Advocacy Report: Tamil Perspectives on Sri Lanka’s Independent Prosecutors Office (IPO) — Accountability, Transitional Justice, and the Shadow of the Office on Missing Persons (OMP)

By Wimal Navaratnam, Human Rights Activist

Tamil Perspectives on Sri Lanka’s Independent Prosecutors Office (IPO) — Accountability, Transitional Justice, and the Shadow of the Office on Missing Persons (OMP)

Advocacy Report: August 13, 2025

Introduction

In 2025, the Sri Lankan government announced the creation of an Independent Prosecutors' Office (IPO), portraying it as a landmark step towards ending impunity for alleged war crimes and major human rights violations, particularly those committed during the civil war and its aftermath. For Sri Lanka’s Tamil communities—long marginalized and aggrieved by state responses to wartime abuses—this move has sparked sharp debate. Many Tamils perceive the IPO as an iteration of past mechanisms such as the Office on Missing Persons (OMP): institutions hailed internationally as progress, but domestically haunted by accusations of inertia, tokenism, and lack of genuine accountability. This advocacy report examines the context, design, and reception of the IPO, evaluating whether it remedies the deep failures of the OMP or risks becoming another state-driven illusion designed to pacify international pressure while sidelining Tamil demands for justice.

The analysis unfolds through a comprehensive historical review of the OMP, a critical exploration of the IPO’s proposed mandate, and a deep dive into the voices and advocacy of Tamil stakeholders. It rigorously compares both institutions’ mandates, strengths, and weaknesses, and closes with balanced, evidence-based recommendations to ensure that hard-won lessons from Tamils’ decades-long struggle for justice are not ignored or co-opted.

Historical Context: The Office on Missing Persons (OMP) and Tamil Grievances

Institutional Genesis and Mandate

The OMP was established in 2017 under the Sirisena–Wickremesinghe administration, which marked it as the inaugural pillar of four proposed transitional justice mechanisms following Sri Lanka’s long civil conflict. Legislated through Act No. 14 of 2016 (amended in 2017), the OMP was tasked with searching for and tracing missing persons, providing administrative and psycho-social support to affected families, compiling centralized databases, and making recommendations to relevant authorities.

But critically, the OMP’s design as a truth-seeking rather than prosecutorial body meant that its findings were intended, by law, not to give rise to criminal or civil liability. It could recommend compensation and inform legal avenues, but could not itself launch or forward prosecutions.

Governance and Structure

OMP commissioners, numbering seven, were formally nominated by the Constitutional Council and appointed by the President. The Act stipulated that commissioners must represent Sri Lanka’s plural society and possess backgrounds in human rights, humanitarian law, or investigation. Governance provisions aimed for institutional independence and transparency, including annual reporting and provisions for victim and witness support.

Operational Record and Performance

By mid-2024, the OMP had received over 21,000 complaints relating to missing persons, especially from the conflict-ravaged North and East provinces. It had, through various stages, conducted thousands of preliminary inquiries, engaged with some civil society organizations, and referred a limited number of cases for reparations or further investigation.

However, its tangible impact was modest to negligible. As of late 2024, the OMP could confirm the fate of only 17 individuals out of over 20,000 cases; even these results were not universally disclosed to families for privacy or procedural reasons. The OMP also faced grave structural and operational deficits: underfunding, shortages of forensic specialists, weak legal standing of its ‘Certificates of Absence’ (CoA), and lack of access to military or police files and databases.

International and Domestic Critique

The OMP’s design and performance attracted piercing criticism from both international human rights actors and, even more vocally, the Tamil communities it aimed to serve:

  • UN and OHCHR: The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the OHCHR repeatedly stressed that the OMP lacked robust investigatory, forensic, or prosecutorial powers, and warned that its process was not delivering “truth, justice, or redress to families”. In 2024, OHCHR found that not a single disappeared person’s fate had been meaningfully clarified.
  • Case Studies and Civil Society: Reports catalogued a pattern of state neglect, poor follow-up on forensic investigations (such as mass graves in Chemmani and Mannar), and bureaucratized compensation schemes that felt like ‘hush money’ to families seeking answers.
  • Tamil Family Associations: Protesting Tamil mothers, the Association for the Relatives of Enforced Disappearances (ARED), and the Families of the Disappeared collectively called for the OMP’s dissolution and the introduction of a genuinely independent, prosecution-capable mechanism with international involvement.

