Systemic Encroachment and the Silenced EEZ: An Investigative Advocacy Dossier on Ocean Grabbing, Energy Exploitation, and Political Betrayal in the Mannar Basin (2011–2026)

Systemic Encroachment and the Silenced EEZ:

An Investigative Advocacy Dossier on Ocean Grabbing, Energy Exploitation, and Political Betrayal in the Mannar Basin (2011–2026)

 NOTE: Systemic Encroachment and the Silenced EEZ:

EEZ stands for Exclusive Economic Zone. Under international law—specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—an EEZ is a sea zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state's baseline. Within this area, the coastal state has special rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage natural resources—both living (like fish) and non-living (such as oil and gas)—in the water column, on the seabed, and beneath the seabed. Other states may have certain freedoms, such as navigation and overflight, but resource rights are reserved for the coastal state. In the context of the Mannar Basin, the EEZ is a central concept for understanding maritime resource rights, legal disputes, and issues of sovereignty and encroachment.

Editor's Note & Legal Disclaimer

This research dossier constitutes an independent geopolitical, legal, and human rights investigation into the structural management of marine spaces, offshore energy reserves, and indigenous resource rights off Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka¹. The analytical frameworks, legal allegations, and interrogatories presented herein are formulated for international public policy advocacy, legal accountability, and academic scrutiny⁴. This report does not constitute individualized legal, financial, or investment advice.

Research Methodology

The findings of this dossier are derived from a multi-tiered research framework combining statutory analysis, geological assessment, geopolitical mapping, and international legal evaluation⁶:

1.     Statutory & Regulatory Audit: Exhaustive analysis of domestic Sri Lankan legislation, including the Petroleum Resources Act No. 21 of 2021¹, the National Policy on Natural Gas (2020)⁹, the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka¹⁰, and historical instruments such as the Vaddukoddai Resolution (1976)¹¹ and the Indo-Lanka Accord (1987)¹¹.

2.     Geological & Energy Asset Mapping: Technical evaluation of seismic data, exploration well logs (Dorado and Barracuda wells)¹², and petroleum system assessments in the Mannar and Cauvery basins published by the Petroleum Development Authority of Sri Lanka (PDASL)⁸, the United States Geological Survey (USGS)¹⁴, and industry research repositories⁷.

3.     Bilateral Agreement & MoU Tracking: Chronological mapping of Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreements, and maritime security arrangements executed between Sri Lanka, India, and foreign corporate entities between 2009 and August 2026⁹.

4.     Human Rights & Socio-Economic Field Data: Integration of socio-economic data regarding coastal fishing communities, female post-harvest labor, and artisanal fishery impacts across Northern districts (Jaffna, Mannar, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu) sourced from institutional studies².

5.     International Legal Jurisprudence: Application of legal norms under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)⁶, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)², the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)¹⁹, and jurisprudence from international tribunals⁴.

Executive Summary

"International justice is not an attack on sovereignty; it is a tool states and victims use to secure durable rule of law and protection—precisely the point Zavala Giler makes in defending the ICC."5 — Osvaldo Zavala Giler, Registrar of the International Criminal Court (Columnists: "International law protects", August 16, 2026)²⁰

The governance of international marine spaces and offshore natural wealth has long been contested between state executive centralism and the fundamental rights of historical coastal populations¹. In post-conflict Sri Lanka, this tension has materialized as a systematic regime of "Ocean Grabbing"—the centralized, non-consensual expropriation, statutory licensing, and militarized enclosure of the ocean and subsurface hydrocarbon reserves surrounding the Northern and Eastern provinces¹. For decades, central state authorities in Colombo have conflated state sovereignty with absolute executive control over natural assets, framing any invocation of international legal oversight or regional resource rights as an infringement on state integrity⁵. However, as Osvaldo Zavala Giler, Registrar of the International Criminal Court, established, international law and multilateral justice frameworks do not undermine legitimate state sovereignty⁴; rather, they serve as essential instruments for victimized communities to secure rule of law, economic survival, and structural protection against state overreach².

