“Sri Lanka’s Psychological Offensive Against Tamil Unity and the Fight for Indigenous Rights”

How Psychological Warfare Divides Us—and Why Unity Is Our Greatest Resistance

Disclaimer

This report is intended for educational, advocacy, and research purposes. It reflects a synthesis of publicly available sources, expert commentary, and community perspectives. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, the sensitive nature of the subject matter—particularly regarding psychological warfare and diaspora dynamics—means that interpretations may vary. The views expressed herein do not represent any official organization unless explicitly stated. Readers are encouraged to critically engage with the material and consult additional sources for a comprehensive understanding.

Editor’s Note

This report was compiled in response to growing concerns within the Eelam Tamil diaspora regarding the fragmentation of communal unity and the persistent obstruction of justice for Tamil victims of war and displacement. The cancellation of Tamil Fest 2025 and the disputes between the Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) and the National Council of Canadian Tamils (NCCT) serve as urgent reminders of the need for introspection and solidarity. We recognize the emotional weight of these issues and have approached them with care, respect, and a commitment to truth. Our hope is that this work contributes meaningfully to dialogue, healing, and collective action.

Methodology

This report employs a qualitative, interdisciplinary approach combining:

Document Analysis: Review of academic literature, NGO reports, news articles, and public statements from Tamil organizations between 2009 and 2025.
Comparative Case Study: Focused examination of the CTC–NCCT dispute and Tamil Fest 2025 as representative of broader diaspora fragmentation.
Historical Contextualization: Situating psychological warfare tactics within the post-war trajectory of Sri Lanka’s governance and its international posture.
Narrative Synthesis: Integrating community testimonies, activist perspectives, and symbolic events to construct a coherent account of disunity and resistance.

Sources were selected based on credibility, relevance, and diversity of viewpoint. APA-style citations are used throughout to maintain transparency and scholarly rigor.

Introduction

In the sixteen years since Sri Lanka’s civil war ended in 2009, the Eelam Tamil global diaspora has been subjected to concerted psychological warfare tactics by the Sri Lankan government. These strategies – ranging from propaganda and misinformation to the co-opting of diaspora organizations – have aimed to divide the Tamil diaspora and weaken its advocacy. The impact on diaspora unity has been profound, fueling internal disputes that repeatedly fracture communal cohesion. A notable example is the rift within the Canadian Tamil community between the Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) and the National Council of Canadian Tamils (NCCT), which culminated in public protests and the cancellation of Tamil Fest 2025, a major cultural event. This report analyzes the government’s tactics and their consequences, providing evidence that internal conflicts in the Eelam Tamil community have been frequent over the past 16 years. It also examines how the failure to counter these psychological operations has hindered progress toward justice for Tamils and the indigenous rights of Eelam Tamils. (All evidence is cited in APA style inline citations with direct sources.)

Case Study: CTC vs. NCCT and the Fallout of Tamil Fest 2025

Since the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war in 2009, the Eelam Tamil diaspora has faced sustained psychological operations by the Sri Lankan state. These tactics aim to fracture diaspora unity, delegitimize Tamil advocacy, and obstruct justice efforts. The fallout is evident in disputes such as the one between the Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) and the National Council of Canadian Tamils (NCCT), culminating in the cancellation of Tamil Fest 2025—a symbolic loss for cultural solidarity.

Background

CTC is a prominent Tamil organization focused on cultural and political advocacy.
NCCT emerged as a grassroots alternative, often challenging CTC’s approach and affiliations.

Conflict Dynamics

Disputes over representation, political alignment, and transparency have escalated over the years.
In 2025, protests and public disagreements led CTC to cancel Tamil Fest, citing safety and reputational concerns (Tamil Fest).

Impact

The cancellation of Tamil Fest 2025—a major cultural event—symbolizes the erosion of communal unity.
It reflects how internal disputes, often exacerbated by external psychological tactics, undermine collective identity and advocacy.

📉 Evidence of Internal Conflicts (2009–2025)

Frequent Splintering: Multiple Tamil organizations have fractured over leadership disputes and ideological differences.
Public Protests: Demonstrations against diaspora leaders accused of compromising Tamil interests have occurred in Toronto, London, and Geneva.
Failed Coalitions: Attempts to form unified diaspora councils have repeatedly collapsed due to mistrust and competing agendas (Tamil Rights Group).

