Strategic Posturing and Information Verification in Post-Conflict Sri Lanka: A Detailed Fact vs. Claim Matrix of the Dossier of Asanga Abeygunasekara

An Evaluative Study of Post-Conflict Posturing, Covert Intelligence Claims, and Alleged Foreign Infiltration

Disclaimer:

The evaluations and assessments presented in this report are based strictly on open-source material, independent monitoring files, and public statements. This analysis does not substantiate or endorse any classified intelligence claims or uncorroborated personal accounts. It is intended solely for academic research, advocacy planning, and dossier integration.

Editor's Note:

In evaluating figures from post-conflict zones, analysts face the critical challenge of navigating through highly personalized and politically charged accounts. This dossier evaluation on Asanga Abeygunasekara isolates specific security claims—such as the layout of camps around Trincomalee and accounts of massive foreign intelligence infiltration in the Ministry of Defence—to highlight the necessity of cross-referencing individual testimonies with established baseline facts. This research provides readers with an objective metric to weigh oral histories against documented evidence.

Methodology:

The methodology for this report relies on a three-pronged verification framework designed to separate confirmed facts from unverified personal claims. First, the subject's claims regarding his early career roles were cross-referenced against his documented private-sector employment in the telecommunications sector during that exact timeframe. Second, specific operational details concerning the establishment of the Manirasakulam camp were evaluated by referencing the actual rulings of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). Third, recent assertions made by the subject concerning high-level foreign intelligence operations within the defense establishment were cataloged. Because these claims were presented entirely without independent documentation or physical evidence, they were categorized in the report as uncorroborated personal narratives.

The assessment of national security dossiers, particularly in post-conflict environments such as Sri Lanka, requires a rigorous separation of verifiable facts from interpretive or personal narratives. State intelligence frameworks often suffer from politicization, where historical accounts are reconstructed to serve contemporary political objectives or to establish personal credibility within elite networks. In analyzing the assertions made by academic and foreign policy analyst Asanga Abeygunasekara regarding the ceasefire era of the Sri Lankan Civil War, one observes a complex intersection of documented military history and uncorroborated personal claims.¹

Sri Lanka’s strategic position in the Indian Ocean Region has historically made its domestic security dynamics a subject of intense geopolitical interest.² Born in 1977, the subject is the son of Ossie Abeygunasekara, a former leader of the Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya and presidential candidate who was assassinated by a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam suicide attack in 1994.¹ Educated at Ananda College and subsequently earning a Bachelor of Science in computer science and an Master of Business Administration from Edith Cowan University, the subject later attended specialized executive programs at the Harvard Kennedy School and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.¹

The subject’s career began in the telecommunications sector, with roles as a project manager at Sri Lanka Telecom and Hutchison Lanka between 2001 and 2005.¹ Transitioning into public service in 2005, the subject was appointed Chairman of the Ceylon Fishery Harbours Corporation following the devastating 2004 Asian tsunami, serving until 2010.¹ Concurrently, the subject served on the board of the Sri Lanka Ports Authority.¹ Subsequent roles included serving as the Chairman of the Sri Lanka Foreign Employment Agency and as the Executive Director of the government’s foreign policy think tank, the Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute for International Relations and Strategic Studies.¹ In 2016, the subject was appointed as the founding Director General of the Institute of National Security Studies Sri Lanka under the Ministry of Defence.¹

Executive Summary:

To promote a thorough understanding of the public statement and ensure historical accountability, it is useful to elaborate on the specific events and context that separate verified records from unsupported claims. For the Tamil community and the general public, a deeper look at the actual source documents from the ceasefire era and the nature of the recent accusations provides a clearer path to factual awareness.

The Historical Realities of the Manirasakulam Camp Crisis The Manirasakulam camp issue was not a quiet or secret affair. In June 2003, the Sri Lankan Army lodged an official complaint with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) stating that the LTTE had established a new military camp at Manirasakulam (also referred to as Kuranku Paanchan Kulam) on the southwestern side of the Trincomalee Bay. After looking into the matter, the SLMM issued a formal ruling stating that the camp was situated within 600 meters of government-controlled areas, putting it in clear violation of the February 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, and ordering its dismantling.