Applying this principle to the maritime domain off Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka reveals an alarming convergence of state-led resource alienation and local political failure¹. While the central Sri Lankan state has constructed an unyielding legal apparatus to commercialize the natural gas deposits of the Mannar Basin¹, political actors across the spectrum have remained silent on the offshore domain¹⁰. Sinhala nationalist political entities have treated the surrounding Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as a centralized state asset to be monetized or leveraged in bilateral energy deals⁹. Concurrently, Tamil political parties—including representatives from the Ilankai Thamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), the Tamil National People's Front (TNPF), and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO)—alongside opportunistic regional civil society organizations, have operated under a profound "land bias"¹⁰. By reducing historical nationalist slogans such as Tamil Eelam, Right to Self-Determination, Tamil Nation, and the North-East Homeland strictly to terrestrial landmasses, these actors have functionally abandoned the surrounding ocean⁹. This conceptual omission has left the contiguous EEZ, continental shelf, and multi-billion-dollar energy plays entirely vulnerable to state alienation and foreign corporate encirclement⁹.

Between 2011 and August 2026, the Mannar Basin transitioned from an underexplored frontier basin into a commercialized and militarized arena of regional geopolitics³. Proven deep-water natural gas discoveries—most notably the Dorado and Barracuda reservoirs containing a confirmed 839 billion cubic feet (BCF) of natural gas and 5.88 million barrels (MMB) of condensate—have been systematically incorporated into national energy blueprints and international bidding calls without obtaining the Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) of local Tamil-speaking communities². Concurrently, militarized High-Security Zones (HSZs), state-sanctioned industrial bottom trawling, and multi-billion-dollar foreign energy concessions have restricted traditional fishing grounds, eroded coastal livelihoods, and fragmented the socio-economic integrity of war-affected coastal communities³.

This dossier provides an exhaustive investigation into the structural mechanics of this maritime alienation. It outlines the chronological progression of offshore gas exploitation, catalogs stakeholder accountability, audits proven energy reserves alongside foreign Memorations of Understanding (MoUs), and constructs a legal demand framework grounded in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)⁶, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)², the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)¹⁹, the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord¹¹, and the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution¹.

Comprehensive Timeline: The Mannar Basin Exploitation & Maritime Encroachment (2011–2026)

The commercialization of the Mannar Basin and the accompanying enclosure of Northern Sri Lankan waters have evolved through three distinct structural phases: initial hydrocarbon discovery and corporate departure (2011–2015)¹², statutory centralization and regulatory restructuring (2016–2021)¹, and accelerated foreign investment calls alongside regional geopolitical encirclement (2022–August 2026)⁹.

In 2011, Cairn Lanka Private Limited, a subsidiary of Cairn India, executed a landmark offshore drilling campaign in Block SL 2007-01-001 (subsequently designated Block M2) within the northern Mannar Basin¹². The campaign yielded Sri Lanka's first confirmed hydrocarbon discoveries¹². The CLPL-Dorado-91H/1z exploration well penetrated a gross 25-meter gas-bearing sandstone reservoir, followed by the CLPL-Barracuda-1G/1 well, which encountered three distinct hydrocarbon-bearing sandstones¹². Together, these discoveries validated a productive petroleum system containing an estimated mid-case recoverable volume of 839 BCF of natural gas and 5.88 MMB of condensate¹⁵. Commercialization stalled due to pricing disputes between Cairn and the Sri Lankan government—with Cairn seeking $8.00–$9.00 per MMBtu for domestic power generation—and a global collapse in crude oil spot prices below $40 per barrel in 2015, leading Cairn to relinquish the block and exit the country¹⁵.

Following Cairn's departure, the Sri Lankan state shifted from project-level negotiations to institutional centralism¹. In September 2020, Colombo gazetted the National Policy on Natural Gas to establish domestic utilization pathways and commercialization frameworks⁹. This legislative push culminated in the passage of the Petroleum Resources Act No. 21 of 2021¹. The Act established the Petroleum Development Authority of Sri Lanka (PDASL), repealing previous statutes and concentrating all regulatory, mapping, block demarcation, licensing, and fiscal control over offshore and onshore hydrocarbon resources directly within a central body operating under the Ministry of Energy¹. This statutory framework deliberately excluded provincial governance structures and regional communities from resource administration¹.

