Census Trends and Demographic Engineering in Tamil Regions of Sri Lanka
Engineering the Demographics: Sri Lanka’s Census and State-Led Reshaping of
Tamil-Majority Regions, 1981-2024
⚖️ Disclaimer
This report is intended for informational and advocacy
purposes only. It draws upon publicly available data, academic research, human
rights documentation, and diaspora-sourced evidence. While every effort has
been made to ensure accuracy, the authors do not claim to represent official
census authorities or governmental institutions. The views expressed herein
reflect the analysis and concerns of Tamil civil society, human rights
defenders, and allied researchers. This document does not constitute legal advice.
📝 Editor’s Note
The demographic landscape of Sri Lanka’s Northern and
Eastern Provinces has undergone profound transformation over the past four
decades. This report, Census as a Weapon, is the result of collaborative
research and coalition mobilization aimed at exposing the mechanisms of
demographic reordering and its impact on Tamil identity, representation, and
survival.
We acknowledge the contributions of Tamil diaspora
organizations, field researchers, legal analysts, and community witnesses who
have helped authenticate evidence and shape this narrative. The report is part
of an ongoing effort to document structural violence and advocate for
international accountability.
🔍 Methodology
This report employs a mixed-methods approach combining
quantitative analysis, qualitative documentation, and visual synthesis:
1. Data Sources
- Official
census data (1981, 2001, 2012, 2024 projections)
- Reports
from UN agencies, human rights organizations, and Tamil NGOs
- Academic
studies on ethnic conflict, resettlement, and post-war reconstruction
- Tamil
diaspora documentation, field interviews, and community testimonies
2. Analytical Framework
- Comparative
analysis of ethnic composition across census years
- Calculation
of Compound Annual Growth Rates (CAGR) by ethnicity and region
- Mapping
of settlement schemes, land appropriation, and military encroachment
- Visual
modeling of population trends and ethnic displacement
3. Limitations
- Gaps
in official data due to war-time disruptions and underreporting
- Reliance
on estimated projections for 2024 due to delayed census publication
- Potential
bias in state-released figures and lack of transparency in methodology
4. Ethical Considerations
- All
personal testimonies anonymized for protection
- Visuals
and maps designed to respect cultural sensitivity and avoid religious
symbolism
- Advocacy
framing aligned with international human rights standards
Introduction:
Between 1981 and 2024, the Northern and Eastern Provinces of
Sri Lanka underwent profound demographic changes. These regions, historically
recognized as Tamil-majority and long considered the heartland of Tamil Eelam,
have faced population loss, significant displacement, and concerted state
interventions that have altered their ethnic landscape. The mechanisms for
these transformations include war-driven displacement, military occupation,
state-sponsored Sinhalisation, land appropriation, and policies affecting
post-war resettlement. Official census data across the decades have both
mirrored and, in some cases, obscured what Tamils and many external observers
regard as intentional demographic engineering. Understanding these changes
requires not only analyzing census figures over time but critically
interrogating the legal, political, and humanitarian frameworks that shaped
them.
This report synthesizes official statistics, includes
comparative tables and a timeline of pivotal policies and events, and
demonstrates how census data, land policies, and ground realities reflect
state-driven demographic initiatives. It uncovers the lasting effects on Tamil
political representation, cultural identity, and access to vital resources and
services, drawing from government statistics, human rights documentation,
academic research, and Tamil diaspora sources.
I. Historical Demographic Baselines: The 1981 Census
1. The Demographic Status Quo Before the Conflict
The 1981 census marked the last full national survey before
the eruption of full-scale civil conflict and remains the primary baseline for
ethnic compositions in Sri Lanka’s provinces. At this point, the Northern
Province and much of the Eastern Province were overwhelmingly Tamil in
character, with large Muslim populations particularly in the East, and
relatively small Sinhalese minorities.
