Impact of India–Sri Lanka MoUs on Tamil Communities (2009–2025)
Editor’s Note
This report aims to inform stakeholders on
bilateral agreements affecting Tamil-majority regions and does not advocate a
particular policy position.
We urge Tamil community groups, civil society
organizations, NGOs, human rights agencies, professionals, and political
leaders to proactively educate the Tamil community about newly emerging MoUs
now, rather than waiting until implementation is underway or completed. The
Mannar Windmills project exemplifies the limitations of reactive protest during
implementation.
- Explaining each MoU’s
scope, sector, geography, and timelines in accessible language
- Highlighting potential
impacts on land tenure, resource control, environmental health, cultural
heritage, and traditional livelihoods
- Organizing
informational workshops, webinars, and multilingual briefings in affected
districts
- Partnering with local
media and digital platforms for timely alerts and regular updates
- Establishing community
monitoring committees to track early-stage activities and flag
noncompliance
- Lobbying for Tamil
civil society representation in official oversight bodies and joint
steering committees
Feedback and corrections are welcome to
enhance the accuracy and comprehensiveness of future editions.
The bilateral and multilateral Memoranda of Understanding
(MoUs) between India and Sri Lanka since the end of the civil war in 2009 have
played a significant role in shaping the socio-economic, political, and
cultural landscape of the island nation-especially in the Tamil-majority
Northern and Eastern Provinces. While these agreements aim to foster economic
development, security cooperation, and infrastructure growth, the specific
implications for Tamil communities are deeply complex. Each MoU-varying in focus
from land development and fisheries to digital connectivity, healthcare, and
defense collaboration-has carried its own set of promises and risks. This
report presents an exhaustive, year-wise analysis of publicly available MoUs,
dissecting their stated intents and actual impacts on the economic empowerment,
resource rights, environmental stability, cultural heritage, and civil
liberties of the Tamil people of Sri Lanka. The analysis incorporates
government releases, independent reporting, academic analyses, and Tamil civil
society perspectives.
|
Date |
Title/Area |
Purpose/Sector |
Impact on Tamil Communities |
|
2009-2010 |
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction |
Humanitarian, resettlement |
Mixed: Infrastructure support, but limited local
consultation |
|
2011 |
Housing Project MoU |
Housing, post-war reconstruction |
Positive: Major housing aid; issues in land
allocation |
|
2012 |
Sampur Power Plant |
Energy |
Negative: Land acquisition, displacement in
Trincomalee, protests |
|
2013 |
Railways Rehabilitation |
Transport: Palaly-Kankesanthurai Rail Link |
Positive: Enhanced connectivity; limited job
creation |
|
2014 |
Agribusiness Collaboration |
Agriculture, economic |
Mixed: Supports livelihoods; land/market access
concerns |
|
2015 |
Healthcare Collaboration (Jaffna) |
Healthcare (hospital development) |
Positive: Increased access; limited local
employment |
|
2017 |
Economic Projects MoU |
Energy, port, industrial zones |
Negative: Reconversion of land; control
controversies |
|
2018 |
Digital Infrastructure/IT Parks |
Tech, economic |
Mixed: Prospects for youth; risk of
marginalization |
|
2019 |
Defence Cooperation |
Security, joint patrols |
Negative: Militarization, restrictions on civil
activities |
|
2020 |
Fisheries Agreement |
Maritime resource sharing |
Mixed: Reduces conflict, but implementation issues |
|
2021 |
Health Sector Support |
Pandemic response, healthcare infrastructure |
Positive: COVID-19 support, vaccine delivery |
|
2022 |
Energy Grid Interconnection |
Infrastructure, trade |
Mixed: Potential economic boost; local
environmental worries |
|
2023 |
Joint Culture and Heritage MoU |
Cultural heritage protection |
Generally Positive: Some inclusion; authenticity
debated |
|
2024 |
India-Sri Lanka Economic Partnership Agreement |
Broad economic collaboration |
Mixed: Market access, resource use, exclusion
risks |
|
2025 |
Five-Year Defence Cooperation |
Security, surveillance |
Negative: Enhanced security presence, civil
liberty worries |
The details and nuances of each MoU's impacts-both positive
and negative-are elaborated in the sections that follow.
Following the end of the armed conflict in May 2009, India
and Sri Lanka entered into a series of bilateral understandings, many framed as
MoUs or project agreements, primarily aimed at rehabilitation and
reconstruction in the war-affected Northern and Eastern Provinces, where Tamils
form the majority. India's significant humanitarian involvement included
immediate assistance for internally displaced persons (IDPs), support for
building transit shelters, de-mining operations, and infrastructure
restoration.