Sri Lankan Government’s Psychological Warfare Tactics Against the Tamil Diaspora

The Sri Lankan state emerged from the armed conflicts viewing the Tamil diaspora as a continuing threat to its “victor’s peace.” Immediately, it launched psychological operations targeting Tamils abroad. These tactics can be categorized as follows:

Propaganda and Misinformation:

In the final phase of the war, the Sri Lankan military tried to demoralize diaspora Tamils by spreading false news of rebel collapse and infighting. For example, in January 2009, state defence authorities leaked stories of defections and disarray within the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), hoping to alienate the diaspora from the rebels. This psychological operation anticipated that Tamil expatriates would lose hope and disengage. (Notably, the effort backfired at the time, as diaspora communities instead rallied in massive protests. But the use of disinformation to influence diaspora morale had been clearly established.)

Labelling and Proscription as “Terrorists”:

A core tactic has been to delegitimize diaspora activism by branding organizations as terrorist fronts. In 2014, the Sri Lankan government banned 15–16 Tamil diaspora groups and 424 individuals, including mainstream bodies like CTC and advocacy groups like NCCT, TGTE (Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam), and the Tamil Youth Organization. By invoking anti-terror legislation, Colombo signaled that any Tamil political mobilization abroad was illicit. As one Tamil Canadian activist observed, “Sri Lanka has long been able to designate acceptable and unacceptable political objectives” through such bans, recasting legitimate Tamil aspirations as security crimes. The designation of diaspora groups as “terrorist” was a form of “war by other means”, intended to isolate and criminalize the Tamil nationalist movement in exile. Practically, the proscription meant any Sri Lankan who engaged with these organizations could be prosecuted, and diaspora members risked arrest under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act if they traveled to Sri Lanka. This created a climate of fear and suspicion, undermining diaspora activism.

Divide-and-Conquer via Co-opting Moderates:

The government has also pursued a divide-and-rule strategy by engaging with selected “moderate” diaspora factions while excluding or vilifying others. In recent years, Colombo reached out to certain diaspora leaders to participate in “reconciliation” initiatives that many Tamils see as one-sided. A prominent example was the “Himalaya Declaration” process in 2023: a small group of diaspora representatives from the Global Tamil Forum (GTF) – of which CTC is a leading member – signed a joint statement with Sinhala Buddhist clergy calling for a united Sri Lanka with devolved power. Sri Lanka’s government actively facilitated these meetings, even having President Ranil Wickremesinghe formally receive the declaration. By delisting certain groups from its terror list (e.g. GTF and CTC were officially de-proscribed in 2022), the government offered a carrot: legitimacy and access in exchange for cooperation. Meanwhile, other diaspora organizations that refused to soften their stances – such as NCCT, the Tamil Youth Organisation (TYO), and TGTE – remained banned and sidelined. This selective engagement is a calculated tactic to fragment the diaspora, nurturing an “acceptable” Tamil voice (willing to work within Sri Lanka’s unitary framework) versus “radical” voices (those demanding self-determination or international justice). It creates mistrust and rivalry within the community, as evidenced by diaspora observers noting that Colombo “seeks to consolidate its victory over the idea of political self-determination for Tamils” by coopting diaspora groups and “targeting the Tamil Diaspora [as] a deliberate…strategy”.

Surveillance, Infiltration and Intimidation:

Although harder to document publicly, Sri Lankan intelligence has surveilled diaspora activists and allegedly infiltrated community organizations. Tamils abroad have long suspected that informants and agents provoke internal discord or report on activists. Sri Lankan embassies have monitored Tamil protests and cultural events in Canada, the UK, and elsewhere, instilling fear that participation might endanger relatives back home or one’s ability to visit Sri Lanka. This intimidation by proxy – effectively extending the reach of Sri Lanka’s security state into diaspora life – is another form of psychological pressure keeping the community on edge. Evidence of this surveillance can be seen in asylum assessments and human rights reports which note that known Tamil activists abroad risk harassment or worse if they return to Sri Lanka. The resulting atmosphere can breed paranoia within diaspora circles, sometimes leading to witch-hunts (accusing rivals of being Colombo’s agents) which further erode unity.

Taken together, these tactics amount to a sustained psychological warfare campaign. The intended outcomes are clear: demoralize the Tamil diaspora, sow internal divisions, sever the bonds between diaspora and homeland, and undermine the credibility of Tamil advocacy. A lecturer from the University of Jaffna succinctly observed in 2014 that the ban on diaspora groups sought to “demoralise Tamils in the homeland” by cutting off a source of strength, while also delegitimizing diaspora input into UN human rights inquiries. By choking information flows and threatening joint efforts, Colombo attempted to drive a wedge between Eelam Tamils at home and abroad. All these strategies have had serious repercussions for diaspora cohesion and effectiveness, as discussed next.