However, the LTTE leadership publicly pushed back, claiming the area had been under LTTE control for a long time and that the order to remove it was "unjust". The group ignored the SLMM orders and rejected compromises to hand over the camp to the monitors until the dispute could be resolved. Because of this flagrant ceasefire violation, even international actors stepped in; the U.S. State Department formally called on the LTTE to comply with the ruling and dismantle the camp.

While the crisis itself was real, the subject's claim to have authored secret intelligence reports about it is difficult to verify because there are no independent public records confirming his role in state intelligence at that time, and his documented employment from 2001 to 2005 places him in the private telecommunications sector.

The Strategic Configuration of Camps around Trincomalee Independent reporting from 2003 did confirm a broader LTTE military buildup around the Trincomalee harbor. It was noted that guerrilla forces were opening new military camps, re-occupying abandoned bases, and surrounding them with satellite camps while deploying long-range artillery guns. However, assigning a highly specific static figure of "one major camp and 17 satellite camps" is not something documented by monitors or independent military analysts. In post-conflict narratives, unverified specific figures often replace documented general patterns, leading to distorted historical assessments. True awareness depends on checking such numbers against baseline monitors' records rather than repeating retrospective claims.

Claims of Massive CIA Infiltration The statements made by Asanga Abeygunasekara regarding the Gotabaya Rajapaksa administration introduce highly sensational claims into the public sphere. He has publicly stated that Gotabaya Rajapaksa personally told him that his entire defense network had been taken over by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and that CIA operatives followed him in Singapore. He directly accused senior state figures like Secretary of Defence General Kamal Gunaratne and Foreign Affairs Advisor Admiral Jayantha Colombage of being associates or operatives assisting the CIA. Furthermore, he attempted to draw a connection to Major General Suresh Sally, who was arrested on February 25, 2026, over the 2019 Easter attacks, implying that Sally’s previous employment at the Pathfinder Institute meant he knew of these alleged CIA activities.

It is crucial for the public to note that these claims were provided entirely without evidence. In complex political environments, it is common for individuals to explain away political failures and shifts in power by citing external plots or massive intelligence infiltrations. Without independent, credible verification, treating these narratives as established facts compromises an accurate understanding of the real forces driving local politics.

By cross-referencing public statements with official documentation and recognizing when serious accusations are made without proof, the community can ensure that the narrative surrounding the conflict and its aftermath remains firmly rooted in reality.

The following Research report provides more details:

Narrative Legitimacy and the Verification of Covert Security Assertions

Literary Contributions and Core Geopolitical Concepts

A central element of dossier construction involves assessing the subject's published works to determine analytical leanings and theoretical consistency. The subject has written several volumes and essays targeting the intersection of domestic instability and external power rivalries in South Asia.¹ These texts serve as primary source indicators of the subject's perspective on the security environment.

Scholarly Publications and Core Themes

Published Work	Publication Details	Core Analytical Focus
Winds of Change: Geopolitics At The Crossroads Of South And Southeast Asia	Published by World Scientific (Singapore), with a distributed launch in Colombo on March 10, 2026. ²	Explores the evolving geopolitical landscape of the Indian Ocean, examining major power rivalries involving the United States, China, and India. ²
Teardrop Diplomacy: China's Sri Lanka Foray	Published by Bloomsbury in 2023. ¹	Introduces the concept of China's "strategic trap" in Sri Lanka and details the nation's slide toward autocratic governance. ¹
Conundrum Of An Island: Sri Lanka's Geopolitical Challenges	Discussed in virtual forums in April 2022. ³	Examines the security problems plaguing the country, specifically dealing with domestic disputes and national security challenges. ³
Sri Lanka At Crossroads: Geopolitical Challenges And National Interests	Published by World Scientific in 2019. ¹	Offers a retrospective analysis of post-conflict challenges, navigating domestic politics, and the strategic importance of the island. ¹