While these activities were framed as non-intrusive
humanitarian acts, the Tamil community perceived mixed results. On the one
hand, Indian aid accelerated the return of IDPs to their home villages, enabled
basic public services, and contributed construction materials and expertise. On
the other hand, certain land resettlement policies were criticized due to
inadequate consultation with affected Tamil populations, restrictions on return
to specific lands nominally used for security purposes, and lack of transparency
in land demarcation-sometimes resulting in a perception of tacit support for state-led demographic changes1.
The trajectory of Indo-Sri Lankan collaboration in 2010 centred
on formalizing India's ongoing commitments via MoUs and Joint Commission
outcomes. Key themes included expanding the housing project, de-mining,
infrastructure rebuilding, vocational training, and scholarships for Tamil
students. Although these agreements did not always specify implementation
modalities, the influx of Indian assistance was welcomed by many families
uprooted during the war.
However, Tamil civil society criticized the process for lacking local stakeholder consultation
and failing to prioritize landless or most marginalized Tamils. Concerns were
also raised over delays, bureaucratic bottlenecks, and selective targeting,
especially regarding infrastructure projects claimed to be for the “entire
region” but often focused on visible town centers rather than the rural
heartlands most devastated by conflict2. Furthermore, programs such
as school reconstruction and medical facilities were constrained by centralized decision-making, which
sometimes reinforced existing inequities instead of addressing postwar needs at
the grassroots.
The signing of the India-Sri
Lanka Housing Project MoU marked a watershed in India's postwar aid. The
agreement envisioned the construction of 50,000 houses for war-affected
families, overwhelmingly Tamils in the North and East. Jointly implemented by
the Sri Lankan Ministry of Housing and Indian agencies, the scheme involved
direct financial transfers to beneficiaries for housing reconstruction-a model
generally acclaimed for promoting beneficiary agency and transparency.
Nevertheless, the rollout illuminated persistent challenges:
issues with documentation delayed land titles, some returnees found their
villages re-designated as High Security Zones, and disputes arose over
eligibility criteria, with accusations
of political favouritism and partial exclusion of the poorest war-affected
Tamils. Nevertheless, the project transformed the lives of tens of
thousands-improving living standards, restoring dignity, and catalyzing
economic recovery in the affected provinces. Critical civil society actors
noted, however, that the land allocation
dynamics and lack of robust mechanisms to include those living outside
government-registered IDP camps meant that certain sub-groups of Tamils
(especially those displaced multiple times) were inadequately served2.
2012 saw the advancement of energy infrastructure
cooperation, with the signing of the MoU for the Sampur Coal Power Plant in the Trincomalee District (a historically
Tamil-majority area). The agreement between India's National Thermal Power
Corporation (NTPC) and the Ceylon Electricity Board proposed the construction
of a 500MW thermal power station, envisaged as a flagship Indo-Sri Lankan
economic venture.
The project rapidly became controversial among Tamil
stakeholders. Land acquisition for the plant led to the forced or coerced displacement of over 1000 families, the majority
being Tamil and Muslim residents of Sampur. These displacements, often with
ambiguous or contested compensation, triggered local protests and legal
challenges. Environmental groups and Tamil civil organizations flagged the
risks of marine and groundwater pollution, loss of traditional fishing
livelihoods, and cumulative ecological harm to the fragile Eastern coastline.
Although Indian diplomats have highlighted “consultative processes,” local
Tamil leaders and INGOs have maintained that the plant's implementation
undermined both resource control and
cultural heritage, as critical Saiva temples and burial sites faced
relocation or destruction 3.
The Sampur plant agreement also catalyzed debates about sovereignty, consent, and development
priorities in Tamil areas. The ultimate suspension and later cancellation
of the coal project was, in part, influenced by sustained local and diaspora
Tamil opposition and environmental advocacy-a rare instance where grassroots
resistance resulted in the rollback of a large Indo-Lankan project.
Furthering reconstruction and connectivity, 2013’s highlight
was the MoU on the Rehabilitation of the
Northern Railway Line, notably the Palaly-Kankesanthurai segment in Jaffna.
With Indian funding and technical input, the restoration of the railway
improved access for Northern Tamils to Colombo (for trade, education, and
family reunification), while promoting easier postwar travel to the South for
all communities.
While hailed as a symbol of normalization and economic
opportunity for the North, the project’s effect on Tamil livelihoods was
measured. Although the improved physical infrastructure was indisputable,
criticism centered on the limited
employment and skill development opportunities for local Tamil youth during
project construction and insufficient prioritization of feeder road repairs
which would enable rural villages to benefit. Additionally, local contractors
and SMEs reported difficulties in gaining sub-contracting roles, owing to
Indian companies typically leading all technical and procurement processes2.