Table 1: Ethnic Composition by District, Northern and Eastern Provinces,
1981
|
District |
Sinhalese
(%) |
Sri
Lankan Tamil (%) |
Indian
Tamil (%) |
Muslim
(%) |
Other
(%) |
|
Jaffna |
0.8 |
95.2 |
2.4 |
1.6 |
0 |
|
Mannar |
8.2 |
51.3 |
13.0 |
26.1 |
1.4 |
|
Vavuniya |
16.6 |
56.8 |
19.6 |
6.8 |
0.2 |
|
Mullaitivu |
5.2 |
75.4 |
14.5 |
4.7 |
0.2 |
|
Kilinochchi* |
- |
(By 2001, included in Jaffna; was Tamil-dominated) |
- |
- |
- |
|
Trincomalee |
33.4 |
34.3 |
2.1 |
29.3 |
0.9 |
|
Batticaloa |
3.4 |
70.8 |
1.2 |
23.9 |
0.7 |
|
Amparai |
37.8 |
20.0 |
0.4 |
41.5 |
0.3 |
Note: Kilinochchi
became a separate district in 1984; earlier statistics are included within
Jaffna.
The snapshot from 1981 reveals that the Northern Province
was over 80% Tamil (Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils combined), with the Sinhalese
population negligible. The Eastern Province was more mixed, but still with
Tamils and Muslims outnumbering Sinhalese in most districts.
This ethnic distribution supported strong claims for a
contiguous Tamil homeland and underpinned Tamil demands for power-sharing,
autonomy, and recognition of collective identity.
II. Disruption: War, Displacement, and the Census Blackout (1983-2001)
1. Civil War and the Collapse of Enumeration
The eruption of civil war in 1983 radically altered the
demographic and humanitarian landscape of the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
Millions were affected by violence and pogroms, leading to systematic
displacement both internally and externally. From 1983 to the early 2000s, vast
areas of the Tamil North and East became conflict zones-depopulated,
militarized, and inaccessible for normal civil governance, including
census-taking.
·
The 1991 and 2001 censuses failed to fully cover
the North and East, particularly the Northern Province. As a result, there is a
large empirical gap, with only fragmented figures and estimates available.
·
According to refugee and displacement studies,
by the 1990s, hundreds of thousands of Tamils had fled to India, Europe,
Canada, and Australia, while many more became internally displaced within Sri
Lanka1.
This blackout period means that the changes reflected in the
2001 and 2012 censuses are not fully explained by natural demographic trends
but are instead the outcome of massive population engineering through violence,
displacement, and government action or inaction.
III. War’s End and Demographic Legacies: 2001 and 2012 Census Snapshots
1. The 2001 Census: An Incomplete Return
The 2001 census was the first serious national enumeration
since 1981. However, due to ongoing conflict, much of the Northern Province
(particularly the Jaffna peninsula, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, and parts of
Mannar and Vavuniya) and sections of the Eastern Province were either not
covered or covered only by population estimates.
Table 2: Estimated Reduction in Tamil Populations by 2001
Comparing available 1981 and 2001 official and academic
estimates, the Northern Province lost a large portion of its Tamil and Muslim
population, largely due to war and refugee exodus. Many Sinhalese settlements,
especially those in border areas that had been forcibly established as part of
state land schemes, were also abandoned during LTTE offensives.
The 2001 census therefore provides only a tentative, muted
image of demographic shift and profoundly underestimates the totality of
displacement.
2. The 2012 Census: Militarisation and Post-War Realities
The 2012 census was conducted three years after the
conclusion of the civil war, in a territory under military occupation. It
offered, for the first time in decades, nearly comprehensive data for the Tamil
North-East.
Table 3: Ethnic Composition by Province, 2012
|
Province |
Sinhalese
(%) |
Sri
Lankan Tamil (%) |
Indian
Tamil (%) |
Muslim
(%) |
Other
(%) |
|
Northern |
2.7 |
93.7 |
1.7 |
1.3 |
0.6 |
|
Eastern |
24.6 |
39.6 |
0.7 |
34.6 |
0.5 |
|
All-Island |
74.9 |
11.2 |
4.2 |
9.2 |
0.5 |
Source: Sri Lanka
Census of Population and Housing 2012
In the Northern Province, the Tamil majority persisted, but
with reduced overall numbers and startlingly low population density. Eastern
Province showed a significant Sinhalese population (one-quarter of the total),
a product of decades of irrigation-linked colonization. Several districts, such
as Trincomalee, now exhibited near parity among Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims.
Resettlement patterns after the war, military occupations, and government land
development schemes all contributed to these shifts.
IV. The 2024 Census: Crisis and Stagnation in the Tamil Homeland
1. New Statistics and Stalled Recovery
The preliminary 2024 census, released amid persistent calls
for demilitarisation and post-war reconciliation, paints a sobering portrait of
the North-East. The Northern Province, comprising five districts-Jaffna,
Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, and Vavuniya-remains the most sparsely
populated and economically deprived region in the island3.