The subject's conceptualization of China's "strategic trap" posits that economic dependencies created via large infrastructure projects and high-interest loans transition directly into political and strategic vulnerabilities for littoral states in the Indian Ocean.¹ This framework serves as a core interpretive lens through which the subject analyzes the post-2019 political landscape in Colombo, suggesting that local administrations failed to balance relations between New Delhi and Beijing.¹

The Manirasakulam Camp Crisis of 2003

A highly specific point of contention in evaluating intelligence claims from the ceasefire era involves the establishment and operations of the LTTE's Manirasakulam camp. In June 2003, the Sri Lankan Army lodged a formal complaint with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission accusing the LTTE of establishing a new military camp at Manirasakulam, located in the southwestern quadrant of the Trincomalee Bay.⁵ The SLMM, after investigation, ruled that the camp was situated within 600 meters of government-controlled territory and ordered its dismantling.⁵ The refusal of the LTTE to comply with this ruling became one of the defining crises of the ceasefire period, highlighting the structural weaknesses of the Ceasefire Agreement monitoring mechanisms.⁵

The factual record demonstrates that the LTTE leadership, including political head S.P. Thamilchelvan, argued that the area had been under long-term LTTE control and that the camp had existed prior to the signing of the CFA, thereby placing it outside the purview of the SLMM's dismantling orders.⁷ Thamilchelvan arrived in the nearby Sampur region via a Sri Lankan Air Force helicopter to review the situation, though the sudden change in the scheduled landing site frustrated media attempts to document the event.⁸ The government in Colombo, divided by extreme internal political rivalries, struggled to formulate a cohesive response. President Chandrika Kumaratunga demanded executive action to remove the camp, while the United National Front government under Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe pursued a strategy of stoic silence and non-confrontation to preserve the fragile peace process.⁵

The physical operations around the Manirasakulam camp were described as intense. Reports from the period suggest that the LTTE fortified the camp with bunkers and observation posts, and deployed heavily armed cadres to dominate the surrounding area during the night to prevent reconnaissance by government forces.⁶ On at least one occasion, an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle deployed by the Sri Lankan Air Force drew radio-intercepted orders to open fire from the camp area, prompting operators to rapidly increase altitude and return the aircraft to a safe landing site.⁶ Leaks circulated in both state and private media claiming the LTTE would dismantle the camp within 72 hours or convert it into a political office, but these reports were promptly dismissed by the insurgent leadership as pipe dreams.⁶

The internationalization of the crisis occurred when United States State Department Deputy Spokesman Philip T. Reeker publicly called upon the LTTE to comply with the SLMM ruling and dismantle the camp, identifying it as a direct violation of the February 2002 Ceasefire Agreement.⁶ This external pressure underscored the high strategic importance both Washington and New Delhi placed on the security of the Trincomalee harbor region.⁶

Fact vs. Claim Matrix for Dossier Integration

The following matrix provides a structured evaluation of the claims made by the subject regarding his role during the 2002–2004 period and the strategic environment surrounding the Manirasakulam camp. This matrix is designed for integration into broader security dossiers analyzing information reliability in South Asian political risk assessments.

Intelligence and Strategic Claims Evaluation Matrix

Claim Made by Asanga Abeygunasekara	Verifiable Facts and Independent Evidence	Analytical Status
Personally prepared a secret intelligence report on the LTTE’s Manirasakulam camp between 2002–2004.	No publicly available documentation confirms his authorship. Intelligence reports from this specific period remain classified by the state. During this era, the subject was formally employed in the private telecommunications sector. ¹	Unverified claim.
The LTTE operated one major camp and 17 satellite camps encircling Trincomalee district.	LTTE presence in the Trincomalee district is historically documented, but the exact number and configuration of camps vary widely across different independent sources. ⁶	Partially verifiable; numbers unconfirmed.
The LTTE’s primary strategic objective was to capture Trincomalee harbor and then advance south to take control of the country.	Military analysts have frequently noted Trincomalee’s immense strategic value, but no consensus exists on a formal, declassified LTTE plan matching this specific description. ⁹	Interpretive claim.
His report on the camp directly influenced Wimal Weerawansa’s protests demanding the removal of the Manirasakulam camp.	There is no public record linking Weerawansa’s political protests directly to a report authored or prepared by Abeygunasekara.	Unverified claim.
Handing the report to Weerawansa created the specific opportunity that led to a close relationship with Gotabaya Rajapaksa.	Abeygunasekara later served in institutional roles connected to administrations involving Gotabaya Rajapaksa, but the origin story of this relationship is based solely on his personal account. ¹	Personal narrative; not independently verifiable.
He made these specific statements at a book launch addressing the Easter Sunday attacks.	Event coverage, panel discussions, and media reporting confirm that these statements were made in the context of academic and book launch proceedings. ²	Confirmed.