Impact on Diaspora Unity and Community Cohesion

The Sri Lankan government’s tactics have directly undermined diaspora unity, exacerbating fault lines within the Eelam Tamil community worldwide. Over the past 16 years, internal conflicts have flared repeatedly, often following the pressure points engineered by Colombo’s psychological operations. Key impacts on diaspora cohesion include:

Fragmentation of Diaspora Organizations

In the immediate post-war period, Tamils abroad made efforts to close ranks and continue their political struggle through democratic means. Two major initiatives in 2009–2010 were the formation of the Global Tamil Forum (GTF) – a worldwide umbrella of Tamil groups – and the establishment of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) – a diaspora “government in exile” with elected representatives. However, these attempts at unity quickly succumbed to infighting and factionalism, much of it traceable to ideological divisions and the Sri Lankan state’s manipulations:

By 2013, the GTF had split: Roughly half its member organizations (particularly those aligned with traditional LTTE-aligned networks) pulled out of the forum. The GTF’s leadership, which included the CTC, increasingly took a moderate line and engaged with Colombo, prompting pro-independence groups such as the British Tamils Forum (BTF) and others to withdraw and go their own way. As a result, the GTF lost much of its broad base; by 2023 it reportedly consisted only of CTC and a Norwegian Tamil group, with all others having left. This left the diaspora without a single unified voice – exactly the outcome Colombo would desire.
The TGTE likewise failed to unite the diaspora. Internal rivalries plagued it from inception. Notably, two factions within the LTTE’s overseas network (loyalists of K.P. Pathmanathan vs. Castro) clashed over TGTE leadership, undermining the project. Some activists participated in TGTE elections only to resign and form opposition blocs, while others founded alternative bodies like GTF to counter it. In the end, “none of the structures created managed to impose itself as the voice of the diaspora” – a fragmentation that Sri Lanka’s government has been keen to exploit.

This post-war diaspora schism can be seen as the continuation of Colombo’s “divide and conquer” strategy. With the LTTE’s centralized command gone, a “myriad of organizations” emerged, often competing for support. The Sri Lankan state’s actions – especially the blanket terrorist proscription of diaspora groups in 2014 – poured fuel on these splits. Moderate activists felt pressure to distance themselves from anything that could be labeled “extremist,” while hardline nationalists doubled down on their stances to preserve Tamil aspirations. The result was a diaspora political sphere that one scholar describes as “fragmented…with different views on goals and strategies,” all operating under contradictory external and internal pressures.

Ideological Divides: “Moderates” vs “Hardliners”

Sri Lanka’s psy-ops have deepened ideological cleavages in the diaspora, especially the tension between reconciliation-minded voices and those upholding maximalist goals (like Tamil Eelam statehood). The terrorist labeling and outreach to select groups created a sharp binary:

Guardians of Tamil Nationalism:

On one side stand organizations and youth groups determined to not “betray” the Tamil struggle. These include bodies like the TYO and NCCT in Canada, as well as many local Tamil Coordinating Committees (TCCs) worldwide that trace their roots to LTTE-era structures. They have taken a firm public line that any compromise on core principles – such as the Tamil right to self-determination or honoring the LTTE’s legacy – is unacceptable. For example, in 2012 the NCCT and TYO issued a joint statement boldly declaring: “We will boycott any Tamil diaspora organization that compromises the principles of Homeland, Nation and Self-Determination, and therefore lends legitimacy to the unitary state of Sri Lanka.”. This “name and shame” approach explicitly targets groups seen as deviating from the traditional Tamil nationalist stance, much like the LTTE used to brand opponents as traitors. While such hardline groups command broad grassroots support in the diaspora majority, they are often dismissed by governments as “extremists”. Notably, Sri Lanka has kept these groups (TYO, NCCT, etc.) on its banned list, signaling that they remain “unacceptable” to the state.

Pro-Reconciliation Moderates:

On the other side are diaspora organizations that have “gradually departed from the LTTE traditional stance” in favor of engagement and reform within a united Sri Lanka. The Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) and the remnants of GTF epitomize this camp. These groups have toned down overt separatist rhetoric; for instance, they often avoid using the Tamil Eelam flag or images of LTTE leaders at public events, arguing (controversially) that such symbolism alienates Western interlocutors. They tend to focus on issues like human rights, accountability, and devolution rather than outright independence. This stance has won them greater credibility with international policymakers – indeed, Western officials “give much more attention” to the moderate diaspora voices – and, in turn, facilitated initiatives like the CTC/GTF engagement in Colombo’s “national conversation” in 2023. However, these same actions have caused outrage among much of the diaspora, who view them as dangerously naive at best or downright treacherous at worst. The Sri Lankan state’s courting of these moderates is a deliberate wedge: by holding up a few Tamil groups who are willing to collaborate (and rewarding them, e.g. via de-proscription), Colombo isolates the hardliners and fuels the narrative that Tamils are divided and thus weaker.