Rejection by Victims and Calls for International Justice

Decades of previous commissions, all accused of ineffectiveness and partiality, meant that the OMP was met with skepticism from its inception. Continuous vigils and protests in the North and East—some surpassing 2,000 consecutive days—demonstrated the depth of Tamil families’ distrust. Key points included:

  • Families directly rejected compensation and ‘Certificates of Death’ in lieu of truth and justice.
  • OMP’s composition (including ex-military personnel) and selection process were seen as state-controlled.
  • Repeated calls for international or hybrid (mixed international/Sri Lankan) mechanisms, as stipulated in UN HRC Resolution 30/1 and reinforced by the Tamil diaspora and NGOs.

The Independent Prosecutors Office (IPO): Structure, Mandate, and Political Context

Official Launch and Justification

By early 2025, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the establishment of an Independent Public Prosecutors Office (alternately ‘IPO’ or ‘IPPO’), styled as a prosecutorial body fully separate from the Attorney General’s Department, with sub-offices at provincial level. Advocates of the IPO argued that it would help end prosecution delays, especially in cases with political or military sensitivities, strengthen public trust, and address widespread international concerns regarding Sri Lanka’s record on accountability for grave violations.

Legal and Structural Framework

The IPO’s guiding proposals included:

  • Structural Independence: A new, separate office empowered to initiate and carry out prosecutions, insulated from the government executive and not subordinate to the Attorney General.
  • Expert Committee: The formation of a technical specialist committee, chaired by a senior judge, to draft the legal framework, comprising the Attorney General or two nominees, the Secretary to the Ministry of Justice, a senior judge, and the President of the Bar Association of Sri Lanka or their nominee.
  • Legislative Mandate: The committee is assigned to recommend draft legislation and amendments to create the office’s mandate, ensure tenure, and protect against executive interference.

International and Policy Context

The IPO proposal has been positioned as aligning with UN and IMF recommendations, notably those of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in September 2024, who explicitly called for urgently establishing an independent prosecutorial authority, and the IMF’s Governance Diagnostic Assessment which cited the need for a break from the Attorney General’s conflicting roles.

Government officials and supporters subsequently presented the IPO as both a response to international pressure and a key promise in election manifestos. Plans for regional sub-offices have been suggested to improve geographic accessibility and outreach.

Structural Critique and Uncertainties

Despite its purported independence, concrete design details remain ambiguous:

  • Overlap of Personnel: The included presence of Attorney General’s Department representatives on the initial planning committee raised concerns about possible institutional overlap and the risk of continued executive influence.
  • Demarcation of Authority: Questions persist about lines of reporting (to Parliament, to executive, or to the public), the relationship to existing prosecutorial frameworks, and the sustainability of prosecutorial independence.
  • Legal Safeguards: Critics question whether the mere creation of a parallel office, without robust legal, operational, and budgetary insulation, would prevent the familiar pitfalls of political or military interference.

Early Reactions and Worldview

Early reactions from human rights organizations and legal commentators have been cautious. While some analysts see the IPO as a long-overdue means to restore prosecutorial independence, the entrenched history of politicized prosecutions and compromised institutions tempers optimism. The IPO is being watched closely for signs of genuine operational autonomy—or evidence that it is, as many critics fear, simply a new face on an old problem.

Comparative Analysis: The OMP and IPO in Structure and Function

Key Similarities and Differences

Feature / Criteria

Office on Missing Persons (OMP)

Independent Prosecutors Office (IPO)

Year Established

2017

Not yet operational; approved May 2025

Legal Foundation

OMP Act No. 14 of 2016

To-be-drafted legislation; in committee stage

Mandate

Trace missing/disappeared, provide data, recommend redress

Prosecute criminal cases, esp. serious human rights abuses

Investigative/Prosecutorial Powers

No criminal/civil liability; truth-seeking only

Intended to possess prosecutorial and indicting authority

Structural Independence

Appointees via Constitutional Council, but seen as state-controlled

Intended as separate from Attorney General, but overlap possible

Membership/Leadership

Human rights, legal, some with military/political backgrounds

Initial committee includes AG reps, Justice Sec, senior judge

Tamil Community Experience

Widespread rejection, boycott, branded ‘sham’