This matrix illustrates the inherent difficulties in verifying claims that rely on classified documents or private oral communications. In the absence of declassified intelligence files from the 2002–2004 era, assertions regarding the authorship of internal security documents or the precise causal chain linking documents to political protests remain speculative.

Strategic Encirclement and the Battle for Trincomalee Harbor

The claim regarding the LTTE operating one major camp and 17 satellite camps encircling Trincomalee speaks to a broader, well-documented military reality: the LTTE viewed the eastern port city of Trincomalee as a vital strategic asset.⁹ Trincomalee possesses one of the world's finest natural deep-water harbors, making it a crucial hub for dominating the critical sea lanes of communication across the Indian Ocean.⁹ For the LTTE, controlling Trincomalee would have provided a contiguous landmass connecting the Northern and Eastern provinces, establishing the geographical core of their proposed separate state, Tamil Eelam.¹²

Historical military analysis confirms that the LTTE continuously attempted to establish a network of bases around the harbor.¹³ The military buildup included reoccupying abandoned bases and opening new military camps to create a ring around the government-controlled naval dockyard.⁶ Air Force surveillance at the time suggested that long-range artillery guns, including howitzers, were positioned in areas expanded after the ceasefire to threaten naval movements.⁶

However, asserting a precise configuration of "one major camp and 17 satellite camps" is difficult to verify through open-source documentation. Military records from the SLMM and independent defense journals describe a fluid network of camps rather than a rigid, static structure.⁶ The LTTE's strategy in the east was often decentralized, relying on the local command structure under figures like Colonel Pathuman and later, after the defection of the eastern commander, the rival faction led by Karuna.⁵

The claim that the LTTE planned to use Trincomalee as a springboard to advance south and conquer the entire country is an interpretive reading of the LTTE’s strategic doctrine. Most scholarly and military consensus suggests that the LTTE's primary military objective was the consolidation and defense of the Northern and Eastern provinces to force the government to recognize a sovereign Tamil state.¹² While offensive operations in the south occurred—primarily through terrorism and economic sabotage in Colombo—the concept of a conventional military march from Trincomalee to take over the southern Sinhalese-majority regions is not supported by standard analyses of LTTE capability or doctrine.¹² The group was structured for hybrid warfare, maintaining conventional military holding power in the north and east while deploying asymmetric assets elsewhere.¹²

The Political Nexus: Wimal Weerawansa and Institutionalized Protests

Tracing the political connections asserted by the subject requires an understanding of the shifting alliances in Sri Lankan politics following the collapse of the 2002 ceasefire. Wimal Weerawansa emerged during this period as a prominent voice of Sinhala nationalism, initially as a firebrand leader within the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and later as the leader of the National Freedom Front.¹⁵ Weerawansa was known for mobilizing large-scale public protests against what he termed the infringement of national sovereignty by international actors, including the SLMM and later the United Nations.¹⁷

The assertion that a secret report on the Manirasakulam camp directly influenced Weerawansa’s protests and subsequently facilitated the subject's entry into the inner circle of Gotabaya Rajapaksa is an unsubstantiated origin story. Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who served as the powerful Secretary to the Ministry of Defence during the final phase of the war (2005–2009) and later as President (2019–2022), was known for relying on a close-knit group of military officers, intelligence operatives, and academic advisors.¹

To contextualize the nature of Weerawansa's protest activities and evaluate the likelihood of their being driven by specific intelligence reports, a review of his documented protest record is required.

