Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka and the Re-Engineering of the Victory Narrative: A Geopolitical and Forensic Analysis of the 2026 Disclosures

Disclaimer: This analysis is based on public disclosures, press conference transcripts, and media reports available as of February 20, 2026. The findings presented are intended for political and historical commentary and do not constitute a legal or judicial judgment on the individuals mentioned. The claims regarding military strategy and surrender negotiations represent the subjective accounts of the parties involved and should be cross-referenced with official state archives as they become available.

Editor’s Note: The February 2026 disclosures by Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka mark a radical shift in the "White Flag" narrative that has persisted since 2010. This analysis contextualizes these new allegations within Sri Lanka's current political landscape, specifically the rise of the National People's Power (NPP) and the significant electoral decline of the Rajapaksa family. It highlights the evolution of Fonseka’s public stance from a defensive position in 2010 to an assertive "total elimination" claim in 2026.

Methodology

This analysis employed a comparative forensic methodology, cross-referencing Field Marshal Fonseka’s February 18, 2026, statements with:

● Official Sri Lankan High Court records from the 2010 "White Flag" trial.

● The 2011 UN Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts (Darusman) Report.

● Leaked US diplomatic cables (WikiLeaks) regarding command responsibility.

● Contemporary reports from international human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and the ICRC.

Publicly available video evidence and broadcast transcripts from News 1st and other local media outlets.

The press conference held by Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka on February 18, 2026, represents a transformative moment in the historical and political historiography of the Sri Lankan Civil War's conclusion.¹ For over sixteen years, the "White Flag" incident and the final hours of the conflict in May 2009 served as the primary nexus of international war crimes allegations against both the military and the civilian leadership of Sri Lanka.² However, the 2026 disclosures introduce a radical reinterpretation of these events, characterized by Fonseka’s attempt to decouple his military legacy from the political legacy of the Rajapaksa family as the nation approaches a critical presidential election cycle. This analysis deconstructs the tactical motivations behind these disclosures, comparing them with previous legal testimonies, international reports from the United Nations and the United States, and the evolving domestic political landscape in the post-Aragalaya era.⁴

The 2026 Disclosures: A Tactical Paradigm Shift in Historical Memory

The February 2026 disclosures are defined by a series of allegations that fundamentally invert the previous decade’s discourse on the end of the war. These allegations focus on three primary temporal clusters: the strategic disagreements of January 2008, the secret negotiations on the eve of victory on May 17, 2009, and a total revision of the "White Flag" narrative that has dominated international legal inquiries. The disclosure is not merely an act of historical reflection but functions as a sophisticated political maneuver aimed at rehabilitating Fonseka's image while simultaneously delegitimizing the Rajapaksas' standing as the exclusive architects of the military victory.¹

The most startling aspect of the 2026 press conference is Fonseka’s admission of a "total elimination" policy regarding the leadership of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).¹ By claiming that he personally ordered the complete annihilation of the LTTE leadership and explicitly rejected any possibility of surrender or "backdoor escape routes," Fonseka is engaging in what can be termed a "confessional gambit".¹ This tactic accepts the potential risk of international legal repercussions for a "denial of quarter"—a war crime under international humanitarian law—in order to secure the domestic political advantage of appearing more uncompromisingly patriotic and militarily decisive than the Rajapaksas, whom he now accuses of attempting to save the enemy leadership for political gain.¹⁰

Comparative Framework of Battlefield Strategies: January 2008

The claim that the civilian leadership attempted to sabotage military operations as early as 2008 serves to challenge the narrative of a unified "war-winning" machine.¹ Fonseka asserts that during a Security Council meeting in January 2008, Mahinda Rajapaksa, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, and Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda proposed a strategy that contradicted his own field-tested encirclement tactics.¹

Tactical Component	Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka’s Strategy	Rajapaksa-Karannagoda Proposal
Operational Focus	Multi-directional encirclement from Weli Oya and other fronts.¹	Direct linear advance from Vavuniya to Mullaitivu. ¹
Strategic Reasoning	Systematically isolating and destroying LTTE pockets to minimize attrition.¹	Rapid conclusion of the conflict through a central thrust.¹
Alleged Intent	Effective and thorough military victory through logistical strangulation.¹	Alleged attempt to prolong the war and increase casualties to discourage the Commander.
Command Perspective	Military autonomy and tactical superiority over civilian oversight.	Civilian-led defence hierarchy overrides field command decisions.¹

This disclosure suggests that a fundamental rift existed between the military command and the civilian defense hierarchy much earlier than the public fallout of late 2009.¹ Fonseka’s claim that this proposal was an effort to "derail the military campaign" by increasing the risk of high-casualty direct advances frames the Rajapaksas as willing to sacrifice soldiers for the purpose of sidelining a popular general. By presenting this now, Fonseka positions himself as the sole protector of the rank-and-file soldier, battling both a ruthless insurgency and a duplicitous political leadership concurrently.¹