Early fear of repeat tokenism; calls for tangible safeguards

International Engagement

Established under transitional justice, high international profile

Responds to UN HRC recommendations, aims to answer pressure

Public Reporting/Transparency

Annual reports, but little disclosure or enforcement

Yet undetermined; transparency and accountability demanded

Outcome/Performance

No significant findings, no prosecutions, minimal reparations

Too early to assess; skepticism abounds

Mechanism for Redress

Recommend compensation, issue CoAs (of disputed legal efficacy)

Meant to enable criminal consequence; effect untested

Perception of Political Influence

High—seen as co-opted by government

Risk of same; committee composition a point of concern

*Table based on data from multiple references, including legal source texts and comparative studies: *

Analytical Elaboration

The comparison reveals several themes:

  • Power and Purpose: The OMP was fundamentally powerless in legal terms; the IPO is explicitly charged with prosecution, promising greater consequence. However, history suggests that new legal offices in Sri Lanka risk being undermined unless their independence is institutionally guaranteed.
  • Structural Ambiguity and Lack of Trust: The pattern of including government or AG-affiliated figures in both mechanisms has deeply eroded trust and given rise to suspicions of state co-optation, especially among Tamil communities who have been burned before.
  • Victim’s Access and International Standards: Neither mechanism has, to date, adequately incorporated victim or survivor participation, nor has either lived up to global best practices for protection, outreach, and transparency. Failure to heed Resolution 30/1’s call for hybrid (partly internationalized) accountability is a major cause of Tamil and advocacy group skepticism.

Tamil Stakeholder Perspectives: Deep Roots of Skepticism

Historical Marginalization and Exclusion

Since independence, Sri Lankan Tamils have endured policies and social structures that systemically prioritized Sinhala-Buddhist identity—through citizenship and language acts, education discrimination, military occupation of Tamil-majority lands, and restrictions on economic, social, and political participation.

In the post-war landscape, the lack of devolution of power and the continued dominance of Colombo-based, military-influenced decision making have left Tamil communities highly suspicious of government-led initiatives, including the OMP and now the IPO.

OMP: Case Studies of Failure

Tamil voices across family associations, civil society groups, and diaspora organizations are strikingly consistent in their assessment of the OMP:

  • Families say the OMP has “not revealed the fate of any forcibly disappeared people,” has provided no closure in emblematic cases (such as lists of those who surrendered in 2009), and has attempted to substitute meager compensation for actual accountability.
  • The inclusion of government and military figures among OMP commissioners, and the state’s failure to consult victim families or incorporate their proposals in the OMP’s design, has been seen as a betrayal.
  • Repeated, years-long protests—frequently met with intimidation by state security—testify to a total loss of confidence in domestic mechanisms.

IPO: Cosmetic Change or Genuine Shift?

Early reactions to the IPO announcement among Tamil stakeholders and diaspora advocacy networks reflect a deep-seated skepticism born of experience:

  • Perception as ‘Another Illusion’: Tamil civil society, political leaders, and NGOs argue that the IPO is “another pacification mechanism,” created to deflect international demands while leaving underlying impunity untouched.
  • Control by State Actors: There is concern that institutions and figures implicated in historical abuses are deeply embedded in the IPO’s planning and would have continued influence over its prosecutions.
  • Exclusion and Tokenism: Tamils note the lack of genuine consultative process in the IPO’s design—a process that would require linguistic, regional, and cultural representation as well as robust victim and civil society input.
  • Demand for International/Hybrid Mechanisms: There is overwhelming support—from affected families, diaspora groups, and local organizers—for a hybrid court, as initially mandated in UN HRC Resolution 30/1, involving international judges, prosecutors, and investigators.

Illustrative Advocacy and Quotes

  • “No Justice, No Peace—Only a Hybrid Court.” (Tamil civil society, Diaspora protests)
  • “Domestic inquiries have proven cosmetic… controlled by the very institutions implicated in these crimes” (Centre for Policy Alternatives)
  • “We have been cheated for years; without prosecutions against the officers responsible, this is another strategy to deceive us” (ARED protesting mothers, December 2024)
  • “Our children’s lives are worth more [than Rs. 200,000]; don’t silence us with compensation—we want an impartial international investigation” (Protesting mothers, Mannar, July 2024)

Diaspora and International Advocacy

The Tamil diaspora, especially in countries like Canada, the UK, Germany, and Australia, has been a powerful voice for transitional justice and international accountability. Diaspora-led campaigns have:

  • Pushed for recognition of the Tamil genocide, universal jurisdiction cases, and referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
  • Driven narrative change in host countries, sometimes drawing diplomatic pushback from the Sri Lankan government but also winning local government support (monuments, education weeks, trauma services).