Chronicled Protests of Wimal Weerawansa and Documented Contexts

Year	Target of Protest	Nature of the Demonstration
2010	United Nations Office in Colombo. ¹⁷	Protested against a UN advisory panel examining alleged war crimes. Supporters surrounded the building, covered security cameras with plastic bags and black paint, and trapped UN staff inside. Weerawansa later conducted a hunger strike. ¹⁶
2016	UN High Commissioner Prince Zeid bin Ra'ad Zeid al-Hussein. ¹⁵	Protested the arrival of the UN High Commissioner. A court case was filed against Weerawansa and five other party members for organizing a protest at Bauddhaloka Mawatha that inconvenienced the public. ¹⁵
2026	Ministry of Education Reforms. ¹⁹	Launched a continuous Satyagraha sit-in calling for the withdrawal of Grade 6 education reforms and demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister from the role of Education Minister. ¹⁹

The subject did indeed hold prominent positions within institutions aligned with the Rajapaksa governance model, including directing the INSSSL.¹ These appointments establish his presence within the state security apparatus, but they do not substantiate the claim that a single report handed to a political figure in 2003 was the catalyst for his professional advancement.¹ In political risk assessment, narratives of this nature must be categorized as personal accounts rather than established historical facts. They reflect the highly centralized and personality-driven nature of political access in Sri Lanka, where proximity to power is frequently explained through claims of unique access to critical information or pivotal personal interventions.

The Easter Sunday Attacks and Intelligence Negligence Controversies

To understand the broader implications of the subject's statements, one must analyze the institutional context in which they were presented: an event surrounding the analysis of the 2019 Easter Sunday terror attacks.¹ The Easter Sunday bombings, executed by local Islamist extremists targeting churches and luxury hotels, represented a massive failure of the national security and intelligence apparatus.³ Following the attacks, severe institutional friction emerged between various branches of the government and the national security think tanks regarding who held accurate threat forecasts and why they were ignored.⁴

The subject has publicly asserted that in January 2019, acting as the Director General of the INSSSL, he presented a Monthly Threat Forecast directly to President Maithripala Sirisena.¹ This document explicitly identified a high-probability threat based on a detonator cache found at Wanathavilluwa.¹⁰ This forecast was cited in Volume I of the findings of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry on the Easter Attacks, specifically on pages 257, 262, and 352.¹⁰ The subject provided testimony before the commission over two full days and submitted a thirteen-page report, though he noted that his contribution was only minimally referenced in the final output.¹⁰ The PCOI report did acknowledge that had the subject received the specific Indian intelligence warning forwarded on April 4, 2019, it would have aligned directly with his earlier forecast, potentially preventing the tragedy.¹⁰

The aftermath of the Easter attacks triggered intense political maneuvering. Following the election of Gotabaya Rajapaksa as President in November 2019, the subject drew attention to an abrupt and unexplained transfer from the Ministry of Defence, which was never executed.¹⁰ He was informed of an appointment to Berlin as Minister Counsellor, but he remained in the country.¹⁰

The subject stated that in a conversation with former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa on June 2, 2024, at his residence, the former leader disclaimed personal involvement in the transfer decision, attributing it to senior advisors.¹⁰ At the time, several advisors closely affiliated with the Pathfinder Foundation appeared to influence the decision.¹⁰ During the period surrounding the transfer, the subject claimed he was instructed multiple times by counter-terrorism academic Prof. Rohan Gunaratna to apologize to Milinda Moragoda, the founder of the Pathfinder Foundation, for allegedly interfering with their research, though the specific nature of the interference was never explained.¹⁰

This sequence of events highlights a recurrent trend in Sri Lankan security administration: the marginalization of institutionalized intelligence and research in favor of personalized advisory circles. The claims made by the subject at his book launch are deeply embedded in these grievances and institutional rivalries, adding another layer of complexity for external analysts trying to extract objective data from his accounts.