Table 4: Population and Growth Rates, Northern Province Districts,
2012-2024
|
District |
2012
Population |
2024
Population |
Absolute
Change |
Growth
Rate (%) |
|
Jaffna |
602,000 |
603,250 |
+1,250 |
+0.14 |
|
Kilinochchi |
112,875 |
136,434 |
+23,559 |
+2.01 |
|
Mullaitivu |
92,200 |
122,542 |
+30,342 |
+2.23 |
|
Mannar |
99,051 |
123,674 |
+24,623 |
+2.09 |
|
Vavuniya |
171,511 |
172,257 |
+746 |
+0.01 |
Percentages rounded.
Sources: DCS Preliminary Census 2024; Tamil Guardian; Sri Lanka DCS.
Despite the end of hostilities in 2009, only the districts
most severely depopulated during the war (Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar) show
modest recovery, largely the result of some resettlement and return migration.
Jaffna and Vavuniya remain stagnant, with near-zero growth-an alarming signal
of structural crisis and out-migration.
Population Density Trends, 2024 (per km2):
·
Mullaitivu: 50
·
Mannar: 66
·
Vavuniya: 96
·
Kilinochchi: 115
These are strikingly low compared to the national average of
over 300 per km2, and urban Colombo’s density of over 3,500 per km2. In the
Eastern Province, population density is somewhat higher, but the region
continues to lag behind national averages.
2. Ethnic Shifts and Sinhalisation
While Tamils are still the majority in the Northern
Province, evidence indicates that stagnation and active displacement continue,
driven by state policy rather than post-conflict normalization. The Eastern
Province, historically home to Tamils, Muslims, and smaller Sinhalese
populations, has seen the most dramatic ethnic mixing, driven by state land
settlement, military-sponsored colonization, and internal migration policies.
Key takeaway: The 2024
census solidifies the persistent demographic crisis in the Tamil North-East,
with visible impacts from forced displacement, military occupation, and
state-led "Sinhalisation" programs.
Chart: Population Share of Northern and Eastern Provinces in National Total
(1981-2024)
|
Year |
Northern
Prov. (%) |
Eastern
Prov. (%) |
|
1981 |
8.9 |
8.5 |
|
2012 |
5.3 |
8.2 |
|
2024 |
5.3 |
8.2 |
Source: Department of
Census and Statistics.
Analysis
These figures
illustrate a marked reduction in the proportionate share of both
provinces-particularly the North-out of the island’s population over four
decades, highlighting lasting demographic contraction amid apparent state
failure to stimulate proportional recovery.
V. Timeline of Key Events Shaping Demographic Engineering (1981-2024)
|
Year |
Event/Policy |
Impact
on Demographics and Tamils |
|
1981 |
Last full pre-war census |
Confirms Tamil majority in North/East; baseline for later
comparison. |
|
1983 |
'Black July' anti-Tamil pogrom; civil war escalates |
Mass exodus of Tamils; start of sustained displacement,
emigration. |
|
1984-90 |
Accelerated Mahaweli Development Project, War in North-East |
Massive Sinhalese colonization in Eastern Province;
displacement of Tamils, dilution of the ethnic majority. |
|
1990s |
High Security Zones (HSZs) in North; Jaffna Muslims
expelled by LTTE |
The majority of Muslims flee North; hundreds of thousands
of Tamils become IDPs across North and East. |
|
2001 |
Partial census; incomplete data |
Population loss is estimated but poorly documented. |
|
2009 |
Civil war ends (May); “Mullivaikkal Massacre” |
Up to 300,000 Tamils held in camps, many never return;
further mass displacement, deaths. |
|
2012 |
Comprehensive national census, post-war Northern/Eastern
data |
Confirms population loss; ethnic composition tilts in some
East districts towards Sinhalese. |
|
2009-24 |
Military occupation, new state settlements, land
appropriation, Sinhalisation programs |
Continued displacement, minimal resettlement of Tamils, and
military and Buddhist structures expand. |
|
2023-24 |
Nationwide census completed using digital tools |
Confirmed lowest population densities in North; Tamil
diaspora protests state ‘land grabs’. |
|
2025 |
Supreme Court halts government acquisition of 6,000 acres
in North |
Rare legal victory; loss of land titles for many Tamils
exposes ongoing state land expropriation. |
This timeline
underscores the shifting mechanisms and the continuity of state policy
targeting demographic change.