Advocacy groups emphasize that any sustainable transitional justice mechanism in Sri Lanka must incorporate diaspora perspectives, learning from international models where collaboration between domestic and foreign experts led to more credible results (Bosnia, Guatemala, Kosovo).

Concerns Over Domestic-Only Process

Tamils collectively argue that a domestically controlled IPO risks the same stalling tactics, evidence suppression, and selective investigation that characterized previous bodies. Without robust oversight and enforcement powers, plus legal protections for witnesses, there is little confidence that impunity for state security personnel or political elites will be overcome.

International and UN Perspectives: The Hybrid Court Mandate

Human Rights Council Resolutions and Global Consensus

UN Human Rights Council Resolutions, especially 30/1 and 34/L1, repeatedly stressed the need for a credible accountability process, comprising independent judicial and prosecutorial institutions led by individuals “known for their integrity and impartiality.” Both specifically reference the inclusion of international judges, prosecutors, and investigators within domestic judicial mechanisms.

The rationale is twofold:

  1. Restoring Victim Trust: Widespread and justifiable suspicion among Tamil victims and civil society cannot be overcome by domestic-only bodies, especially given “decades of violations, malpractice and broken promises”.
  2. Capacity and Impartiality: International experts can bring experience, technical skill, and a guarantee of impartiality often lacking in post-conflict settings, and can shield vulnerable witnesses and prosecutors from political or military retaliation.

The OHCHR’s 2024/2025 reports further confirm that domestic mechanisms in Sri Lanka have not delivered and explicitly encourage the government to accept internationalized solutions.

Global and Comparative Lessons

Transitional justice research finds greater success and legitimacy where multiple mechanisms work in tandem, particularly where truth-seeking is integrated with real prosecutorial and reparative capacity and international expertise.

Hybrid models in East Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Cambodia have shown mixed results, but generally outperform domestic-only systems in outcomes for victims, transparency, and public confidence. Key failings in such models arise when international personnel are “window dressing,” or when political interference—through funding, leadership appointments, or legal changes—is not decisively blocked.

Comparative Table: Key Similarities and Differences — OMP vs IPO

Feature

Office on Missing Persons (OMP)

Independent Prosecutors Office (IPO)

Establishment

2017, via Act No. 14 of 2016

Cabinet approval May 2025; legislative design underway

Mandate

Truth-seeking; tracing and documenting the missing

Intended criminal prosecution of grave violations

Judicial Powers

No prosecution; recommend redress/compensation only

To be prosecutorial, with power to indict (details TBD)

Structure

7-member commission, Constitutional Council nomination

Technical committee (AG reps; Justice Sec; Bar rep; Senior judge)

Independence

Designed as independent, widely seen as executive-influenced

Designed as separate, but concerns over overlaps and political input

Victim Input

Minimal participation; families insist exclusion and tokenism

Early criticisms of exclusion; calls for meaningful engagement

Outcome Record

No criminal or civil outcomes; scant success in tracing the missing

Not yet operational; skepticism about actual prosecutorial independence

Community Trust

Very low among Tamils; subject to protests, calls for abolition

Early perception among Tamils is of repeat “illusion”; credibility in question

International Reaction

Criticized as ineffective, insufficient for real accountability

Initial praise for intention, but international and UN actors recommend a hybrid, not domestic-only, accountability mechanism

Role in Reconciliation

Limited, superficial

Potential only if independent, empowered, and impartial

Sourced and synthesized from:

Will the IPO Break With the Past or Repeat OMP Failures?

Positive Potential

If robustly designed and insulated in practice from all political interference, a truly independent prosecutorial service could finally begin the process of holding perpetrators of international crimes to account. It could enable fair trials, bolster public trust, and demonstrate to the world a new commitment to the rule of law in Sri Lanka. The inclusion of regional offices and transparent selection processes could help address long-standing regional, ethnic, and linguistic imbalances in access and representation.

Risks of History Repeating

But as of August 2025, the risk of cosmetic reform far outweighs evidence of structural change.