By 2022, compounding economic shocks and foreign exchange deficits compelled the central government to accelerate the monetization of offshore energy assets²³. Block M2 was re-tendered on the global market, while state-level concessions expanded into offshore renewable energy¹⁶. Agreements were signed with foreign corporate giants, including India's Adani Group, for wind energy installations in Mannar and Pooneryn¹⁰. As regional powers expanded their maritime footprints—highlighted by India's $8.83 billion Samudra Manthan offshore exploration program launched in 2025–2026—the Sri Lankan government issued formal calls in mid-August 2026 for international bids to develop four prime offshore exploration blocks in the Mannar Basin9. Throughout this fifteen-year period, local coastal communities were subjected to strict maritime restrictions and economic hardship, while regional political elites maintained total silence on the offshore legal domain².

Chronological Period	Key Event / Milestone	Technical & Geopolitical Mechanisms	Impact on Local Coastal Rights & Livelihoods
August–December 2011	Hydrocarbon Discoveries at Dorado and Barracuda12	Cairn Lanka drills two successful wells in Block SL 2007-01-001 (Block M2), confirming 839 BCF gas and 5.88 MMB condensate12.	Zero public consultation; military maritime safety zones established around offshore rigs without local consent2.
November 2013	Launch of Second Offshore Bidding Round24	Government offers additional deep-water blocks in Mannar and Cauvery basins to international exploration entities14.	Sri Lanka Navy maintains militarized High-Security Zones (HSZs), restricting traditional artisanal fishing routes3.
October 2015	Relinquishment of Block M2 by Cairn Lanka15	Cairn exits due to low global crude prices (<$40/bbl) and failure to agree on domestic gas pricing terms ($8–9/MMBtu)15.	Gas discoveries remain undeveloped; central government retains exclusive ownership of seismic and well data25.
September 2020	Gazetting of National Policy on Natural Gas9	Ministry of Energy formulates policy to drive domestic gas adoption and structure offshore commercialization9.	Northern and Eastern Provincial Council structures completely excluded from policy drafting and resource planning9.
October 2021	Enactment of Petroleum Resources Act No. 211	Repeals 2003 legislation; creates the Petroleum Development Authority of Sri Lanka (PDASL) as central regulator1.	Absolute legal centralization of all offshore subsoil resources; provincial authorities formally bypassed1.
Early 2022	Re-tendering of Deep-Water Block M223	Energy Ministry opens tender for Block M2 (300,000 hectares) encompassing proven Dorado and Barracuda fields23.	Artisanal fishers face compounding economic distress and fuel price spikes; resource licensing moves forward unhindered23.
September 2022–2023	Execution of Adani Group Infrastructure Deals10	Central government signs BOT and green energy agreements with India's Adani Group for Mannar and Pooneryn10.	Community opposition mounts over land acquisition and marine ecology damage; Tamil political posture remains fragmented10.
February 2025	Indo-Lanka Naval Task Force Proposals17	Northern fisher leaders meet Indian Consulate in Jaffna; proposals introduced for joint naval patrolling in Palk Bay17.	Palk Bay seabed suffers ongoing degradation from bottom trawling; local fishers experience severe gear destruction3.
August 15, 2026	International Calls for Bids on 4 Mannar Blocks9	Sri Lanka formally opens international bidding for four major Mannar Basin blocks, targeting an estimated $267B in resources9.	Absence of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC); complete lack of statutory regional revenue-sharing provisions2.
August 18–19, 2026	Consolidation of Structural Maritime Siege	Central government and foreign corporate actors finalize investment guidelines for deep-water extraction9.	Complete alienation of local Tamil, Muslim, and Christian coastal communities from their ancestral marine commons2.

Stakeholder Accountability Matrix

The systematic alienation of offshore energy wealth and marine territory off Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka is driven by active executive centralism, bilateral corporate expansion, and the silence of regional political actors¹. The matrix below cataloguing the specific operational acts, concessions, silences, and institutional failures across all primary stakeholder groups:

