controversy for the prolonged displacement of its people while the land was earmarked for development projects.

In sum, the story of military operations in the Sampoor region (1980s–2009) is one of strategic battles intertwined with human suffering. Each key operation – whether by the IPKF or Sri Lankan forces – achieved some immediate aim in the long-running conflict, but also left behind consequences for the ordinary men, women, and children living there. As Sri Lanka moved past 2009 into a post-war era, the lessons from Sampoor’s experience underscore the importance of addressing local grievances and healing the wounds of war, lest the sacrifices and sorrows of those decades be forgotten or repeated.