The net effect of these divides is an erosion of trust within the diaspora. Sri Lanka’s propaganda has each side accusing the other: moderates are slandered as “sell-outs” or Sri Lankan agents, while hardline activists are branded as “Tiger terrorists” clinging to the past. This mistrust sometimes spills into the open in diaspora forums and social media, undermining chances for consensus on even basic community issues. A scholar of transnational activism noted that since 2009, “heated debates have taken place within [diaspora] organizations about the extent of concessions that should be made”, particularly on abandoning the demand for a separate state. The diaspora’s dilemma has been aptly summarized as “confrontation or reconciliation?” – a schism aggravated by Colombo’s maneuvers. Crucially, when diaspora moderates attempted reconciliation (e.g., meetings with the Sri Lankan President), the lack of tangible progress and the government’s continued hostile rhetoric often vindicated the hardliners’ suspicions, perpetuating the cycle of internal division.

Case Study – Canadian Tamil Congress vs National Council of Canadian Tamils

Nowhere have these dynamics been more visible than in Canada, home to one of the largest Eelam Tamil diaspora populations. The longstanding rift between the Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) and the National Council of Canadian Tamils (NCCT) illustrates how Sri Lanka’s tactics have exacerbated diaspora factionalism, with real-world consequences for community events and advocacy.

Background:

The CTC (formed in 2000) is a mainstream organization that positioned itself as a cultural and advocacy group for Tamil Canadians – it engages with Canadian politicians, hosts cultural festivals, and until recently took strong human-rights stands. The NCCT was created in 2010 as a democratically elected council of Tamils across Canada, in the wake of the war. Endorsed by 85 Tamil organizations and even linked to the TGTE’s vision, NCCT’s mandate was explicitly nationalist: to advance “the long-standing legitimate aspirations of the Tamil Nation…based on their inherent right to self-determination,” and pursue international justice for genocide. In essence, CTC and NCCT emerged as parallel representative bodies – with overlapping membership but diverging philosophies (CTC seen as more moderate/inclusive, NCCT as more hardline/pro-independence).

Government Proscription and Aftermath:

In March 2014, Sri Lanka’s proscription list banned both CTC and NCCT, lumping them together as terrorist fronts. Tamil activists in Canada widely condemned this as an attempt to gag the diaspora. Over 80 Canadian Tamil groups – spanning the CTC/NCCT divide – convened a Tamil Community General Assembly in April 2014 and unanimously rejected Colombo’s ban. Their joint document noted that proscribing diaspora organizations was intended to “prevent the Tamil diaspora from campaigning for the right to self-determination,” calling it a “reactionary measure” showing Sri Lanka’s unwillingness to pursue truth or accountability. This moment of solidarity, however, was short-lived. By 2015–16, Colombo selectively delisted certain groups as a conciliatory gesture under a new government – the CTC was removed from the ban list and hailed this move, whereas NCCT remained proscribed. The CTC’s president openly welcomed being “delisted” and “no LTTE to support” as a positive step. To hardliners, this reinforced suspicions that CTC was getting too cosy with Colombo.

“Betrayal” – CTC’s Engagement with Colombo:

Tensions exploded in late 2023 when CTC leaders, as part of the GTF delegation, traveled to Colombo and met with former Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa – the very individual most Tamils regard as a war criminal responsible for the 2009 massacres. Photos of CTC representatives smiling and shaking hands with Rajapaksa (who remains under Canadian sanctions for gross human rights violations) went viral. The diaspora reaction was swift and furious. Tamils across Canada’s political spectrum felt “betrayed beyond belief”. A founder and past director of CTC said he was angered and astonished that the organization would “meet and pose for photographs with the man who bears chief responsibility” for mass atrocities. Canadian Member of Parliament Gary Anandasangaree (himself Tamil Canadian) publicly denounced the meeting as “deplorable”, noting it undermined years of advocacy for justice. In diaspora forums, CTC was excoriated for collaborating with “war criminals and perpetrators of Tamil genocide”. This event crystallized the diaspora’s internal rift: CTC (and by extension its GTF partners) were now seen by many Tamils as appeasers, whereas NCCT and allied groups positioned themselves as the true voice of Tamil resistance.