The May 17 Surrender Negotiations: Analyzing the "Poison Seed"

The second pillar of the 2026 disclosure focuses on the hours immediately preceding the final victory on May 19, 2009. Fonseka alleges that while he was out of the country in China, the Rajapaksas—specifically Basil and Gotabaya—were engaged in unauthorized negotiations with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Amnesty International, and other organizations to facilitate the surrender of the LTTE high command.¹

This allegation is supported by what Fonseka describes as newly released video evidence of a phone call involving the then-Defense Secretary and Shavendra Silva, the commander of the 58th Division.¹ The tactical brilliance of this claim lies in its target: the Sinhalese nationalist voter base.¹⁷ For nearly two decades, the Rajapaksas have leveraged their refusal to yield to international pressure as proof of their nationalist credentials.¹⁹ Fonseka’s claim that they were secretly "offering LTTE leaders a chance to surrender" to third parties—a move he claims could have allowed Velupillai Prabhakaran or Pottu Amman to survive and potentially enter the political arena—is intended to be perceived as a supreme betrayal of the "war hero" ethos.¹

The Role of International Organizations in the Final Hours

The mention of the ICRC and Amnesty International in Fonseka's 2026 disclosures aligns with broader historical records of the LTTE’s political wing attempting to negotiate a safe exit in May 2009.⁹ Previous accounts from international journalists and UN experts indicated that Balasingham Nadesan and Seevaratnam Pulidevan had indeed contacted intermediaries to arrange a surrender under international supervision.¹⁶

However, the 2026 narrative diverges significantly by claiming the Rajapaksas were the ones receptive to these overtures, while the military command, led by Fonseka, was kept in the dark.¹ Previous accounts, including the UN Panel of Experts report (Darusman Report), suggested a unified government stance of rejecting international mediation for surrender.³ By asserting he was "not informed" of these discussions despite being reachable in China, Fonseka creates a clear delineation between his operational command, which focused on "total destruction," and the political leadership, which he characterizes as harboring a "poison seed" of compromise.¹

Deconstructing the "White Flag" Metamorphosis: 2010 vs. 2026

The most complex and legally perilous element of the 2026 interview is Fonseka's revisionist history of the "White Flag" incident.¹ In 2010, following his retirement and unsuccessful presidential bid, Fonseka was convicted of "propagating a false rumor" after an interview with The Sunday Leader suggested that Gotabaya Rajapaksa had ordered the execution of surrendering LTTE members.²¹ At that time, his legal defense was built on the claim that he had been misrepresented by the media and that he was merely repeating a story heard from journalists who were at the front.²¹

In the 2026 press conference, Fonseka shifts his position entirely.¹ He no longer claims to have been a victim of media "imagination"; rather, he asserts that the entire "white flag" narrative was a fabricated trap used by the media and political opponents to tarnish his reputation.¹ Most significantly, he now claims that he refused to accommodate surrender and that the military's objective was always the total elimination of the leadership—a stance he argues the Rajapaksas were attempting to undermine.¹

Evolution of Judicial and Public Statements on the White Flag Incident

Timeline	Statement / Legal Position	Narrative Objective
December 2009	Alleged in The Sunday Leader that Gotabaya ordered Shavendra Silva to shoot surrendering LTTE leaders.²⁰	To discredit the Defence Secretary and civilian leadership during the election.¹³
2010 High Court Trial	Claimed the editor "imagined" the quotes; that no one came forward with white flags to his knowledge. ²¹	To avoid a 3-year prison sentence and preserve "war hero" status among soldiers.¹⁴
February 2026	Asserts he ordered the "total elimination," and the Rajapaksas were the ones trying to allow a "white flag" surrender to third parties.¹	To claim the "kill" for the nationalist base and frame the Rajapaksas as weak on terrorism.⁸

This 2026 reversal is a bold tactical maneuver. By claiming he personally ordered the annihilation, he "claims the kill" for the nationalist voter base, portraying himself as the true and uncompromising victor of the war.⁸ While this paradoxically "exonerates" the Rajapaksas from the specific charge of ordering the killings, it harms them politically by making them appear willing to cut deals with the LTTE through international intermediaries like the ICRC and Amnesty International.⁸

International Accusations and the Risk of Admission

While Fonseka’s 2026 disclosures serve a vital domestic political function, they carry profound implications for international law and the ongoing pursuit of accountability for war crimes in Sri Lanka.⁹ Article 40 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol I), which reflects customary international law, explicitly prohibits "denial of quarter"—the act of ordering that there shall be no survivors or conducting hostilities on that basis.¹⁰ Fonseka’s clear statement that his objective was the "total elimination" and that he had "no intention of allowing LTTE leaders to surrender" could be interpreted by international monitoring bodies as an admission of such a policy.