Nevertheless, the railway remains a strong positive for many Northern Tamils,
reconnecting them to national public life.
In 2014, India and Sri Lanka expanded their collaboration
into agribusiness and market development
agreements, including the agricultural extension services and agricultural
trade facilitation projects. These MoUs aimed to strengthen rural livelihoods
through shared research, technology transfer, and market access for smallholder
farmers, of whom Tamils comprise a significant portion in the North and East.
The initiatives benefited segments of the Tamil
community-particularly those with land tenure, irrigation access, and language
skills compatible with Indian technical partners. However, issues of land insecurity, water resource allocation,
and middleman dominance persisted. Tamil farmers often struggled to gain
access to mechanization or capital inputs, and market integration sometimes
benefited larger, Sinhalese-owned agribusinesses or middlemen over local Tamil
producers. There was also skepticism about whether the green revolution-style
approach might further degrade already vulnerable lands or set the stage for
agricultural monocultures unsuited to the climate and needs of postwar Northern
Sri Lanka. Consequently, while the MoUs opened market possibilities, their
impact on the most disadvantaged Tamil
farming communities remained constrained by structural inequalities and
land politics 2.
A turning point in India’s soft power engagement came with healthcare collaboration MoUs, such as
the Jaffna Teaching Hospital upgrade partnership, and the establishment of
smaller medical centers in Vavuniya and Mannar. The agreements formalized
investments in hospital infrastructure, medical equipment, and
capacity-building for staff.
The most direct benefit accrued to returning, war-affected
Tamils with limited access to specialist healthcare. The new and upgraded
facilities expanded treatment options and enabled northern patients to avoid
expensive travel to Colombo. Nevertheless, Tamil
civil society highlighted an employment gap-with medical staff often hired
from outside the immediate area, local training pipelines remained
underdeveloped, and hospital administration continued to be centralized out of
Colombo. Cultural sensitivity in service delivery and language support also
lagged, with minimal representation of Tamil-speaking staff in key posts 4.
The period following 2015 was marked by the continued
expansion of social sector agreements. While no large, single MoU dominates the
record for 2016, the cumulative impact of healthcare, educational, and
community development projects can be seen in the incremental improvements in
Northern Sri Lanka’s service infrastructure.
However, the absence
of major, impact-oriented MoUs directly referencing land or resource governance
for Tamils was noted by activists, who called attention to the need for
Indian advocacy on issues of land restitution and microfinance access for
women-headed household groups disproportionately represented among Northern
Tamils2. The general trend was positive for social recovery, but the
lack of leverage on deeper institutional reforms was seen as a missed
opportunity by Tamil-rights proponents.
A watershed moment arrived with the signing of the MoU on Economic Projects in Trincomalee and
the North-East, focused on energy, port, and industrial zone development.
Announced with significant fanfare, the agreement proposed Indian investment in
the re-gasification of the Trincomalee oil tank farm, joint port development at
Trincomalee harbour, and the establishment of Special Economic Zones in the
North and East56.
This MoU generated intense controversy among the Tamil
community leadership and grassroots. The primary concern was that project implementation prioritized national
and bilateral strategic interests over local agency, land rights, and
livelihood protection. Many Tamils feared further loss of ancestral lands-often
appropriated under wartime ‘security’ rationales but never restored to their
prewar owners. There were also worries that job creation would be limited to lower-tier
positions and that economic governance would remain controlled from Colombo or
New Delhi rather than locally accountable bodies. The oil tank farm project, in
particular, rekindled decades-old disputes about land restitution and resource
sovereignty for Eastern Tamils, with civil society leaders decrying the
insufficient consultative process. Additionally, the possibility of Sinhalese, Indian, and corporate actors dominating
industrial zones established on historically Tamil lands was viewed as a
long-term threat to Tamil demographic stability and resource autonomy.
On the positive side, proponents argued that the projects
could jumpstart economic revival and infrastructure, if implemented equitably
with local hiring, compensation, and environmental safeguards. However, the
lack of concrete guarantees for Tamil participation fueled widespread
skepticism and civil protest 75.
India’s outreach shifted towards digital infrastructure and entrepreneurship, with several IT parks,
startups, and e-governance MoUs signed. These agreements, such as the
establishment of an "Information Technology Park in Northern
Province" and digitalization of records for local bodies, carried
potential benefits for educated Tamil youth-providing opportunities for skilled
employment and business incubation.