Tamil Fest 2024 Controversy and 2025 Cancellation:

The schism soon spilled into community life. The CTC annually organizes Tamil Fest, a large street festival in Toronto celebrating Tamil culture. In August 2024, the festival became a flashpoint for protest. Diaspora activists launched a boycott campaign against Tamil Fest, demanding CTC apologize for the Rajapaksa meeting and its involvement in the Sri Lanka–approved “Himalaya Declaration”. In the run-up, dozens of Tamil student associations and community groups called on the public and sponsors to shun the event, accusing CTC of genocide denial and betrayal. When Tamil Fest 2024 opened, demonstrators stood at the gates with signs and even disrupted performances: one Sri Lankan singer’s set was cut short after protesters pelted the stage with eggs. Several major sponsors and vendors withdrew at the last minute, and attendance was visibly lower than in previous years. A newly formed Canadian Tamil Collective stated that by proceeding despite community outcry, “the CTC has chosen to ignore the community’s concerns, risking unnecessary conflict and division.” CTC’s leadership, sensing the depth of anger, used the festival stage to issue an apology. CTC President Kumar Ratnam publicly acknowledged that meeting Rajapaksa was “a great mistake” and pleaded for forgiveness, vowing not to repeat such errors. Yet, as media noted, “the apology…has not quelled the anger of the Tamil Canadian community and leaves the future of the festival in the balance.” Indeed, by early 2025 the CTC canceled Tamil Fest 2025, citing the untenable divisions. (Toronto city officials had been petitioned to revoke CTC’s exclusive permit and allow a coalition of Tamil groups to run the festival instead, and community pressure remained high.) What should have been a joyous cultural showcase turned into a very public embodiment of diaspora disunity, sown by the Sri Lankan state’s tactics. A Federation of Global Tamil Organizations letter to the City of Toronto summarized the sentiment: the CTC “lost credibility in the Tamil Canadian community due to their active engagement with perpetrators of the Tamil Genocide,” and many felt a collective, multi-group approach was needed to heal the rift.

This Canadian case study underscores how Sri Lanka’s psychological operations directly contribute to diaspora infighting. Colombo’s orchestration of the “national conversation” and the optics of diaspora leaders with accused war criminals achieved precisely what one might suspect was intended – Tamils turning against Tamils. The CTC–NCCT feud is not an isolated incident; similar patterns of diaspora schisms have played out in the U.K., Australia, and elsewhere (for example, the split between the British Tamils Forum and the GTF in Britain, or disagreements between various Tamil associations in Europe over engaging with Sri Lankan initiatives). Each time, the Sri Lankan government seizes the narrative to its advantage, while the diaspora expends energy on internal disputes.

Frequent Internal Conflicts (2009–2025): A Timeline of Disputes

To appreciate how persistent these internal rifts have been, it is useful to review a chronology of major conflicts within the Eelam Tamil diaspora in the past 16 years, many traceable in some form to Colombo’s influence:

2009–2010 – Post-war Reorganization vs. Rivalry:

In the immediate aftermath of the war, diaspora activists worldwide organized mass protests and then formed new political structures (TGTE, GTF) to carry the torch. However, by late 2010, rival camps (ex-LTTE functionaries, new community leaders, etc.) were jockeying for leadership. This led to parallel bodies and mutual distrust. Rival LTTE diaspora networks (KP vs Castro factions) fought over TGTE’s control, while others refused to work together, preferring separate platforms. The seeds of future discord were sown early.

2012 – Hardliner Backlash:

As some diaspora groups began moderating their tone, hardline youth and nationalist groups openly challenged them. The NCCT/TYO boycott statement of 2012 (quoted above) is a prime example, effectively drawing a line that foreshadowed the CTC’s ostracism later. This showed that even without direct government prompting, the diaspora’s internal ideological guardrails (shaped by decades of war) would punish those seen as compromising. Yet, it is important to note that this extremely uncompromising stance also plays into Colombo’s narrative of an “intransigent diaspora.”

2014 – United Response to Bans, then Divergence:

Colombo’s mass proscription of diaspora groups in March 2014 initially unified the diaspora in outrage. Tamil organizations jointly denounced it, and Tamil Nadu’s legislature and international figures also criticized the ban. The diaspora held conferences (like one in Toronto, April 2014) to outline a common position defending Tamil nationhood and condemning Sri Lanka’s actions. However, as mentioned, the unity did not last. When Sri Lanka changed tactics under international pressure – e.g., temporarily lifting some bans in 2015 and engaging moderate diaspora activists – the fragile unity shattered. Those who engaged with Colombo (believing in a chance for incremental change) soon stood apart from those who remained distrustful. By the late 2010s, the diaspora was essentially operating in two or three siloed camps with minimal coordination.

