The Calculus of Complicity:

Analyzing Sri Lanka's Relaxed Restrictions on Maaveerar Naal and the Imperative for Sustained International Justice Advocacy

Editor's Note

This report has been prepared by an independent researcher and is intended as an advocacy and strategic guidance document for Eelam Tamil political parties, civil society organizations in Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern provinces, and international diaspora advocacy groups. Its objective is to critically examine recent changes in the Sri Lankan government's policy towards the commemoration of Maaveerar Naal (Great Heroes' Day), and to propose a cohesive, disciplined, and strengthened strategy for advancing accountability and self-determination at the international level.

Disclaimer

This advocacy report is based on publicly available documentation, expert analysis, and mandated inputs. It reflects a critical legal and political interpretation of events surrounding the Tamil national struggle. While adherence to the suggested recommendations—particularly those related to non-violence and organizational discipline—is strongly advised to maximize the efficacy of international engagement and minimize security risks, this report does not constitute legal counsel or a guarantee of personal safety in areas subject to pervasive surveillance and restrictive legislation in Sri Lanka.

Abstract

This report critically examines the Sri Lankan government's recent relaxation of restrictions surrounding the commemoration of Maaveerar Naal (Great Heroes’ Day), a key event in the Tamil national struggle. It examines how memorialization practices serve as indicators of transitional justice, with a focus on the rights to assembly, association, and remembrance for Sri Lankan Tamils. Drawing on publicly available documentation and expert analysis, the report highlights the ongoing tension between cultural mourning and state securitization and offers strategic guidance for Eelam Tamil political parties, civil society, and diaspora organizations. The recommendations emphasize non-violent advocacy and disciplined international engagement to advance accountability and self-determination, while noting the continued risks posed by surveillance and restrictive legislation in Sri Lanka.

I. Introduction: The Right to Memorialization as a Barometer for Transitional Justice

1.1. Contextualizing Maaveerar Naal (MvN) within the National Struggle

Maaveerar Naal (MvN), or Great Heroes’ Day, is observed annually on November 27th.¹ This date commemorates the death in combat of the first Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) cadre, Lieutenant Shankar (Sathiyanathan alias Suresh), in 1982.^1. The event was formally institutionalized on November 27, 1989, by LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran, establishing a “cult of martyrdom” central to the organization’s identity and subsequent diaspora mobilization.¹

The tradition involves specific, ritualized ceremonies, including the lighting of oil lamps for three days ending on November 27th, and the raising of the Tamil Eelam flag.¹ The official symbol for the observance is the Gloriosa superba flower, which naturally blooms during November.¹

From a legal and transitional justice perspective, the ability of Sri Lankan Tamils to observe MvN is fundamentally an exercise of the protected rights to freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and the inherent right to mourn and remember kin lost during the conflict. This right to memory serves as a crucial barometer for measuring genuine progress in reconciliation and the fulfillment of transitional justice commitments. However, the SLG consistently frames MvN not as a cultural day of mourning but as an exclusively LTTE-centric political ritual designed to glorify armed militancy and sustain the quest for separatism.³ This classification allows the state to legally justify suppression under counter-terrorism laws.⁴

1.2. Scope and Methodology

This report employs a critical geopolitical and legal analysis, utilizing qualitative data derived from human rights reports, judicial rulings, and official statements from international financial institutions (IFIs).

The core analytical framework involves a geopolitical triangulation study. This study systematically compares the observed shifts in the SLG's policy regarding the memorialization of MvN (specifically the contrast between aggressive suppression in 2023 and reported minimal interference in 2024/2025) with the procedural cycles of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Extended Fund Facility (EFF) reviews ⁵ and the SLG’s non-compliance with human rights obligations stemming from the UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) resolutions.⁷ This analysis seeks to determine if the measured relaxation of restrictions is a true gesture of goodwill or a strategic maneuver driven by external financial and diplomatic pressure to secure funding and evade international accountability.

All evidence and major claims within this report are supported by APA Style inline citations, referencing the provided documentation.¹

II. The Contested Landscape of Memory: State Suppression and Resilience

2.1. The Symbolic and Physical Significance of the Thuyilum Illam

Central to the memory culture of MvN are the Thuyilum Illams, or resting places, which serve as cemeteries for fallen LTTE cadres.⁹ These sites transcend mere burial grounds; the LTTE’s burial process was known as vithaiththal (planting of a seed), symbolizing that the deceased were not gone but had taken root as seeds for future generations to rise.⁹ This architecturalization of martyrdom was intended to reinforce the continuity of the national struggle.