Stakeholder Category	Specific Operational Acts, MoUs & Concessions Executed	Systemic Silences, Conceptual Omissions & Institutional Failures
Sri Lankan State Authorities   (Ministry of Energy, PDASL, Cabinet, Sri Lanka Navy)	• Enacted the Petroleum Resources Act No. 21 of 2021, vesting absolute statutory ownership of petroleum in the central state1.   • Gazetted the 2020 National Policy on Natural Gas to drive central commercialization9.   • Issued August 2026 international calls for bids on four major Mannar Basin exploration blocks9.	• Complete failure to conduct Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) consultations with coastal communities2.   • Enforced militarized High-Security Zones (HSZs) restricting local fishers while clearing seismic survey zones3.   • Excluded Northern and Eastern Provincial Councils from offshore revenue frameworks1.
Tamil Political Parties & Nationalist Leaders   (ITAK, TNA, TNPF, TELO, TMTK, Regional Elites)	• Focused political manifestos and advocacy exclusively on land rights, military camp removal, and constitutional devolution10.   • Participated in parliamentary debates without raising objections to the centralized mapping of offshore blocks1.   • Maintained fragmented responses to foreign energy concessions based on short-term electoral interest16.	• Failed to file legal challenges against the PDASL or statutory centralization under Act No. 21 of 20211.   • Omitted the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf from nationalist platform definitions11.   • Maintained total silence on international bidding rounds for offshore natural gas reserves9.
Sinhala Political Entities & Executive Governance   (Central Cabinets, Ministry of Defense, National Parties)	• Weaponized state security apparatuses to enforce executive control over Northern and Eastern marine zones3.   • Negotiated bilateral energy and port deals directly with foreign conglomerates, bypassing regional input10.   • Promoted central treasury retention of all offshore royalties and production-sharing revenues1.	• Disregarded constitutional devolution mandates under the 13th Amendment regarding coastal planning1.   • Denied indigenous resource rights to war-affected Tamil-speaking coastal communities2.   • Ignored environmental degradation caused by foreign industrial fishing and energy projects3.
Foreign State & Corporate Entities   (Government of India, ONGC Videsh, Adani Group, Foreign E&P Firms)	• Cairn India executed deep-water drilling discovering Dorado and Barracuda gas fields12.   • Adani Group secured 35-year BOT port deals and green energy concessions in Mannar and Pooneryn10.   • Indian Cabinet approved $8.83B Samudra Manthan offshore program covering contiguous marine zones9.	• Failed to conduct transparent community consultations or secure FPIC from local coastal rights-holders2.   • Leveraged bilateral macroeconomic leverage over Colombo to secure strategic energy footholds9.   • Disregarded localized ecological impacts on fragile coastal ecosystems and fishing grounds16.
Regional Civil Society & Opportunistic NGOs   (Human Rights NGOs, Advocacy Groups, Local CSOs)	• Produced documentation on terrestrial land confiscation, civil liberties abuses, and war-widow poverty18.   • Managed localized coastal rehabilitation projects funded by international development banks30.   • Focused on short-term relief distributions during fuel and economic crises27.	• Completely ignored "Ocean Grabbing" and subsurface gas alienation in Northern waters2.   • Failed to submit formal legal petitions under UNCLOS Dispute Settlement or ICJ advisory mechanisms6.   • Omitted maritime resource rights from regional human rights documentation2.

The Mechanics of Systemic Failure

The stakeholder audit reveals a structural pattern of collusion, opportunism, and conceptual limitation¹. Central state authorities in Colombo have consistently utilized statutory law and military deployment to enforce executive ownership over offshore assets¹. By establishing the PDASL under Act No. 21 of 2021, the state created a centralized gatekeeper to monetize subsurface assets while insulating itself from regional governance obligations¹.

Concurrently, mainstream Tamil political leaders have exhibited an enduring "land bias"¹¹. Rooted in traditional agrarian conceptions of territory, Tamil political parties have treated nationalist struggles as a contest over land boundaries, failing to recognize that modern state power and wealth are increasingly concentrated in the ocean⁹. When the central government established the PDASL, mapped offshore blocks across the Mannar Basin, and launched multi-billion-dollar tenders, Tamil parliamentarians mounted no legislative or legal defense¹. Their silence has effectively granted Colombo a free hand to alienate Northern marine resources to foreign corporate actors⁹.

Foreign state and corporate entities have capitalized on this regulatory and political void¹⁰. Operating through bilateral agreements negotiated directly with Colombo executive officials, entities such as India's Adani Group and state energy corporations have secured valuable assets in Mannar and Palk Bay⁹. These projects bypass local administrative structures, ignore FPIC protocols, and treat the Northern marine domain as an empty, extractable frontier².