2015–2020 – Stagnation and Mutual Recrimination:

During Sri Lanka’s Yahapalanaya (Good Governance) period (2015–2019), Colombo made token gestures toward reconciliation. Some diaspora groups like CTC cautiously welcomed these, focusing on lobbying for reforms (e.g., constitutional changes, release of political prisoners). Hardline diaspora voices warned that this would lead nowhere substantive – a prediction arguably borne out when promised reforms stalled. Each side blamed the other: moderates accused hardliners of holding back progress with maximalist demands, while hardliners accused moderates of being naïve and undercutting calls for strong international action. This internal tug-of-war meant that, for example, when Sri Lanka defaulted on commitments (like failing to fully implement UN Human Rights Council resolutions), the diaspora response was not as unified or forceful as it could have been.

2020–2023 – Renewed Hostilities and Public Splits:

The return of the Rajapaksa regime in 2020 saw a reversion to hardline Colombo policies (e.g., reinstating the diaspora ban in 2021 on many groups that had been delisted). The diaspora once again broadly condemned this and continued pushing for international accountability (supporting initiatives like the UN investigation and sanctions on Sri Lankan officials). However, the very end of this period saw the controversial GTF-CTC engagement with the Sri Lankan government’s “national conversation” project (the Himalayan Declaration tours in 2023). This proved to be the breaking point that openly pit diaspora factions against each other in a way not seen in years – culminating in the CTC’s isolation in Canada by late 2024 as described. Thus, by 2025 the diaspora was as divided as ever, despite facing the same unresolved core issues since 2009.

In summary, internal conflicts have indeed been frequent and at times painfully public. While not all can be directly attributed to Sri Lankan government interference, Colombo has consistently acted in ways that exploit and widen these rifts. As one diaspora commentator noted, “targeting the Tamil Diaspora remains a deliberate strategy” to consolidate the Sinhala nationalist victory, and part of that strategy is clearly to set Tamils against Tamils. The failure of the community to develop a unified front or an effective strategy to resist these manipulations leads to detrimental consequences for the broader Tamil cause.

Consequences for Justice and the Eelam Tamil Cause

The implications of diaspora disunity have been grave, particularly for the quest for justice and the rights of Eelam Tamils (the Tamil people of Sri Lanka’s north and east, who identify as an indigenous nation on the island). The infighting and fragmentation detailed above have obstructed progress on multiple fronts:

Diluted International Advocacy:

A united diaspora could exert formidable pressure on the international community to pursue war crimes investigations, enforce human-rights conditions on Sri Lanka, or recognize Tamil political grievances. Instead, competing diaspora narratives have sometimes muddled the message. For instance, when diaspora moderates engage with Colombo and issue joint statements about reconciliation, it can signal to foreign governments that the Tamil question is on the path to resolution – undercutting campaigns for international accountability. Sri Lanka’s president has cynically leveraged these divisions; even as security forces crack down on memorial events in the Tamil homeland, he showcases meetings with diaspora groups as evidence of “progress”. This feeds a false international perception that the Tamil issue is primarily a diaspora quarrel, thereby reducing urgency to press Sri Lanka on justice. A diaspora scholar noted that if diaspora organizations enter negotiations or dialogues that yield no real concessions, the only result is “giving the impression that the crisis is being resolved and drawing away the attention of the international community.” Unfortunately, this has happened more than once in the past decade.

Stalled Justice and Accountability Efforts:

Every internal dispute is a distraction from the core mission of securing justice for mass atrocities. Sri Lanka has adeptly used the “terrorist diaspora” label to deflect war crimes allegations – portraying them as LTTE propaganda – and the diaspora’s fragmentation has made it easier to maintain that narrative. Notably, the 2014 proscription was timed just as the UN Human Rights Council’s inquiry into wartime abuses was beginning; by banning key Tamil organizations, Sri Lanka aimed to “delegitimise the involvement of Tamil diaspora organisations in [the UN] inquiry”. A prominent Tamil civil society activist, Kumaravadivel Guruparan, observed that this would make it harder for investigators to engage with diaspora witnesses and groups. Indeed, if some Tamil groups are branded extremist and others are co-opted, international justice mechanisms may struggle to identify credible partners. The end result has been delays and shortcomings in justice: years after the war, survivors still await a genuine accountability process. Meanwhile, Sri Lanka continues to use draconian security laws (PTA) against Tamils, justifying it by the purported threat of an “LTTE revival” via the diaspora. This has perpetuated a state of impunity and insecurity on the ground.