The UN Panel of Experts found "credible allegations" of summary executions of prisoners and surrendering combatants by the Sri Lankan military.² These reports consistently implicated the "senior civilian and military leadership," including President Mahinda Rajapaksa, Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, and Army Commander Sarath Fonseka.⁴ By claiming sole operational command and the intent to "wipe out" the leadership despite political attempts at negotiation, Fonseka is effectively centralizing the command responsibility for these actions onto himself, potentially to shield the broader military institution while isolating the former political leadership.⁸

The Nexus of Command Responsibility and International Sanctions

The international community’s view of the Sri Lankan leadership has been crystallized in various sanctions and investigative reports.²⁵ Confidential cables from the US Ambassador in Colombo, released via Wikileaks, noted that responsibility for wartime crimes rested with both the Rajapaksas and Fonseka.⁴ The 2026 narrative seeks to decouple these responsibilities in a way that aligns with the current global trend toward individual accountability.²⁶

Individual	Sanction / Accountability Status	Fonseka's 2026 Response / Implication
Gotabaya Rajapaksa	Accused of ordering executions in the "White Flag" incident.¹⁶	Fonseka now claims he was the one who ordered the elimination, while Gota "negotiated".¹
Shavendra Silva	UK/US Sanctions for war crimes in the final stages.²⁵	Fonseka defends Silva, calling sanctions "unreasonable" and Silva a front-line hero.²⁵
Wasantha Karannagoda	US Sanctions for abductions/disappearances in 2008-09.²⁷	Fonseka calls sanctions "reasonable" and accuses him of sabotaging the war in 2008.¹
Jagath Jayasuriya	UK Sanctions for abuses in the Vanni.²⁵	Fonseka calls sanctions "reasonable" and claims Jayasuriya was not on the front lines.²⁶

This selective defense of Shavendra Silva while condemning Karannagoda and Jayasuriya is a clear political tactic.²⁶ Fonseka is attempting to build a coalition of "front-line war heroes" (Silva and the rank-and-file) against "backroom collaborators and corrupt officials" (Karannagoda, Jayasuriya, and the Rajapaksas).⁷

Inter-Service Rivalry and the Karannagoda Factor

The inclusion of Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda in the January 2008 "sabotage" allegation is a continuation of a decades-long feud.²⁶ The friction between Fonseka and Karannagoda was a defining feature of the defense establishment during the war, often manifesting as inter-service disputes over budget, credit for operations, and direct access to the President.²⁶

Karannagoda has previously taken legal action against Fonseka, including a 500-million-rupee defamation claim in 2009 regarding comments made on television.²⁸ Furthermore, Karannagoda has been implicated in the "Navy 11" case involving the abduction and disappearance of youth for ransom in Colombo.²⁷ By linking Karannagoda to the 2008 strategy, which he claims would have "prolonged the war," Fonseka is attempting to frame his rivals not merely as human rights violators but as incompetent military strategists who actively hindered the national cause.¹

The "Whistleblower" and the Authenticity of the Video

A significant new element in the 2026 disclosure is the presentation of video evidence and the mention of a whistleblower who recorded the footage. Fonseka claims that the individual who recorded the phone conversation between the Defence Secretary and Shavendra Silva had to flee the country due to death threats from the previous administration.

The tactical use of "newly obtained" evidence fifteen years after the fact is designed to explain why this narrative was not presented during his 2010 trial.¹ By framing the evidence as having been "suppressed" by the Rajapaksa "dictatorship," Fonseka aligns himself with the post-Aragalaya sentiment of uncovering the "hidden truth" of the previous regime's corruption and betrayal.⁷ This appeals to a voter base that is increasingly skeptical of official state narratives and hungry for "accountability" against the Rajapaksa family.⁶

The 2026 Political Context: The NPP Supermajority and the Rajapaksa Collapse

The timing of Fonseka’s disclosures is inextricable from the seismic shift in Sri Lanka’s political landscape following the 2024 elections.⁶ The rise of Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD) and the National People's Power (NPP) coalition, which secured a two-thirds supermajority in parliament, has fundamentally marginalized the traditional political elite.⁶ The Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), the vehicle for the Rajapaksa family, saw its support base evaporate, winning only a handful of seats.¹⁸

In this environment, the "War Hero" branding that the Rajapaksas used to maintain power for nearly two decades has been severely compromised by the 2022 economic crisis and subsequent national bankruptcy.¹⁸ Fonseka, who has long maintained an anti-corruption stance and was himself a victim of the Rajapaksas' authoritarianism, is attempting to seize the nationalist vacuum left by the SLPP’s decline.¹³

Tactics of the "Hero-Villain" Inversion

Fonseka’s strategy involves an inversion of the established hero-villain dynamic within the Sinhalese nationalist framework.