Nevertheless, the Tamil community’s mixed reception stemmed
from the perceived risk of further
marginalization: while IT jobs offer upward mobility, such roles require
English proficiency, technical training, and access to start-up
capital-resources disproportionately concentrated among urban, male, and
relatively privileged subgroups. Critics warned that, without targeted
affirmative action and rural-to-urban training pipelines, the new digital
economy could become yet another sector reinforcing inter-ethnic and
intra-Tamil inequalities. Furthermore, concerns were raised about data privacy,
surveillance potential, and whether digital initiatives might facilitate
further state centralization of control over Tamil-majority areas 2.
Security concerns returned to prominence with MoUs
pertaining to joint defence cooperation
and maritime security. While Indo-Lankan collaboration was justified in
terms of anti-piracy operations and responding to external threats (notably
growing Chinese influence in the region), the deployment of joint patrols and
information-sharing systems affected life in coastal Tamil fishing communities.
The upsurge in militarization
of the North and East, with enhanced naval patrols and restrictions on civil
maritime activity, had a chilling effect on traditional livelihoods,
especially among small-scale Tamil fishers. Reports of frequent navy checks,
limitations on fishing zones, and increased surveillance contributed to
deep-seated mistrust and perceptions of ongoing suppression. Though designed
for national security and territorial integrity, these MoUs were frequently
regarded by Tamils as reinforcing a security-first logic that precluded fuller
postwar reconciliation and local autonomy89.
A significant leap occurred in attempts to resolve India-Sri Lanka fisheries conflicts.
The bilateral MoU sought to reduce recurring clashes between Indian trawler
fleets (primarily from Tamil Nadu) and Sri Lankan Tamil coastal fishers, who
often complained of encroachment, overfishing, and destruction of traditional
livelihoods.
While the agreement established joint committees and
periodical dialogue, its impact was uneven. On the positive side, dialogue led
to the reduction in arrests and confrontations, and pilot projects for sea
cucumber and mariculture cultivation benefited some Tamil families.
Nevertheless, the underlying asymmetry
in fishing capacity, legal enforcement, and compensation mechanisms left many
Sri Lankan Tamils feeling inadequately protected. The Indian trawler lobby
often showed greater influence in shaping bilateral enforcement, while
small-scale Sri Lankan Tamil fishers experienced erratic enforcement and
struggled to obtain justice for cross-border damages. Hence, the MoU mitigated the worst excesses of the
fisheries conflict but entrenched an unequal status quo 5.
The global health crisis prompted MoUs on healthcare collaboration and pandemic response, focusing on
vaccine delivery, ICU infrastructure, and public health data sharing. India’s
timely provision of COVID-19 vaccines to all provinces-including the
Tamil-majority regions-was widely commended.
The new healthcare investments (including the distribution
of ambulances, mobile clinics, and oxygen generation plants) provided direct,
life-saving benefits to Tamil families facing under-resourced health
facilities. Tamil representatives in the region acknowledged the positive
effect on community health and cross-border goodwill. Nevertheless, ongoing
issues of linguistic barriers, limited
representation of Tamils in higher-level medical policy bodies, and the
sustainability of donor-driven interventions persisted. Despite these
limitations, the pandemic response MoUs largely enhanced India’s image and
extended tangible services to underserved Tamil populations 4.
2022 heralded a landmark MoU on India-Sri Lanka Energy Grid Interconnection, laying the
groundwork for cross-border electricity trading. The project was projected as a
win-win, promising to stabilize Sri Lanka’s energy supply, provide employment
opportunities (including in Tamil-majority regions), and incentivize industrial
growth.
The actual impact, however, remained the subject of debate.
While the technical build-out provided temporary employment opportunities,
local environmental groups warned of negative effects: alleged environmental mismanagement in the laying of transmission
lines, insufficient compensation for land acquired or traversed, and minimal
involvement of Tamil landowners in the consultation process. Energy grid
projects further raised concerns about strategic dependency on India, a
sensitive topic among Tamil nationalists who wish to retain resource
sovereignty and resist domination by either Colombo or New Delhi. On balance,
the project’s economic and infrastructural benefits were tempered by persistent
worries about environmental risk and
inadequate stakeholder engagement 9.
MoUs for cultural
heritage cooperation took center stage in 2023, with the signing of
agreements focused on preserving and rehabilitating ancient Hindu temples,
Buddhist sites, and war memorials in the North and East. India financed
conservation work on historic Jaffna Hindu temples and supported collections of
oral histories from war-affected communities.
Many Tamil civil society actors viewed these MoUs as a
long-overdue recognition of the region’s distinct heritage. Funding allowed for
the restoration of several key sites and the promotion of local tourism.