Following the end of the conflict in May 2009, the Sri Lankan state engaged in a systematic effort to erase this physical architecture of Tamil national memory. All 35 LTTE resting places were razed and bulldozed.⁹ This destruction was often followed by the military occupation of the site. The starkest example of this structural repression is the Koppay Thuyilum Illam in Jaffna, which housed at least 2,000 fallen cadres. After being bulldozed in 2010, the land was seized, and the Sri Lankan military’s 51 Division base was constructed directly on top of the cemetery.⁹ This action is a definitive demonstration of state symbolic dominance and the structural refusal to permit the right to memory.

2.2. Documentation of State Repression vs. Calculated Relaxation (2023–2025)

The governmental approach to MvN has historically been characterized by outright prohibition, enforced through security forces and judicial mandates.

In 2023, state repression was overtly aggressive. Incidents documented include the demolition of memorial structures at Tharavai Thuyilum Illam in Batticaloa.¹¹ The police obtained court orders prohibiting events dedicated to the commemoration of dead LTTE cadres, and roadblocks were deployed to obstruct access to cemeteries.¹¹ Notably, surveillance intensified around the MvN event, resulting in arrests and disruption, including the detention of nine Tamils under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). .¹²

A demonstrable shift occurred by late 2024 and extending into 2025, when reports indicated that large-scale commemorations and protests, including MvN events and so-called Tamil Genocide Remembrance Day, occurred with “minimal interference” from the authorities.¹²

However, this apparent relaxation is not consistent across all forms of memorialization. While the state permitted high-visibility gatherings, it continued to prosecute specific, symbolic acts linked directly to wartime atrocity allegations. For example, in May 2024, magistrates issued orders preventing the distribution of Mullivaikkal Kanji (rice gruel), asserting that this act of remembrance amounted to the commemoration of LTTE cadres and posed a risk to public health and safety.¹³ The subsequent arrests of individuals engaged in distributing Kanji demonstrate that the government maintains its capacity and willingness to suppress specific acts of memory, even as it tolerates larger assemblies.

This tactical change in enforcement illustrates a dual strategy of visibility management deployed by the Sri Lankan state. By allowing the high-visibility, large-scale MvN ceremonies to proceed with minimal interference, the SLG aims to satisfy external demands for civic space and freedom of assembly, projecting the political stability necessary for ongoing financial confidence and investment. Simultaneously, by maintaining the occupation of critical memorial sites ⁹ and prosecuting low-visibility but potent symbolic acts (Kanji) ¹³, the SLG reinforces its core commitment to control the narrative and ensures that the structural instruments of repression—such as the PTA and military surveillance—remain absolute.¹² The objective is to secure geopolitical compliance while maintaining domestic control over the historical narrative and security architecture.

2.3. List of Thuyilum Illam in the North and East

The Thuyilum Illams listed below represent sites of significant community memory and political contention, many of which have been destroyed or are subject to ongoing military presence and community restoration efforts.

Table 1: Confirmed Thuyilum Illam (Resting Places) in the North and East

District	Name of Thuyilum Illam	Status / Significance (Post-2009)	Source Reference
Jaffna	Koppay	Bulldozed; occupied by Sri Lankan military 51 Division base (since 2010)	⁹
Kilinochchi	Kanagapuram	Site of major recent community restoration efforts and large gatherings	¹⁰
Kilinochchi	Mulankavil	Site of recent community clearing and commemoration	¹⁰
Mullaitivu	Visuvamadu	Destroyed by Sri Lankan Army; site of recent commemorations	⁹
Mullaitivu	Alambil	Listed Maveerar Thuyilum Illam	¹⁰
Mannar	Pandivirichchan	Partially restored by community efforts despite ongoing military surveillance	¹⁰
Vavuniya	Echchankulam	Listed Maveerar Thuyilum Illam	¹⁰
Trincomalee	Aalankulam (Sampur)	Site of recent clearing and decoration efforts	¹⁴
Batticaloa	Mavadi Munmari	Site of recent clearing and decoration efforts	¹⁴
Manal Aru	Punithapoomi, Uthapeedam	Historically prominent sites for early commemorations	¹⁰
Final Conflict Area	Suthanthirapuram, Iranaippalai, Mullivaikkal East/West	Sites located near the conflict's final phase	¹⁰

III. The Calculus of Compliance: Geopolitical Triggers for Relaxation

The core question facing the Eelam Tamil-speaking people is whether the relaxation of restrictions on MvN memorialization a true gesture from the SL government or is a strategic necessity dictated by external geopolitical constraints. Analysis confirms the latter: the shift is primarily driven by the need for financial stability and avoidance of international justice mechanisms.