1. The Soldier vs. The Politician: He frames the war victory as a purely military achievement that was nearly sabotaged by politicians (the Rajapaksas) seeking to prolong it for their own gain.¹

2. The Uncompromising Patriot vs. The International Negotiator: He portrays himself as the one who wanted to "wipe out" the LTTE entirely, while framing the Rajapaksas as weak leaders who were secretly talking to international NGOs to spare the LTTE high command.¹

3. The Truth-Teller vs. The Fabricator: He claims the "White Flag" story (which he used against the Rajapaksas in 2009) was actually a media/political trap used to discredit him, thereby positioning himself as the ultimate victim of "fake news".¹

This "Reverse-Prosecution" tactic is intended to make it impossible for the Rajapaksas to take credit for the victory without also accepting the "betrayal" of the 2008 and 2009 negotiations.¹

True Political Tactics Behind the Interview

The analysis of the February 18, 2026, press conference reveals a multi-layered political strategy designed to achieve several domestic and international objectives:

The primary objective is the Neutralization of the "War Criminal" Stigma within the domestic electorate. By reframing the execution of LTTE leaders as a legitimate military objective of "total elimination" rather than a "murder of surrendering combatants," Fonseka is attempting to transform a legal liability into a political asset.¹ He is betting that the Sri Lankan public will value "victory at any cost" over "adherence to international norms," particularly if the alternative was the survival and political integration of the LTTE leadership.¹²

The second objective is the Systemic Dismantling of the Rajapaksa Legacy. By alleging that Mahinda and Gotabaya attempted to save Prabhakaran for political reasons (the "poison seed" theory), Fonseka is attacking the very foundation of the Rajapaksas' legitimacy.¹ This narrative is designed to ensure that the Rajapaksa family can never again claim to be the exclusive guardians of the Sinhalese-Buddhist state.⁶

The third objective is Electoral Positioning for the 2026 Presidential Race. With the Rajapaksas sidelined and the NPP focused on economic reform and the IMF program, Fonseka is positioning himself as a "Third Way" leader—a disciplined military "strongman" who can handle security and corruption with the same ruthlessness he used to defeat the LTTE.³² His visit to Delhi and his "courage and confidence" rhetoric suggest he is seeking both domestic and regional recognition as a viable alternative to the NPP's civilian leadership.³⁶

Analysis of the "Total Elimination" Confession

Fonseka’s tactical admission of the "total elimination" policy is a calculated risk that hinges on the domestic vs. international divide in legal perception.⁸ In the context of Sri Lankan politics, a confession of "killing the enemy" is often seen as a badge of honor among hardline nationalists.¹⁷ By claiming this responsibility, he achieves two goals:

● He makes it impossible for the Rajapaksas to claim credit for the "end-game" without also taking credit for the very actions he now claims were his orders alone.⁹

● He positions himself as the only leader honest enough to tell the "truth" about how the war was won, contrasting his "transparency" with the Rajapaksas' "secrecy".⁷

Conclusion: The Weaponization of Historical Truth

The 2026 disclosures by Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka represent a sophisticated exercise in political repositioning. By weaving together legitimate historical grievances (the 2008 strategic disagreements) with explosive new allegations (the May 17 "secret deals"), he has fundamentally challenged the history of the Sri Lankan Civil War's conclusion.¹

The evidence suggests that Fonseka’s primary goal is to strip the Rajapaksas of their "War Hero" status and claim it entirely for the military and himself as the nation enters a new political era.⁶ His 2026 narrative is a "reverse-prosecution"—instead of defending himself against charges of war crimes, he is "prosecuting" the Rajapaksas for the "crime" of being too merciful or politically compromised during the war's final hours.⁸

For the international community, these disclosures present a paradox. While Fonseka’s statements provide a potential roadmap for establishing individual command responsibility for the deaths of surrendering LTTE leaders, his domestic popularity as an uncompromising victor may make any legal action politically explosive within Sri Lanka.⁹ As the 2026 election approaches, the "truth" of the war's end has become a weaponized commodity, used by a former commander to eliminate the legacy of his erstwhile masters and seize the ultimate prize of political leadership.⁷ The transition from the "White Flag" story of 2010 to the "Annihilation" story of 2026 marks the final stage in the politicization of the military victory, ensuring that the legacy of 2009 remains a primary battlefield in the struggle for Sri Lanka's future.¹

In solidarity,

Wimal Navaratnam

Human Rights Advocate | ABC Tamil Oli (ECOSOC)

Email: tamilolicanada@gmail.com

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