The Maritime Dimension of the Tamil-Speaking Homeland:

Legal & Conceptual Analysis

Territorial Definition and the "Land Bias" Omission

The political and legal discourse surrounding the rights of Tamil-speaking peoples in Sri Lanka has historically been constrained by a terrestrial definition of geography¹¹. The Vaddukoddai Resolution of May 14, 1976—which served as the foundational political text for the demand for an independent state—formally articulated the boundaries of the proposed homeland by reference to land administrative divisions¹¹:

"Consisting of the Northern and Eastern provinces... declaring that Tamils in Sri Lanka are a distinct nation based on their history, culture, and territory."¹¹

By conceptualizing the homeland strictly as a landmass, Tamil political entities created a profound legal disconnect¹¹. Under modern international law, state sovereign rights and economic jurisdiction extend seamlessly from the coastline into adjacent marine zones⁶. Pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a coastal state exercises sovereignty over its 12-nautical-mile Territorial Sea, sovereign rights over the 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and jurisdiction over the seabed and subsoil of the Continental Shelf⁶. Sri Lanka’s total EEZ encompasses approximately 517,000 square kilometers—nearly eight times its land area of 65,610 square kilometers—complemented by a continental shelf of 30,000 square kilometers¹⁹. A major portion of this maritime space directly adjoins the 1,585-kilometer coastline of the Northern and Eastern provinces¹².

By failing to incorporate the EEZ and continental shelf into the conceptual definition of the Tamil-speaking homeland, political leaders surrendered the legal discourse over maritime wealth⁹. Central state authorities in Colombo seized upon this omission, establishing an absolute statutory monopoly over offshore natural resources and treating sub-surface hydrocarbon reserves in the Mannar Basin as state domain¹.

Comparative Gravity: Ocean Grabbing vs. Land Grabbing

While the confiscation of private and communal land for military cantonments, forestry reserves, and state agricultural schemes ("land grabbing") has drawn significant international attention, the systematic enclosure of marine spaces ("ocean grabbing") is equally destructive to coastal communities².

In the Northern Province alone, over 40,000 families rely on coastal and offshore fisheries for their daily survival¹⁸. Coastal districts such as Mannar and Mullaitivu exhibit high poverty rates—20.1% and 28.8% respectively—compared to a national average of 6.7%¹⁸. Fishing communities in these regions are not merely economic actors; they are indigenous rights-holders whose culture, dietary protein, traditional knowledge, and social cohesion are linked to the marine ecosystem².

Ocean grabbing operates through both physical exclusion and statutory reallocation¹. When the central state licenses offshore deep-water blocks to multinational corporations or permits destructive industrial bottom trawling by foreign fleets, it dispossesses artisanal fishers of their ancestral commons². Industrial bottom trawling destroys fragile benthic habitats, coral reefs, and sea-grass beds in the Palk Bay, while deep-water energy operations restrict navigation and alter marine environments³.

Furthermore, ocean grabbing has a severe gendered impact². In coastal districts like Jaffna and Mannar, women form the backbone of the post-harvest fisheries economy—sorting, gutting, drying, and marketing catches, and running harbour stalls². In areas like Ponnalai, female fishers contribute to half of all fishery operations, specializing in crustacean harvesting². When marine spaces are enclosed for energy infrastructure or degraded by industrial operations, coastal women suffer immediate income loss, deepening cycle of rural poverty and indebtedness².

Attribute / Dimension	Terrestrial Land Grabbing	Maritime Ocean Grabbing
Primary Mechanisms	Executive gazetting of forest reserves, military camp expansions, state-sponsored agricultural schemes18.	Statutory centralization under PDASL, offshore block licensing, military HSZs, foreign energy concessions1.
Socio-Economic Impact	Displacement of agricultural households, loss of farm yields, physical relocation of villages18.	Destruction of artisanal fisheries, loss of protein, fuel starvation, collapse of coastal micro-economies18.
Cultural & Gender Dimension	Severing of ancestral land links; disruption of rural female agricultural labor force18.	Erasure of traditional beach-seining (karavalai) commons; destruction of female post-harvest processing networks2.
Political & Legal Response	Frequent fundamental rights petitions, parliamentary protests, UN Human Rights Council submissions10.	Near-total absence of domestic legal challenges; zero cases filed under UNCLOS or ICJ international mechanisms6.