Emergent Claims of CIA Infiltration and Geopolitical Manipulation

In assessing dossiers involving security figures from South Asia, analysts must account for the increasing frequency of accusations involving foreign intelligence services. In recent public discussions, the subject escalated his claims regarding the Gotabaya Rajapaksa administration, asserting that the former President personally told him that the entire defense network of Sri Lanka had been infiltrated or taken over by the United States Central Intelligence Agency.²¹

According to these claims, Gotabaya Rajapaksa believed he lost the presidency in 2022 because key figures within his own security structure were acting in accordance with CIA interests.²¹ The subject explicitly named General Kamal Gunaratne, who served as Secretary of Defence during both the Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Ranil Wickremesinghe presidencies, as an individual allegedly involved in assisting the CIA.²¹ He further noted that it was publicly known at the time that one of the conditions associated with Ranil Wickremesinghe assuming the presidency was the retention of Kamal Gunaratne as Defence Secretary.²¹

The subject also claimed that Gotabaya Rajapaksa identified Admiral Jayantha Colombage, who served as his Foreign Affairs Advisor, as another associate of the CIA who attempted to cause him difficulties.²¹ These claims involve individuals associated with the Pathfinder Foundation, established by Milinda Moragoda.²¹ The subject highlighted that Major General Suresh Sally, who was arrested on February 25, 2026, in relation to the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks, had been working at the Pathfinder Institute before his arrest.²¹ He suggested without providing direct evidence that Sally may have been aware of the alleged CIA-related activities.²¹

These claims are of extreme gravity but remain entirely uncorroborated by independent evidence. They mirror the prevailing political culture in Sri Lanka, where local actors frequently project domestic political failures onto external geopolitical forces. For corporate risk analysts and foreign policy dossier compilers, these assertions serve as indicators of deep-seated distrust within the military and political elite, rather than proof of external intelligence operations. Without independent verification from multiple distinct sources, treating these personal accounts as established facts poses a severe threat to analytical objectivity.

To further complicate the narrative, the subject acknowledged that he was recruited by the United States Agency for International Development to prepare a report on the 2022 popular struggle, stating he was paid more than one hundred thousand rupees per hour for this work.²¹ Critics have utilized this disclosure to question his impartiality, framing it as an organization linked to external intelligence interests, while the subject defended it as transparent professional research.²¹ This dual positioning as both an exposed target of political maneuvering and a beneficiary of foreign institutional funding underscores the nuanced and highly complex background of the subject.

Conclusions and Dossier Guidance

The evaluation of the claims made by Asanga Abeygunasekara highlights a systemic challenge in contemporary security analysis: the reliance on narrative accounts that blend verifiable historical events with unverified personal interactions and interpretations. The Manirasakulam camp dispute is a historical fact, and the LTTE's focus on Trincomalee is well-supported by military doctrine.⁵ However, the claims regarding secret reports, direct lines of political influence, and mass infiltration by foreign intelligence agencies lack the necessary documentary support to move beyond the category of unverified personal narratives.

When integrating such claims into corporate or policy dossiers, specific evaluative protocols must be observed to avoid the internalization of bias and politicized narratives. Documented military history, verified by international monitors such as the SLMM, declassified operational reports, and multi-sided media coverage, can be integrated as a baseline for factual context and timeline reconstruction. Institutional testimony, such as that sourced from the Presidential Commission of Inquiry, is usable with attribution to the specific body, noting the extent of reference and institutional consensus.¹⁰ In contrast, personal oral histories regarding private conversations or classified documents must be strictly categorized as unverified claims or personal narratives, and allegations of foreign intelligence infiltration without corroborating evidence should be treated solely as indicators of domestic political friction and elite paranoia rather than objective security assessments.

The failure to maintain strict boundaries between these categories results in highly distorted risk assessments. Accepting the narrative that a specific unverified report formed the foundational link between high-level political actors creates a false understanding of how political networks coalesce in Sri Lanka. Ultimately, the dossier of the subject serves as an ideal case study in the necessity of rigorous fact-checking and structured analysis. By placing his statements within a fact vs. claim matrix and cross-referencing them with the broader geopolitical landscape of the Indian Ocean and the internal dynamics of Sri Lankan politics, security analysts can produce outputs that are exhaustive in detail and free from the distortions of unverified personal narratives.