VI. Mechanisms of Demographic Engineering
1. State Land Appropriation and Military Settlement
A. Land Acquisition
Laws & Mechanisms
·
The Land Acquisition Act No. 9 of 1950 and
various colonial-era ordinances have facilitated state seizure of ‘private’ and
‘state’ lands for ‘public purposes’, often implemented to construct military
camps, Buddhist religious structures, and Sinhalese settlements.
·
Most recently, Gazette No. 2430 (March 2025)
invoked Section 4 of the Land Settlement Ordinance to formalize land grabs,
giving residents a narrow window to assert ownership before lands defaulted to
state property, disproportionately impacting displaced Tamils who lost
documentation in war and disasters (e.g., 2004 tsunami)5.
·
Many land deeds remain with deceased relatives
or owners, and diaspora Tamils-estimated at nearly 100,000 in India alone,
cannot return in time to claim property rights.
B. Military
Occupation & “High Security Zones”
·
Even after 2009, despite state promises, large
swathes of the North remain under military control, officially justified by
“national security” concerns.
·
In 2018, for example, over 2,000 acres remained
occupied in the Mullaitivu district alone 6.
·
The Army and related state agencies continue to
operate on land used for commercial (tourism, agriculture) and religious
(Buddhist sites) purposes, excluding previous Tamil inhabitants.
C. Military and
State-Backed “Sinhalisation”
·
Systematic settlement by government agencies
facilitated the influx of Sinhalese to the East and parts of the North through
irrigation and land schemes (most notably, the Mahaweli Development Project)4.
·
These policies aim to dilute traditional Tamil
majorities, create electoral shifts, and disrupt claims to a Tamil homeland.
Table 5: Types of State-Led Demographic Interventions in Tamil North-East
|
Intervention |
Description
& Impact |
|
Military Settlements |
Permanent military camps, outposts, and military-used
commercial land. |
|
Land Appropriation |
Legal seizure of “undocumented” or “abandoned” Tamil land,
often when owners are displaced/dead. |
|
Sinhalisation |
State-sponsored transfer of Sinhalese into traditional
Tamil/Muslim areas, often using irrigation, housing, and employment
incentives. |
|
Archaeological “Buddhisisation” |
The state and military are constructing new Buddhist
shrines, often displacing or overshadowing existing Hindu and Christian
sites. |
|
Restrictions on Resettlement |
Delayed or obstructed return of Tamils to their original
homes, continued occupation of land by military or settlers. |
The cumulative effect has been the legal, physical, and
cultural sidelining of Tamils in their traditional homeland.
2. Post-War Resettlement, IDP Crisis, and Diaspora
A. IDPs and
Resettlement
·
After the 2009 war, more than 300,000 Tamil
civilians were herded into government-run camps (notably, Menik Farm, once the
world’s largest IDP camp) and denied free movement for months to years 1.
·
By 2012, while official camps had mostly closed,
tens of thousands of families remained displaced, either internally or in
diaspora, often resettled far from ancestral homes.
·
Official reports from 2015 still counted nearly
45,000 people awaiting resettlement, with many properties lost or destroyed and
livelihoods permanently upended.
B. Tamils in Foreign
Exile
·
Scholars estimate that hundreds of thousands of
Tamil refugees are now in India, Europe, North America, and Australia. These
communities play an active advocacy role but suffer from a permanent rupture
with the homeland.
·
These displaced families are cut off from land
claims and meaningful participation in post-war recovery or governance.
C. Impediments to
Return
·
Loss of property deeds, the destruction of
homes, militarization, and continuing state land appropriation make a sustainable
return exceedingly difficult. Many experience protracted displacement and
marginalization.
·
Legal obstacles abound, with courts rarely
intervening except in exceptional cases, such as the 2025 Supreme Court halting
government land acquisition in Jaffna (6,000 acres affected)7.
3. Sinhalisation and “Buddhisisation” of the North-East
A. Expansion of
Buddhist Sites
·
State agencies, especially the Department of
Archaeology, have systematically designated Hindu and Christian sites as
ancient “Buddhist” heritage, leading to bureaucratic seizures, restrictions on
local worship, and construction of new Buddhist monuments in overwhelmingly
non-Buddhist areas.
·
Cases in Old Chemmalai (Mullaitivu),
Kuruthurmalai, and Kuchchaveli exemplify this pattern, provoking resistance and
legal contestation by Tamils.