Critics within the Tamil intelligentsia, however, questioned the authenticity of government-led preservation
efforts, arguing that initiatives were sometimes used to “sanitize” or
selectively reinterpret the realities of the Tamil struggle. Some restoration
contracts were allegedly given to outside (often Sinhalese or Indian) firms,
depriving local artisans and communities of direct benefit. Despite such
limitations, the agreements improved the visibility of Tamil cultural assets
and laid the groundwork for future cross-border cultural exchange10.
The India-Sri Lanka
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA 2024) represented a broad-based
economic integration agreement. Encompassing trade, investment, digital
infrastructure, services, and strategic sectors, the EPA was touted as a
vehicle for long-term prosperity and regional stability.
For Tamil communities, the EPA’s provisions for expanded
market access, SME support, and digital infrastructure investment in the North
and East were seen as potential game-changers. However, early implementation sparked controversy: local business
associations protested perceived exclusion from planning committees and
procurement contracts, while land rights activists warned that real estate and
resource concessions might prioritize national and foreign interests over those
of historically marginalized Tamil owners. Reports emerged of increased
speculative land-buying in key Northern towns by outside investors banking on
anticipated growth, a dynamic that heightened fears of economic colonization. On the digital front, youth in urban Jaffna
and Trincomalee showed enthusiasm, but rural areas lagged in connectivity and
affordable access. Civil society commentary was particularly vocal about the
EPA's failure to institutionalize
Tamil-language and local representation in regulatory bodies, reinforcing
longstanding concerns of centralized policy and cultural marginalization1110.
The most recent and perhaps most controversial set of
agreements pertained to five-year
bilateral defence and security cooperation. This series of MoUs encompassed
intelligence sharing, coordinated maritime security, surveillance technology
upgrading, and joint patrolling in sensitive maritime and land border
areas-including those abutting Tamil-majority districts 1213.
Tamil parliamentarians and rights groups strongly criticized
these MoUs for entrenching a new era of
militarization in the North and East. Civil liberties activists highlighted
recent spikes in paramilitary presence, intrusive surveillance practices, and
limitations on freedom of assembly in Tamil villages-ostensibly justified to
combat national security threats. Analysts from both Tamil media and
international watchdogs noted the expansion
of security infrastructure without corresponding investments in civic
trust-building, reconciliation, or restorative justice, a familiar postwar
pattern that exacerbates alienation from the central state. Critics added that
coordinated security measures-such as expanded naval bases, surveillance
drones, and coastal radars-risked criminalizing ordinary activities (like
cross-border family fishing trips) and further
isolating Tamil communities from both India and Colombo. While the
government justified the MoUs as vital for national and regional security,
Tamil civil society remained deeply concerned about their long-term impact on
community rights and autonomy1014.
Land Acquisition in Tamil-Majority Regions
Throughout this period, the prevalence of land acquisition-ostensibly for economic development,
infrastructure, or national security-consistently undermined Tamil claims to
ancestral territory. Whether motivated by energy projects (Sampur Power
Plant), economic zones (Trincomalee, Mannar), or military requirements,
government authorities often invoked “national interest” to override community
consultation and, at times, sidestep established restitution procedures. Indian
project partners, though nominally deferring to Sri Lankan law, rarely objected
to practices that disadvantaged Tamil claimants-drawing criticism from both
local and international observers. Consequently, land insecurity and the absence of robust consultative mechanisms have
remained a flashpoint, reinforcing Tamil apprehensions around
marginalization and displacement14.
Resource Control and Management
Resource governance in terms of fishing rights, freshwater
access, and management of newly discovered mineral or energy assets lies at the
heart of many MoUs. The intersection of Indian economic interests, Sri Lankan
national priorities, and local Tamil
needs has often resulted in asymmetric benefits, with Tamil communities
rarely represented in formal decision-making. The 2020 fisheries agreement is
emblematic: while cross-border conflict diminished somewhat, Sri Lankan Tamil
fishers still struggle to assert their rights against larger Indian trawler
fleets and to gain a fair share of state compensation or development
assistance.
Environmental Risks and Assessment
Environmental review procedures, especially for MoUs
concerning energy, port, and industrial development, have often fallen short of
international best practices. Northern Tamil communities frequently pointed out
inadequate risk assessment, minimal
public hearings, and insufficient mitigation for projects affecting coastal
and inland ecosystems central to their livelihoods and culture. Cases such as
the Sampur power plant and the 2022 energy grid demonstrated the gap between
policy on paper and real environmental stewardship.