3.1. IMF Conditionalities and the Governance Imperative

The economic stability of Sri Lanka is fundamentally dependent on the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The US$3 billion IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was approved after Sri Lanka defaulted on its foreign debt in 2022 and was instrumental in stemming the immediate economic crisis.17 The continued disbursement of funds, which are released after periodic reviews, is vital for the country's recovery.⁵

A key pillar of the IMF program is strengthening governance and reducing corruption vulnerabilities.¹⁹ Reports from Human Rights Watch (HRW) and other international bodies have consistently argued that Sri Lanka’s economic crisis is inextricably linked to fundamental misgovernance and chronic impunity for atrocity crimes and corruption.⁸ Therefore, to secure continued financial support, the SLG must project an image of improving political stability and adherence to the rule of law.

The calculated non-interference in large-scale MvN commemorations in late 2024 and 2025 is a direct response to this financial necessity. Overt, globally visible repression, such as the arrests under the PTA documented in 2023 ¹², triggers immediate negative attention from international partners and may jeopardize IMF governance scores and the subsequent financial tranches.¹⁷ By tolerating scheduled, high-visibility MvN assemblies, the SLG executes a political cost-benefit analysis: the cost of permitting memorialization is significantly lower than the cost of jeopardizing the multi-billion dollar IMF package and new financing from institutions like the World Bank.²¹ The allowance of MvN, therefore, serves as a superficial demonstration of domestic human rights tolerance, essential for satisfying the geopolitical compliance requirements imposed by IFIs.

3.2. UN UPR, International Justice, and Whitewashing

Beyond the financial incentives, the SLG's relaxation is strongly influenced by ongoing international accountability mechanisms. Sri Lanka faces sustained pressure through the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process, which urges the state to protect human rights defenders and civil society and advance transitional justice.⁷ The inability to make substantive progress on accountability since 2015, despite commitments to establish a judicial mechanism to prosecute perpetrators of atrocity crimes, remains a significant failure.⁸

The temporary easing of restrictions on memorialization is designed to pre-empt stronger international action. Tamil political parties and civil society continue to advocate for the UN to refer Sri Lanka to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and to expand the mandate of the UN’s Sri Lanka Accountability Project (OSLAP).²⁴ By permitting MvN, the government seeks to diffuse this pressure, arguing to the international community that domestic conditions for civic expression are improving, thereby attempting to negate the need for international justice intervention.

This strategy is unequivocally a form of whitewashing accountability for past international crimes committed against Tamils. The SLG has taken minimal steps to investigate and punish officials credibly accused of human rights abuses.²⁶ Despite the political change following the 2024 elections, Tamils continue to face persistent discrimination, heavy military surveillance, and the ongoing use of repressive legislation.¹² The gesture is untrustworthy because it fundamentally fails to address the lack of justice for alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide that characterize the end phase of the conflict.²³ The tactical allowance of mourning rituals is a superficial trade-off, purchased at a minimal political cost to ensure the maximum benefit of continued impunity and global financial stabilization.

Table 2: State Response to Tamil Memorialization (2023-2025): Conflict vs. Compliance Analysis

Dimension	2023 Enforcement Posture	2024-2025 Enforcement Posture	Strategic Interpretation
Underlying Legal Structure	Aggressive use of PTA and judicial prohibitions. ¹¹	PTA remains in force; new repressive laws proposed; proscription lists maintained.¹⁷	Structural impunity remains despite cosmetic changes.
Geopolitical Driver	Domestic Ethno-nationalist Security/Political Mandate.	Geopolitical Compliance (IMF/UPR) to secure financial stability and avoid ICC referral. ¹⁹	Compliance is conditional, reversible, and non-genuine.
Accountability for Crimes	Zero progress on transitional justice commitments.⁸	Continued denial of accountability for past international crimes.²³ Minimal punishment of abusive officials.²⁶	Whitewash Strategy: Use human rights optics to cover impunity for atrocity crimes.