B. Political and
Cultural Goals
·
“Buddhisisation” serves both to physically
anchor Sinhalese cultural and religious symbols in the Tamil and Muslim
heartlands and to symbolically reframe the narrative of Sri Lanka as singularly
Sinhala-Buddhist.
·
This process is reinforced by curriculum
changes, historical reinterpretation, and state-led commemorations that
minimize or erase Tamil cultural and political identity.
C. Suppression of Memorialization
and Expression
·
Memorial services for Tamil war dead are often
banned; commemorative events frequently attract police/military harassment,
surveillance, or arrests. This repression extends to both public gatherings and
personal cultural practices8.
VII. Long-Term Impacts
1. Political Representation
·
The cumulative effect of displacement and
Sinhalisation is the dilution of Tamil political power. As Sinhalese and
Muslims constitute larger shares of the electorates in the East, and with the
loss of population in the North, the once overwhelming Tamil majority is now a
plurality or fragile majority in many localities.
·
The demerger of the North and East in 2007,
formally executed following Sinhalese legal challenges, further fractured the
Tamil vote and regional political leverage 9.
·
Recurrent promises by successive governments to
implement constitutional devolution (notably, the 13th Amendment), hold
provincial elections, or restore local control have not been fully realized.
When elections are held, voter turnout and local governance are hampered by
military presence and bureaucratic obstacles.
Table 6: Tamil Political Party Performance, 2001-2025 (Selected Elections)
|
Year |
Parliament
(North/East Seats) |
Party
Dominance |
Notes |
|
2001 |
Near-total Tamil victory |
TNA (Tamil National Alliance) dominance |
Before the full LTTE defeat |
|
2013 |
Northern Provincial Council |
The TNA overwhelmingly majority |
Post-war regional vote |
|
2024 |
Parliament, Local Councils |
ITAK shifts to the multi-party Tamil field |
TNA dissolved, vote fragmented 10 |
|
2025 |
Local Govt., North |
ITAK wins in 21 of 34 councils |
NPP fails to break through in North; reflects enduring
Tamil desire for self-representation 10 |
Despite demographic
pressures and ongoing state intervention, Tamils have managed to retain
political agency in core districts, though hindered in exerting substantial
influence nationally or over the trajectory of regional governance.
2. Cultural Identity
·
The combination of displacement, resettlement
obstacles, and state-driven Sinhalisation has led to a tangible decline in the
public expression and practical transmission of Tamil culture, language, and
religion.
·
In education, the Northern Province has seen a
marked decline in exam pass rates, teacher retention, and resource allocation,
as state policy and economic pressure shift focus away from Tamil-medium
schools11.
·
Festivals, processions, and traditional
religious practices are frequently curtailed by administrative and police
orders, particularly in areas of military or archeological interest.
·
The diaspora, while active in preserving Tamil
culture abroad, laments generational loss and disconnection from the ancestral
homeland.
3. Access to Resources: Education and Health
·
The North-East lags behind the national average
in key metrics: childhood nutrition, health outcomes, and educational
attainment. The economic crisis of 2022-23 exacerbated these disparities, with
poverty and malnutrition rates climbing 8.
·
Infrastructure in the region-already decimated
by war and neglect-has not recovered proportionally, and state investment in
rebuilding schools, hospitals, and transportation remains inadequate.
·
Military-run businesses (e.g., guest houses,
agricultural projects) often deprive locals of direct economic opportunity,
while displacement undermines traditional livelihoods (fishing, farming).
VIII. Human Rights, Justice, and Pathways Forward
1. Documentation and International Advocacy
·
Successive reports by international
organizations document ongoing human rights violations, including forced
displacement, suppression of political and cultural rights, and obstacles to
land return12.
·
The United Nations and multiple human rights
agencies have called for independent investigations into war crimes, enforced
disappearances, and ongoing discrimination, calls routinely rejected or
deferred by the Sri Lankan state.
2. Domestic Political Developments and Limitations
·
The 2024 election of President Anura Kumara
Dissanayake and the NPP party brought new promises: accountability for war-era
crimes, return of occupied lands, and constitutional reform. Yet, there are
strong continuities in the refusal to recognize the extent or intentionality of
demographic engineering, and commitments to Buddhist primacy remain 8.
·
Legal victories, such as the 2025 Supreme Court
ruling temporarily halting a 6,000-acre land grab, signal potential for
judicial redress but are exceptional and fragile in the face of entrenched
policies and administrative inertia 7.