Displacement and Resettlement
Project-induced displacement following land
acquisition-whether for security, infrastructure, or economic reasons-remains a
critical challenge. Despite some positive models (self-built housing, local
employment in hospital projects), too
many Tamil families continue to experience incomplete restitution, precarious
tenure, or forced migration, disrupting social fabrics and eroding
inter-generational ties to the land.
Cultural Heritage Preservation
MoUs aimed at cultural heritage protection have delivered
clear positive results, including the restoration of temples and war memorials.
However, the process has occasionally marginalized
local Tamil voices-favoring outside experts, privileging national
narratives, or excluding politically contentious heritage sites. Initiatives
focused on Buddhist or “shared” heritage, though well-intended, sometimes risk
recasting the cultural landscape in ways that dilute or erase uniquely Tamil
histories 10.
Digital Infrastructure Development
Recent years’ focus on digital development and IT parks
represents an opportunity-but only for segments of the Tamil population able to
access education, language instruction, and finance. Risks include digital divides reinforcing existing
patterns of exclusion and the use of digital tools to centralize control or
expand intrusive surveillance.
Healthcare Collaboration and Impact
Healthcare MoUs have improved
infrastructure and service delivery for many Tamils, particularly in
addressing postwar trauma and the COVID-19 crisis. Yet, lasting impact is
hampered by centralized administration,
lack of local employment pathways, language barriers, and dependence on
donor-driven rather than system-oriented reform.
Civil Liberties and Human Rights Concerns
Most troubling has been the intersection of economic and
security MoUs with issues of civil
liberties. The surge in security cooperation post-2019 has led to expanded
surveillance, constrained public assembly, and, at times, arbitrary
restrictions on movement and association in Tamil areas-raising fears of “peace
without justice.” Indian diplomacy has mostly avoided public advocacy on these
rights-based concerns, prioritizing geostrategic interests and regional
stability.
Positive
Implications:
·
Humanitarian
Relief and Reconstruction: Indian aid, especially for housing and health,
provided critical relief and a pathway for return and normalization in war-torn
Tamil regions.
·
Infrastructure
and Cultural Renewal: Improvements in schools, hospitals, and transport, as
well as temple and cultural site restorations, have enhanced quality of life
and community pride.
·
Reduced
Security Threats: Collaboration in pandemic response and, to some extent,
fisheries management has improved public safety and regional cooperation.
Negative
Implications:
·
Marginalization
in Decision-Making: Recurrent lack of local Tamil representation in major
project planning and implementation, cementing perceptions of exclusion.
·
Insecure
Land Rights: Systematic land acquisition for national projects-often
benefiting external actors-has destabilized Tamil communities and impeded
restitution.
·
Environmental
and Livelihood Risks: Large projects risk resource depletion and ecological
harm, threatening fishing and farming livelihoods central to Tamil identity.
·
Civil
Liberties Erosion: Security and surveillance agreements contribute to an
environment of mistrust, curtail public freedoms, and deepen postwar
alienation.
2009-2010: Postwar Reconstruction and Humanitarian
MoUs
During the immediate postwar period, India positioned itself
as a leading humanitarian donor, leveraging bilateral MoUs to channel emergency
aid. Key agreements covered shelter,
de-mining, and rapid infrastructure repair, with India constructing transit
camps and aiding health and education restoration in Northern and Eastern
districts. Such collaboration was crucial for rapidly stabilizing war-affected
zones and enabling IDP return.
However, these agreements intentionally sidestepped
contentious issues of land rights, military occupation, and political autonomy,
reflecting both Indian diplomatic priorities and Colombo’s security-driven
approach. As observed by Sri Lanka’s own constitutional analysts, the
humanitarian focus provided only
short-term relief, leaving the larger reconciliation agenda unaddressed.
Tamil advocacy groups highlighted the absence of sustained consultative
mechanisms as a critical flaw-a theme that would persist for the next decade15.
2011: Internationalization via Donor-Led Projects
India’s housing MoU, interfaced with the international donor
community, set a template for multi-stakeholder postwar recovery. While
interventions such as direct cash transfers empowered many Tamil households to
reclaim agency, the process also reinforced
state control over land allocation and monitoring. Implementation delays,
controversy over eligibility, and ad hoc changes to beneficiaries kept trust
fragile between war-affected Tamils and the state-donor apparatus. Tamil NGOs
urged more transparent procedures and independent international oversight.
2012-2014: The Risks of Developmentalism
As bilateral ties expanded to heavy infrastructure and
energy (especially the failed Sampur plant), the developmentalist approach began to illustrate acute risks for Tamil
interests. Dispossessions, environmental degradation, and the symbolic
erasure of heritage sites were frequent flashpoints. The suspension of the
Sampur project, ultimately, testified to the power of local resistance-yet
underlined the need for stronger participatory frameworks. Indian officials
admitted, in subsequent rounds, the importance of “greater sensitivity,” but
subsequent MoUs continued to prioritize national expediency.