IV. The Imperative for Unchanged Advocacy: Seeking International Justice

The analysis confirms that the SLG’s relaxation of restrictions is a strategic and reversible maneuver, not an unchangeable concession based on a genuine commitment to human rights or reconciliation. Therefore, Tamils must continue to expedite and enhance their advocacy at the international stage in seeking international justice.

4.1. Escalating Demands for High-Level Accountability

Given the state's deep-seated rejection of accountability, as demonstrated by the lack of progress on post-war transitional justice ⁸, the necessity of external mechanisms remains paramount. Advocacy efforts must be directed toward forcing binding international intervention.

1. ICC Referral: Political advocacy must maintain the demand for the United Nations to refer Sri Lanka to the International Criminal Court (ICC), given the gravity and scale of the alleged atrocity crimes.²⁴

2. Strengthening OSLAP: Demands must focus on extending the mandate of the UN's Sri Lanka Accountability Project (OSLAP) and expanding its investigative capacity. ²⁵ Crucially, the mandate should be coupled with an explicit message urging referral to the ICC, thus ensuring that OSLAP’s documentation contributes directly to a pathway for international prosecution.²⁴

3. Universal Jurisdiction (UJ): Continued focus on supporting universal jurisdiction cases outside Sri Lanka is essential. This strategy leverages the domestic laws of third-party states to prosecute alleged perpetrators, effectively shrinking the safe havens available to officials credibly accused of international crimes.²⁴

4.2. Leveraging Diaspora and Political Momentum on the Global Stage

Global advocacy has gained tangible momentum, exemplified by US Congressional resolutions introduced in 2023 and 2024. These resolutions, supported by dozens of Tamil diaspora organizations, clearly advocate for addressing justice grievances and promoting the long-term goal of self-determination, including an internationally monitored independence referendum for Eelam Tamils. ²⁹

The SLG recognizes the political efficacy of this external advocacy, evidenced by its decision in 2024 to renew the prohibition of several major Tamil diaspora political organizations. ²⁸ People affiliated with or perceived to support these proscribed groups, such as the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE), remain subject to surveillance.¹² International pressure, particularly from the UK and US, must be exerted to challenge and lift these politically motivated bans, which obstruct legitimate engagement and human rights advocacy.

A critical element of future advocacy must be the strategic alignment of the justice agenda with the international community's concerns regarding governance and financial stability. By continuously arguing that sustainable economic recovery (as sought by the IMF) cannot be achieved without dismantling the structural impunity that fueled corruption and conflict ²¹, the Tamil advocacy movement can link the pursuit of accountability for war crimes directly to the geopolitical interests of major world powers.

V. Operational and Organizational Strategy: Recommendations for Eelam Tamils

To capitalize on the limited civic space currently afforded and to maximize the effectiveness of international advocacy, local organizers and the Tamil community in the North and East must strictly adhere to principles of discipline, unity, and non-violence.

5.1. Upholding Foundational Discipline and Non-Violent Principles

Maintain Non-Violence and Strict Protocol. Tamils and the organizers in the North and East must strictly maintain the discipline and structure as outlined by the founders of Maaveerar Naal. This foundational discipline must be anchored in non-violence at all times.

This commitment to non-violence is not merely a moral imperative but a critical legal strategy. When MvN events are conducted with disciplined non-violence, they transform the event from a perceived "terrorist" threat (justifying state suppression under the PTA) into a legally protected exercise of cultural memory and the right to assemble under international human rights law.

Strategic De-Militarization. Furthermore, organizers must avoid politicizing the event or structures at all times. This means rigorously avoiding the display of any logos, uniforms, or images associated with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), as the SL Minister of Public Security has confirmed these remain prohibited under anti-terrorism laws.³ By denying the government any pretext of glorifying militancy through symbolism, organizers restrict the SLG’s legal grounds for intervention, thereby preserving the hard-won, albeit fragile, civic space for commemoration.

5.2. Collaborative Management and Preservation of Thuyilum Illam

Unified Stewardship and Maintenance. Effective stewardship of the memorial sites is essential to counteract the state’s deliberate policy of erasure. All Thuyilum Illam must work in coordination and fully collaboratively (No divided policies). This unified approach ensures a consistent defence against land grabs, legal challenges, and military intimidation, maximizing the collective security and ownership of these contested spaces.