Audit of MoUs, Offshore Gas Reserves, and FPIC Violations (Status as of August 19, 2026)

Hydrocarbon Asset Base of the Mannar Basin

Geological and geophysical assessments establish that the Mannar Basin represents a major, undeveloped deep-water natural gas province in South Asia¹⁵. Geologically classified as a failed rift basin formed during the breakup of Gondwana, the basin contains thick Mesozoic and Cenozoic sedimentary sequences⁷. Exploratory drilling by Cairn Lanka in 2011 confirmed working petroleum systems within Upper Cretaceous clastic reservoirs, capped by igneous sill intrusions and basaltic flows⁷

Asset / Metric	CLPL-Dorado-91H/1z Well	CLPL-Barracuda-1G/1 Well	Cumulative Proven Asset Base
Water Depth	1,354 meters12	1,509 meters12	Deep-water continental slope environment12.
Total Measured Depth	3,288 meters12	4,741 meters12	Deepest exploratory wells drilled in Sri Lanka12.
Net Gas Pay Zone	25-meter sandstone reservoir12	24 meters across 3 sandstones12	Upper Cretaceous sandstone formations12.
Recoverable Gas Volume	300 BCF (9.9 billion cubic meters)23	539 BCF (28.3 billion cubic meters)23	839 BCF confirmed mid-case gas15.
Recoverable Condensate	2.00 million barrels (MMB)24	3.88 million barrels (MMB)15	5.88 MMB light condensate15.

Official estimations issued by the Parliamentary Media Unit value the undiscovered and proven oil and gas potential across the Mannar Basin at approximately $267 billion⁹. Block M2 alone covers an acreage of 300,000 hectares off the northwestern coast²³. Despite this wealth located directly adjacent to the war-affected Northern Province¹⁸, the legal framework established under the Petroleum Resources Act No. 21 of 2021 mandates that 100% of state production-sharing revenues, royalties, and bonus payments flow directly to Colombo’s central treasury, completely excluding regional governance bodies¹.

Bilateral Energy Agreements and Geopolitical Encirclement

The commercial development of the Mannar Basin is tied to bilateral agreements and foreign corporate concessions that encircle the Northern marine domain⁹:

1.     Adani Group Renewable Energy Concessions: Executed between 2022 and 2024, build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreements granted India's Adani Group large-scale wind power projects in Mannar and Pooneryn¹⁰. These installations occupy sensitive coastal land and shallow marine zones, impacting local fishing operations and avian ecosystems without local consultation².

2.     Indian Offshore Exploration Scheme (Samudra Manthan): Approved by the Indian Cabinet with an budget of $8.83 billion through FY2030–31, this program expands offshore oil and gas exploration across India's deep-water blocks, including the Cauvery Basin and Kanya Kumari offshore regions contiguous to Sri Lankan waters⁹. Sri Lanka’s August 2026 tender launch for four Mannar blocks aligns with this broader regional push, seeking to link Mannar gas discoveries into Indian industrial supply chains⁹.

3.     Militarized Maritime Security MoUs: Proposals advanced in early 2025 to establish a joint Indo-Lanka Naval Task Force operating from Katchatheevu seek to police the Palk Bay¹⁷. While presented as a measure to manage fishing disputes, this structure militarizes the maritime boundary, insulating offshore energy assets from local disruption while failing to halt industrial bottom trawling³.

Audit of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) Compliance

Under international legal norms—specifically UNDRIP Articles 19 and 32—states must consult and cooperate in good faith with indigenous rights-holders to obtain their Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) before approving any project affecting their lands, territories, or natural resources². An audit of the PDASL licensing rounds, the National Policy on Natural Gas, and foreign energy MoUs as of August 19, 2026, reveals systemic non-compliance²:

●       Zero Public Hearings: No public consultations or environmental impact hearings were held in Northern coastal districts (Jaffna, Mannar, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu) prior to launching international bidding rounds for offshore blocks².

●       Exclusion of Local Fisheries Cooperatives: Neither the Northern Province Fisher People's Alliance (NPFPA) nor local village-level fisher cooperatives were granted representation or consultation rights under the Petroleum Resources Act No. 21 of 2021¹.