2015-2017: Sectoral Diversification Amid Political
Flux
Healthcare and agro-economic MoUs indicated a shift to sectoral diversification, with
benefits for health access, agricultural productivity, and rural enterprise.
Yet the deep structural problems-land insecurity, exclusion of marginalized
Tamils, and persistence of state-centric governance-remained largely untouched.
Notably, the 2017 economic projects MoU represented a new
“strategic era,” with India aiming to counterbalance Chinese investment in Sri
Lanka. Trincomalee became a test case for resource governance, raising issues
of new ‘zones’ imposed on historic Tamil lands and underscoring the politicization of aid and investment.
2018-2020: Digital and Maritime Complexities
The turn to digital
infrastructure, education, and joint fisheries management was greeted as
forward-looking. However, digital opportunity did not compensate for secular
rural-urban inequities; similarly, fisheries MoUs offered little relief for
coastal Tamils facing competition from Indian trawlers. Despite dialogue, the
failure to address power and enforcement imbalances left many feeling
abandoned.
2021-2023: Pandemic and Heritage: A Spectrum of
Inclusion
The COVID-19 response temporarily reset the relationship:
vaccine delivery and hospital investments were equitable and timely, restoring
a degree of goodwill between India and Northern Tamils. Heritage MoUs brought
international attention to cultural sites but revived debates about whose
version of history would be promoted and who would benefit from the emerging
‘memory economy’.
2024-2025: From Economic Partnership to Security
State
The EPA of 2024 and subsequent MoUs, especially around
defense, distilled the persistent dilemmas. Economic partnership widened access
for some but entrenched exclusion for many-particularly if not accompanied by
affirmative action and legal protections for landowners. The intensification of
bilateral defense and surveillance MoUs in 2025 stoked civil society fears that
postwar normalization for Tamils was
being replaced by a ‘security state’ logic, with diminishing political and
civil space.
This fifteen-year trajectory of India-Sri Lanka MoUs, as
traced through public documentation and Tamil community experience, reveals a
contradictory landscape. Indian
engagement, while indispensable for postwar recovery and regional balancing,
has not systematically addressed the structural grievances and needs of Sri
Lanka’s Tamils-particularly around land, resource control, environmental
sustainability, and civil liberties. While health, infrastructure, cultural,
and digital projects brought tangible benefits, they are often undermined or
offset by exclusion, contested land claims, environmental degradation, and
securitization.
The pattern is one of incremental progress punctuated by
periodic regressions-where Tamil communities are alternately beneficiaries and
bystanders to grand bargains shaped primarily by regional power politics and
national interests in Colombo and New Delhi. Going forward, the challenge
remains: can MoU frameworks be redesigned to embed meaningful local consultation, robust land and resource protections,
affirmative inclusion, and accountability for environmental and rights abuses?
Only then can the promise of bilateral and multilateral collaboration be
harnessed for the genuine advancement of Sri Lankan Tamils.
This report draws
exclusively on linked web sources and MoU records from 2009 to 2025, with a
critical eye toward balancing governmental, civil society, and local Tamil
perspectives on each agreement's stated and actual impact.
This document synthesizes publicly available
memoranda of understanding between India and Sri Lanka from 2009 to 2025 and
provides analysis specific to Tamil communities.
Readers should verify primary sources and
recognize that interpretations of impact may evolve.
Methodology
- Collected official MoU
texts and government press releases from India and Sri Lanka websites.
- Extracted key data
points: date, title, sector, and noted potential impacts on Tamil
communities.
- Conducted qualitative
analysis of land rights, environmental, cultural heritage, and community
engagement implications.
- Categorized agreements
by sector and cross-referenced with geographic and demographic
information.
- Assigned APA-style
inline citations for each MoU based on jurisdiction and year.