Works cited

1. Asanga Abeyagoonasekera - Wikipedia, accessed April 2, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asanga_Abeyagoonasekera

2. Winds of Change: Geopolitics Book Launch in Sri Lanka | Asanga Abeyagoonasekera, accessed April 2, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_S8BYboijkE

3. National Press Club member-author writes about Sri Lanka's struggles in new book, accessed April 2, 2026, https://www.press.org/newsroom/national-press-club-member-author-writes-about-sri-lankas-struggles-new-book

4. Asanga Abeyagoonasekera: 'Rajapaksa didn't trust India, tilted towards China' - Rediff.com, accessed April 2, 2026, https://m.rediff.com/news/interview/asanga-abeyagoonasekera-rajapaksa-didnt-trust-india-tilted-towards-china/20220715.htm

5. A Violent 'Ceasefire' - Outlook India, accessed April 2, 2026, https://www.outlookindia.com/making-a-difference/a-violent-ceasefire-news-224896

6. Situation Report - Sunday Times, accessed April 2, 2026, https://www.sundaytimes.lk/030810/columns/sitrep.html

7. Front Page - Sunday Times, accessed April 2, 2026, https://www.sundaytimes.lk/030831/front/ltte.htm

8. 'SLMM unjust in asking the LTTE to remove camp' -Thamilchelvan - TamilNet, accessed April 2, 2026, https://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?artid=9558&catid=13

9. Sri Lanka's 'War Within' and India - Columbia International Affairs Online, accessed April 2, 2026, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_jul00mup01.html

10. Obstructing Easter attacks research in 2019 : Asanga writes to President - Newswire, accessed April 2, 2026, https://www.newswire.lk/2025/04/18/obstructing-easter-attacks-research-in-2019-asanga-writes-to-president/

11. Incisive Strategy & Tactics behind the Defeat of the LTTE in 2006-09 | Thuppahi's Blog, accessed April 2, 2026, https://thuppahis.com/2023/05/19/incisive-strategy-tactics-behind-the-defeat-of-the-ltte-in-2006-09/

12. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam - Wikipedia, accessed April 2, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberation_Tigers_of_Tamil_Eelam

13. Sri Lankan civil war - Wikipedia, accessed April 2, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sri_Lankan_civil_war

14. A Guerilla War At Sea: The Sri Lankan Civil War - DTIC, accessed April 2, 2026, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA549049.pdf

15. Case against Wimal, six others over unlawful protest fixed for Dec 4 - Sunday Times, accessed April 2, 2026, https://sundaytimes.lk/online/news-online/case-against-wimal-six-others-over-unlawful-protest-fixed-for-dec-4/2-1097590

16. United Nations closes Sri Lanka mission after protests - The Guardian, accessed April 2, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/08/united-nations-closes-sri-lanka

17. 'Ban panel' protest fails to deter UN - Sunday Times, accessed April 2, 2026, https://www.sundaytimes.lk/100711/News/nws_39.html

18. Case against MP Weerawansa over unlawful protest fixed for August 5 - Sunday Times, accessed April 2, 2026, https://sundaytimes.lk/online/news-online/case-against-mp-weerawangsa-over-unlawful-protest-fixed-for-august-5/2-1087776

19. Wimal Weerawansa ends 'Satyagraha' against education reforms - Ada Derana, accessed April 2, 2026, http://www.adaderana.lk/news/117120/wimal-weerawansa-ends-satyagraha-against-education-reforms

20. Easter Sunday In Sri Lanka: Crisis, Correction & Hope - Colombo Telegraph, accessed April 2, 2026, https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/easter-sunday-in-sri-lanka-crisis-correction-hope/

21. "My entire defence network, including Defence Secretary General Kamal Gunaratne, was infiltrated by the CIA,” — Gotabaya Rajapaksa • Sri Lanka Brief, accessed April 2, 2026, https://srilankabrief.org/my-entire-defence-network-including-defence-secretary-general-kamal-gunaratne-was-infiltrated-by-the-cia-gotabaya-rajapaksa/

In solidarity,

Wimal Navaratnam

Human Rights Defender |Independent Researcher | ABC Tamil Oli (ECOSOC)

Email: tamilolicanada@gmail.com

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