Undermining Indigenous Rights and Tamil Nationhood:

The concept of Eelam Tamils as an indigenous nation with the right to self-determination has been a cornerstone of Tamil political thought. One of Colombo’s key objectives in its psychological war is to destroy the legitimacy of Tamil nationhood. By fostering internal Tamil disagreements over goals (e.g., federalism vs. separatism), the Sri Lankan state attempts to show that Tamils themselves do not have a unified claim. For example, the Himalayan Declaration touted by the government in 2023 made no mention of the word “Tamil” or recognition of Tamil nationhood – it spoke only in broad strokes about individual rights in a united country. Tamil critics pointed out that this declaration “totally ignore[d] Tamil grievances and the pain and suffering Tamils have undergone since independence”, accusing its diaspora signatories of undermining the long-standing demand for an international justice process. The failure to counter such initiatives with a single Tamil voice means Colombo can claim it is addressing Tamil issues while actually sidestepping core political questions (like autonomy, land rights, demilitarization of Tamil areas, etc.). Divisions between diaspora groups and Tamil political leaders in Sri Lanka have also hurt the cause: at times diaspora hardliners have been at odds with the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) – the main party representing Tamils in Sri Lanka – accusing it of being too conciliatory, while the TNA has in turn been skeptical of diaspora agendas. This lack of coordination has weakened efforts to secure constitutional reforms or international support for Tamil rights. In short, as long as Tamils speak with disparate voices, the Sri Lankan state can continue to deny the distinct status and rights of the Eelam Tamil people.

Erosion of Communal Morale:

The constant infighting has also sapped the morale of the Tamil community, both abroad and in the homeland. The diaspora was often referred to as the “voice for the voiceless” and a source of moral support for Tamils living under military occupation in the North-East. When diaspora organizations fight each other or are discredited, it has a demoralizing effect on Tamils on the ground. Guruparan explicitly noted that the overarching goal of proscribing diaspora groups was to demoralize Tamils in the homeland, precisely because “the diaspora is considered by Tamils in the homeland as a source of strength.”. By cutting off diaspora partnerships (through fear of legal repercussions) and funding flows to Tamil areas, Colombo tries to isolate the struggle. For example, the ban disrupted diaspora-funded development and memorial projects in the North-East, leaving local activists feeling abandoned. Moreover, within the diaspora, younger generations witnessing bitter disputes may become disillusioned or apathetic about community activism. This brain drain of activism is a loss for the Tamil cause in the long term. The Sri Lankan state’s aim of creating a wedge between Tamils abroad and Tamils at homeserves to diminish the overall resilience of the Tamil resistance to assimilation and injustice.

Ultimately, the inability to effectively counter Colombo’s psychological operations has meant that sixteen years after the war, Tamils are still struggling to achieve unity of purpose. The community’s immense potential – as evidenced by the mass protests of 2009 and the global mobilization for justice – has been blunted but not broken. Many analysts and community leaders assert that overcoming these divisions is vital. As one diaspora coalition put it, “No one organization holds the authority to decide for the entirety of our population” – implying that inclusive, collective leadership is needed going forward. The lesson from the past decade and a half is stark: so long as Colombo can pit Tamil against Tamil, the path to justice and equality will remain obstructed.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In conclusion, the psychological warfare waged by the Sri Lankan government within the Eelam Tamil global community has had deep and damaging effects. Through propaganda, legal bans, selective engagement, and intimidation, Colombo has managed to engender repeated internal conflicts in the Tamil diaspora, sapping its unity. This report has highlighted how these tactics played out – from early post-war splits in diaspora leadership to the recent CTC–NCCT feud that saw community institutions in Canada come to a standstill. The failure to counteract these tactics – due in part to pre-existing ideological splits and mistrust – has significantly hindered progress toward the Tamil people’s collective goals. It has delayed justice for wartime atrocities, weakened international recognition of Tamil rights, and demoralized the very community whose solidarity is essential for any political solution.

Going forward, the Eelam Tamil diaspora and their allies face the imperative of learning from these experiences. To resist Colombo’s divide-and-rule strategy, Tamil diaspora groups may need to establish mechanisms for dialogue among themselves, perhaps a new inclusive consultative process that bridges moderates and hardliners on minimum common principles. Honest communication, transparency with the wider community, and confidence-building across factions will be key. The diaspora might also form a united front for specific campaigns – for example, on prosecuting war crimes or defending Tamil detainees’ rights – even if they differ on the end-state question. International actors (host governments, NGOs, the UN) should be made aware of Sri Lanka’s “divide and distract” methods, so they are not misled by a curated appearance of progress. Supporting broad-based Tamil civil society and listening to a range of diaspora voices (and not only those hand-picked by Colombo) is crucial.