  • Political and Institutional Overlap: The involvement of Attorney General’s appointees and state officials on foundational committees echoes the central flaw of previous mechanisms, blurring lines between prosecution and executive influence.
  • No Guarantees of Independence: Without safeguards—guaranteed tenures, transparent funding, external oversight—the IPO risks suffering the same fate as the OMP: slow, inconclusive, and unable to resist pressure from entrenched power.
  • Absence of International Oversight: The breakout lesson from hybrid models—also endorsed in UN HRC 30/1—remains unadopted. Reluctance to internationalize, often disguised as “sovereignty,” equates to continued avoidance of real justice for Tamil victims.
  • Community Exclusion and Mistrust: The IPO’s initial framing and process have not meaningfully incorporated Tamil civil society or victim association leadership, guaranteeing a trust deficit from day one.

Recommendations

For the Government of Sri Lanka

  1. Guarantee Structural and Functional Independence
    • Enshrine IPO’s autonomy in law, ensuring that its leadership appointment/removal and funding are shielded from executive intervention.
    • Build in robust tenure, competitive and transparent recruitment, and exclusion of current or recent AG Department officials and state security personnel from IPO roles for all conflict-related cases.
  2. Ensure Meaningful Victim and Community Involvement
    • Institute participatory mechanisms for Tamil stakeholders, victim associations, and civil society at every stage of the IPO’s design, operations, and assessments.
  3. Hybridize for Credibility
    • Incorporate international personnel—judges, prosecutors, investigators, and forensic experts—empowered to lead or co-lead prosecutions as per HRC Resolution 30/1 and best international practice.
  4. Mandate Transparency and Accountability
    • Require regular public reporting of the IPO’s casework, policies, and outcomes, as well as a genuine parliamentary oversight structure (including opposition and minority representation).
    • Submit to independent audits and invite regular reviews by international human rights bodies.
  5. Provide Real Protections for Victims, Witnesses, and Activists
    • Establish a robust and fully resourced witness and victim protection program, ensuring non-reprisal and access to legal aid.
  6. Deliver Justice, Not Just Process
    • Avoid the trap of administrative closure and compensation payouts as ends in themselves; instead, prioritize investigation, prosecution, and conviction of perpetrators, regardless of rank.
    • Section all war crimes, crimes against humanity, and enforced disappearances as per international definitions with retroactive applicability.

For International Partners, the UN, and Advocacy Groups

  1. Condition Assistance on Genuine Reform
    • Tie multilateral assistance and engagement to the adoption of international participation in the IPO and visible progress on prosecutions involving state actors.
  2. Support Evidence Preservation and Hybrid Mechanisms
    • Continue and expand the work of the Sri Lanka Accountability Project in preserving evidence for future hybrid or internationalized accountability.
  3. Enable Diaspora and Victim Voices
    • Promote international platforms for Tamil survivor testimony and independent monitoring missions with access to mass grave sites and conflict regions.
  4. Strengthen Universal Jurisdiction Efforts
    • Encourage and support prosecutions in third countries where domestic processes in Sri Lanka fail, as advocated by the Tamil diaspora.
  5. Insist on Ongoing International Monitoring
    • Recommend the establishment of a permanent OHCHR country presence in Sri Lanka’s North and East with a mandate to monitor accountability efforts.

Conclusion

The creation of the Independent Prosecutors Office could represent a meaningful turning point for accountability in Sri Lanka—if, and only if, it learns from the deep failures of the Office on Missing Persons and moves beyond performative institutional redesign toward genuine, enforceable justice.

For Sri Lanka’s Tamil communities, the true measure of progress will not be legislative announcements or media briefings but rather convictions for crimes, recognition of lived harms, robust victim protection, and lasting institutional reform—all guaranteed through international participation and local ownership. Anything less risks repeating a now-familiar cycle: the enactment of mechanisms for appearances’ sake, and, in practice, the continuation of impunity and erosion of hope.

The international community, partners, and Sri Lanka’s own reformists must recognize that credibility will be earned not through new offices but through new outcomes—outcomes measured by truth, justice, and the genuine restoration of trust for victims and survivors.



     In solidarity,

     Wimal Navaratnam

     Human Rights Advocate | ABC Tamil Oli (ECOSOC)

     Email: tamilolicanada@gmail.com


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