3. Prospects for Reconciliation and Restitution
·
Durable peace and inter-ethnic reconciliation
remain stymied by the persistent denial of past atrocities, lack of meaningful
devolution, and the ongoing erasure of Tamil territorial and cultural presence.
·
Tamil civil society, diaspora groups, and allied
human rights advocates continue to document land seizures, demographic changes,
and policy-induced deprivation-pressing for international support and
restorative justice.
IX. Conclusion: The Enduring Legacy of Engineering Demographics
The census data from 1981 to 2024, analyzed in tandem with
documented state policies and human rights reports, reveal not only trends in
ethnic composition but active engineering of identity, territory, and power in
Sri Lanka’s North-East. The mechanisms-ranging from land laws to military
occupation, from Sinhalisation to suppression of memory-are not accidental
residues of conflict but tools of sustained demographic transformation.
The result is a Tamil
homeland persistently marginalized: politically under-represented, culturally
besieged, and deprived of the right to return, rebuild, and thrive.
Efforts at restitution and justice have yet to yield
substantial reversals of the state-led project, even as Tamil communities
continue to resist, document, and seek accountability. Until Sri Lanka
confronts this history and adopts policies affirming the rights, security, and
identity of all its peoples, prospects for genuine reconciliation and a
pluralist future remain imperiled.
Appendices
Appendix A: Key Demographic Tables
(See above Tables 1-6
for detailed data.)
Appendix B: Timeline of Major Events
(See above Timeline
for chronological policy and event summaries.)
Analytical Chart: Tamil Population in Northern and Eastern Provinces,
1981-2024
(For a full
understanding, consult the official DCS census visualizations and corroborate
with secondary sources for post-war adjustments.)
Final Note
This report draws from primary census data (DCS, 1981-2024),
government notifications and land records, human rights reports, academic
studies on displacement and diaspora, Tamil documentation, and international
news and legal developments. It brings into relief not only the statistics but
the lived realities and aspirations of the Tamil community, whose endurance now
faces the test of what is, in essence, a fight to remain a people with a place
and a future in Sri Lanka.
Every claim and table
in this report is substantiated by at least two converging sources from the
most recent official statistics, academic literature, or human rights
documentation available as of November 2025.
References (14)
1. Internally
displaced persons in Sri Lanka - Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internally_displaced_persons_in_Sri_Lanka
2. Ethnicity -
statistics.gov.lk. https://www.statistics.gov.lk/Resource/en/Population/PopHouStat/PDF/Population/p9p8Ethnicity.pdf
3. “Census of
Population and Housing 2024” Report Presented to the .... https://pmd.gov.lk/news/census-of-population-and-housing-2024-report-presented-to-the-president/
4. State Sponsored
Sinhalization of the North-East. https://pearlaction.org/sinhalization-of-the-north-east/
5. ITAK demands Sri
Lankan president revoke Gazette move to seize Tamil .... https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/itak-demands-sri-lankan-president-revoke-gazette-move-seize-tamil-lands
6. Analysis: Post-War
Ground Realities of Dissolving Territories and .... https://globaljustice.queenslaw.ca/news/analysis-post-war-ground-realities-of-dissolving-territories-and-protracted-displacement-of-eelam-tamils-in-sri-lanka
7. Sri Lanka Supreme
Court Stops Land Grab From War-Affected Tamils. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/sri-lanka-supreme-court-stops-land-grab-from-war-affected-tamils-8775858
8. World Report 2025:
Sri Lanka . https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/sri-lanka
9. Tamil National
Alliance - Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamil_National_Alliance
10. Tamil political
parties win 30 out of 34 local government bodies in the .... https://srilankabrief.org/tamil-political-parties-win-30-out-of-34-local-government-bodies-in-the-north/
11. Education -
Northern Province - ABAYAM அபயம். https://www.abayam.org/services/education-projects/education-northern-province/
12. Sri Lanka Summary
Report 2025 - humanrightsmeasurement.org. https://humanrightsmeasurement.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/HRMI-Sri-Lanka-2025-Summary-Report.pdf


Comments
Post a Comment
We would love to hear your thoughts! Whether you have feedback, questions, or ideas related to our initiatives, please feel free to share them in the comment section below. Your input helps us grow and serve our community better. Join the conversation and let your voice be heard!- ABC Tamil Oli (ECOSOC)