Above all, the Tamil diaspora must recognize that intra-community disputes ultimately only serve the oppressor’s interests. The past 16 years furnish ample proof of that: every major dispute has set back the push for truth, accountability, and a political solution. It is a testament to the resilience of the Tamil nation that, despite these setbacks, the call for justice and rights is still alive – evidenced by continuous advocacy at the UN, sanctions on Sri Lankan human rights abusers by countries like Canada, and the unwavering remembrance of Tamil genocide by diaspora youth. To truly honor the sacrifices of the past and secure the future of Eelam Tamils, diaspora unity is paramount. Countering Colombo’s psychological warfare is not easy, but it begins by refusing to play the zero-sum games it has engineered. As the saying goes, united we stand, divided we fall – and the Eelam Tamil struggle for justice and self-determination cannot afford to fall any further behind.

In solidarity,

Wimal Navaratnam

Human Rights Advocate | ABC Tamil Oli (ECOSOC)

Email: tamilolicanada@gmail.com

References (APA Style)

Amarasingam, A. (2014, April 20). Canadian Tamils outline consensus position on Eelam Tamil issues. Tamil Guardian.

Balasundaram, N. (2013, May 4). Is the Tamil Diaspora against unity in Sri Lanka? Groundviews. (Discusses post-war Tamil diaspora dynamics).

Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC). (2016, May 2). No LTTE to support – Interview with CTC President Raj Thavaratnasingham. Ceylon Today via CTC website. (CTC welcomes delisting by Sri Lanka)

Canadian Tamil Congress. (2025, May 27). CTC News – Distribution of Moringa plants to war-affected women in Batticaloa. (Example of CTC engagement in Lanka after delisting).

Federation of Global Tamil Organizations (FGTO). (2024, January 9). Instead of CTC, consider Tamil orgs coalition as host for Toronto Tamil Fest – Letter to City of Toronto. FGTO Press Release.

Guruparan, K. (2014, April 1). Proscription of diaspora orgs is to demoralise Tamils in homeland. Tamil Guardian.

Jalal, M. A. (2011). Think like a Guerilla: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Sri Lanka. Harvard National Security Journal, 2(1). (Details on SL military strategy, including psy-ops).

Nadarajah, S. (2018). The Tamil Proscriptions: Identities, Legitimacies, and Situated Practices. Terrorism and Political Violence, 30(2), 278-297. (Academic analysis of diaspora ban impacts).

Noria Research. (2017, May 23). From Arms to Politics: The New Struggle of the Tamil Diaspora. Noria – South Asia Program.

Saravanamuttu, K. (2014, April 1). The Proscription of the Tamil Diaspora: War by Other Means. Colombo Telegraph.

Sri Lanka Brief. (2022, August 13). Ban on key Tamil diaspora groups lifted including GTF. Sri Lanka Brief News.

Tamil Guardian. (2009, Jan 23). Sri Lanka targets diaspora, but Tamils resist. Tamil Guardian.

Tamil Guardian. (2023, Dec 18). “A betrayal beyond belief” – Tamil Canadians vent their fury at CTC after meeting with Rajapaksa. Tamil Guardian.

Tamil Guardian. (2023, Dec 8). GTF meets Sri Lankan president and signs joint declaration with Sinhala Buddhist monks. Tamil Guardian.

Tamil Guardian. (2024, Aug 30). Protests and boycott campaign hit Canada’s Tamil Fest. Tamil Guardian.

Tamil Guardian. (2024, Nov 19). Weerawansa criticizes diaspora influence as CTC calls for reforms. Tamil Guardian. (Sri Lankan politician accusing CTC of separatism)

Tamil Net. (2010, June 18). Eezham Tamils in Canada to form country council. TamilNet.

The Morning (Sri Lanka). (2023, Dec 24). Reconciliation through “national conversation”. The Morning (By A. Fernando). (Discusses Govt’s Himalayan Declaration meetings)

United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). (2015). Report of the OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL). (UN inquiry into war crimes, with diaspora witness contributions).

Vatta, R. (2021). Disrupting the “Tamil diaspora–terrorism” paradigm: Mobilisation of younger generation Tamils in London. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 14(4). (Insights into post-war diaspora youth activism challenging state narratives).

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“FRACTURED FRONTLINES: THE CTC–NCCT DIVIDE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR TAMIL DIASPORA UNITY”