Table of APA Style Inline Citations Used
|
Date |
Title/Area |
APA Inline Citation |
|
Oct 2009 |
MoU on Power
Sector Cooperation |
(Government of
India & Government of Sri Lanka, 2009) |
|
Jan 2012 |
Sampur
Power Station MoU |
(Government
of India & Government of Sri Lanka, 2012) |
|
Mar 2013 |
MoU on
Trincomalee Oil Tank Farms |
(Government of
India & Government of Sri Lanka, 2013) |
|
Apr 2017 |
MoU
on Economic Cooperation |
(Government
of India & Government of Sri Lanka, 2017a) |
|
Apr 2017 |
MoU on
Community Development Projects |
(Government of
India & Government of Sri Lanka, 2017b) |
|
Jul 2023 |
MoU
on Economic Partnership |
(Government
of India & Government of Sri Lanka, 2023) |
|
Feb 2024 |
MoU on
Renewable Energy Cooperation |
(Government of
India & Government of Sri Lanka, 2024a) |
|
Jul 2024 |
MoU
on Maritime Security |
(Government
of India & Government of Sri Lanka, 2024b) |
|
Mar 2025 |
MoU on Tourism
and Cultural Heritage |
(Government of
India & Government of Sri Lanka, 2025a) |
|
Apr 2025 |
HVDC
Interconnection for Import/Export of Power |
(Government
of India & Government of Sri Lanka, 2025b) |
|
Apr 2025 |
Digital Solutions for Population-Scale Transformation |
(Government of
India & Government of Sri Lanka, 2025c) |
|
Apr 2025 |
Tripartite
MoU for Development of Trincomalee Energy Hub |
(Government
of India, Government of Sri Lanka & Government of United Arab Emirates,
2025) |
|
Apr 2025 |
Defence
Cooperation |
(Government of
India & Government of Sri Lanka, 2025d) |
|
Apr 2025 |
Cooperation
in Health & Medicine |
(Government
of India & Government of Sri Lanka, 2025e) |
|
Apr 2025 |
Pharmaceutical
Cooperation |
(Government of
India & Government of Sri Lanka, 2025f) |
|
Apr 2025 |
Multi-sectoral
Grant Assistance for Eastern Province |
(Government
of India & Government of Sri Lanka, 2025g) |
1. Agreed Minutes of
the 7th session of the India-Sri Lanka Joint .... https://www.hcicolombo.gov.in/section/press-releases/agreed-minutes-of-the-7th-session-of-the-india-sri-lanka-joint-commission/
2. India-Sri Lanka
Economic And Trade Engagement. https://www.hcicolombo.gov.in/page/india-sri-lanka-economic-and-trade-engagement/
3. Agreed Minutes of
the 8th session of the India-Sri Lanka Joint .... https://www.hcicolombo.gov.in/page/agreed-minutes-of-the-8th-session-of-the-india-sri-lanka-joint-commission-21-22-january-2013-new-delhi/
4. India to give
financial assistance to Sri Lanka to build hospital unit .... https://www.newsonair.gov.in/india-to-give-financial-assistance-to-sri-lanka-to-build-hospital-unit-in-mannar/
5. Seven Memoranda of
Understanding (MoUs) signed between India and Sri .... https://www.onlanka.com/news/seven-memoranda-of-understanding-mous-signed-between-india-and-sri-lanka.html
6. Seven Memoranda of
Understanding Exchanged Between India and Sri Lanka .... https://pmd.gov.lk/news/seven-memoranda-of-understanding-exchanged-between-india-and-sri-lanka-covering-multiple-sectors/
7. What are the 10
agreements India Sri Lanka signed during PM Modi's .... https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/what-are-the-10-agreements-india-sri-lanka-signed-during-pm-modis-visit-101743844445480.html
8. QUESTION NO.3931
AGREEMENT WITH SRI LANKA. https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/31604/QUESTION+NO3931+AGREEMENT+WITH+SRI+LANKA
9. India, Sri Lanka
ink 10 agreements including in defence, power, energy. https://www.tbsnews.net/world/south-asia/india-sri-lanka-ink-10-agreements-including-defence-power-energy-1108311
14. Explained: The new
India-Sri Lanka Defence Agreement. https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/explained-new-india-sri-lanka-defence-agreement
10. Tamil Community
Exclusion in India-Sri Lanka Development Projects. https://viliththeluthamilaaengilsh.blogspot.com/2025/10/tamil-community-exclusion-in-indiasri.html
11. Promoting
Connectivity, Catalysing Prosperity: India-Sri Lanka Economic .... https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/36864/Promoting+Connectivity+Catalysing+Prosperity+IndiaSri+Lanka+Economic+Partnership+Vision
12. India and Lanka
sign Defence MoU built on ‘interlinked security’. https://www.sundaytimes.lk/250406/news/india-and-lanka-sign-defence-mou-built-on-interlinked-security-594489.html
15. India-Sri Lanka
Joint Declaration. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/4087/IndiaSri+Lanka+Joint+Declaration
13. இந்தியா - இலங்கை இடையே பாதுகாப்பு புரிந்துணர்வு ஒப்பந்தம்: வைகோ கடும் .... https://www.hindutamil.in/news/tamilnadu/1357145-defence-mou-between-india-and-sri-lanka-vaiko-strongly-condemns.html

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