It is imperative to maintain all the Thuyilum Illam in the North and Eastern, ensuring they are neat at all times. As evidenced by community efforts in Pandivirichchan and Kanagapuram, continuous, visible maintenance and clearing, sometimes including the planting of symbolic trees ¹⁴, constitute a powerful, non-violent assertion of civilian ownership. This persistent civil action directly challenges the state’s narrative of military dominance and perpetual occupation of these sensitive sites.⁹

5.3. Inclusive Memorialization: Recognizing All Fighters

Expanding the Narrative of Sacrifice. A critical recommendation for strengthening the legitimacy of the struggle involves embracing pluralism in remembrance. Organizers must recognize the brothers and sisters from the Muslim Maaveerar and Sinhala Maaveerar who fought along and their community and families.

Historically, the LTTE committed violent acts, including massacres and ethnic cleansing, against both Muslim and Sinhalese communities.³ However, records confirm the presence of individuals from Muslim and, presumably, Sinhala backgrounds who fought alongside the movement, including Muslim cadres such as Naseem, Latheep, and Captain Farooq. ³¹

The strategic value of inclusive memorialization is twofold:

1. Moral Authority: It proactively addresses historical criticisms concerning the LTTE’s exclusionary practices and reinforces the moral legitimacy of the struggle as a multi-ethnic quest for justice and liberation against systemic state oppression.

2. Solidarity Building: By honouring all who died fighting against state violence, regardless of their ethnic background, the Tamil political movement signals a long-term commitment to a pluralistic political future. This reframing fosters broader political solidarity within the North and East and enhances the movement’s acceptance among international human rights organizations concerned with minority rights and future political governance. ³²

VI. Conclusion: Vigilance and Unwavering Commitment

The SL government’s relaxation of restrictions on the memorialization of Maaveerar Naal is a fragile diplomatic fiction. It is a calculated and reversible political concession, driven not by genuine commitment to human rights or reconciliation, but by the critical need for economic stabilization linked to IMF compliance and a strategic effort to forestall stronger UN accountability mechanisms, such as ICC referral. This action is ultimately designed to whitewash a deeply entrenched culture of impunity for atrocity crimes.

The enduring structural threat—maintained through the military occupation of sites like Koppay, pervasive surveillance, and the retention of draconian laws like the PTA—mandates extreme caution and vigilance. The strategic imperative for the Eelam Tamil-speaking people remains clear: maintain rigorous non-violent discipline and organizational unity in the homeland while relentlessly intensifying advocacy for international justice. Only mechanisms external to Sri Lanka, such as referral to the ICC, expansion of OSLAP, and the utilization of universal jurisdiction, possess the mandate and capacity to dismantle the systemic impunity that continues to define the Sri Lankan state. The pursuit of truth, memory, and accountability must not yield to the temporary illusion of minimal interference.

VII. Appendix: Confirmed Thuyilum Illam in the North and East

District	Name of Thuyilum Illam	Source Reference
Jaffna	Koppay	⁹
Kilinochchi	Kanagapuram	¹⁰
Kilinochchi	Mulankavil	¹⁰
Mullaitivu	Visuvamadu	⁹
Mullaitivu	Alambil	¹⁰
Mullaitivu	Suthanthirapuram (Final Battle Area)	¹⁰
Mullaitivu	Dharmapuram (Final Battle Area)	¹⁰
Mullaitivu	Iranaippalai (Final Battle Area)	¹⁰
Mullaitivu	Pachaippulveli (Final Battle Area)	¹⁰
Mullaitivu	Mullivaikkal East (Final Battle Area)	¹⁰
Mullaitivu	Mullivaikkal West (Final Battle Area)	¹⁰
Mannar	Pandivirichchan	¹⁰
Mannar	Mullikkulam	¹⁰
Vavuniya	Echchankulam	¹⁰
Trincomalee	Aalankulam (Sampur)	¹⁴
Batticaloa	Mavadi Munmari	¹⁴
Manal Aru	Punithapoomi	¹⁰
Manal Aru	Uthapeedam	¹⁰
Vadamarachchi East	Uduthurai	¹⁰
Thenmarachchi	Kodikamam	¹⁰
Vadamarachchi	Ellangulam	¹⁰
Theevakam	Saaddi	¹⁰

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