●       Absence of Gender-Impact Assessments: Despite female workers comprising over half the post-harvest fisheries workforce in regions like Ponnalai and Mannar², no gender-specific environmental or economic impact assessments were conducted regarding potential offshore oil spills, seismic disturbances, or coastal land enclosures².

Legal Demand Framework: 

Formal Allegations and Causes of Action

To challenge the centralized expropriation of maritime wealth off Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka, this dossier formulates five primary legal causes of action under international treaties, customary law, and domestic constitutional frameworks¹.

Legal Framework	Primary Statutory / Treaty Provisions	Core Allegation / Cause of Action
1. Indigenous & Human Rights	UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), Arts. 25, 26, 322; ICESCR, Art. 119.	Systematic licensing of traditional marine territories without obtaining Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC)2; deprivation of local means of subsistence19.
2. Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)	UNCLOS, Part V (Exclusive Economic Zone) & Part VI (Continental Shelf)6.	Abusive exercise of state sovereign rights; utilization of military HSZs to clear waters for corporate extraction under prolonged occupation3.
3. International Ocean Grabbing	FAO Voluntary Guidelines on Small-Scale Fisheries; Customary Law2.	Non-consensual reallocation of public and indigenous marine commons to state and foreign corporate entities, dispossessing traditional rights-holders2.
4. Indo-Lanka Accord (1987)	Indo-Lanka Accord, Clauses 1.2 and 2.111.	Fragmentation of the contiguous socio-economic integrity and historical habitation zones of the Northern and Eastern provinces via unilateral central concessions9.
5. 13th Amendment to Constitution	Constitution of Sri Lanka, Ninth Schedule (List I: Provincial Council List, List III: Concurrent List)1.	Statutory preemption of provincial authority over coastal planning, local development, and regional resource revenue sharing under Act No. 21 of 20211.

Cause of Action 1: Violations of Indigenous and Human Rights (UNDRIP & ICESCR)

Coastal Tamil-speaking communities represent traditional rights-holders who have historically occupied, utilized, and conserved the marine commons off Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka². Article 26 of UNDRIP establishes that indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories, and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied, or used². By unilaterally licensing offshore hydrocarbon blocks and executing foreign energy MoUs without securing community FPIC, the Sri Lankan state and foreign corporate entities violate Article 32 of UNDRIP². Furthermore, depriving local fishers of access to traditional grounds violates Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which explicitly mandates that in no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence¹⁹.

Cause of Action 2: Violations of International Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

Under UNCLOS Parts V and VI, coastal states possess sovereign rights for exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing natural resources in the EEZ and continental shelf⁶. However, these rights must be exercised in good faith and in alignment with the broader principles of international law, including the right of self-determination². The Sri Lankan state’s deployment of the Navy to enforce High-Security Zones (HSZs) off the Northern coast restricts artisanal fishing while clearing marine areas for foreign seismic survey vessels³. This constitutes an abusive exercise of state authority, utilizing military enforcement to facilitate non-consensual corporate resource extraction under conditions of post-war occupation².

Cause of Action 3: Systematic "Ocean Grabbing" under Customary International Law

Ocean grabbing occurs when state and corporate actors reallocate marine spaces and sub-surface resources from traditional users through opaque, top-down mechanisms that dispossess local communities². The centralized allocation of 300,000 hectares in Block M2²³, alongside the August 2026 bidding calls for four additional blocks⁹, constitutes systemic ocean grabbing. This reallocation strips coastal populations of their ancestral resource base, degrades marine biodiversity through industrial deep-water operations, and threatens long-term regional food security².

Cause of Action 4: Breach of the Indo-Lanka Accord (1987)

The Indo-Lanka Accord explicitly recognizes that the Northern and Eastern provinces are areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil-speaking peoples, forming a contiguous socio-economic environment¹¹. Unilateral central state concessions granted to foreign entities—including energy leases in the Mannar Basin and coastal land alienations for wind power installations—sever the contiguous marine and coastal linkage between the Northern and Eastern provinces⁹. This violates the structural integrity and security commitments of the Accord by fragmenting the territorial and economic cohesion of the regional population¹¹.

Cause of Action 5: Constitutional Encroachment on the 13th Amendment

The 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution devolved administrative authority over regional land, planning, and local economic development to Provincial Councils¹⁰. By enacting the Petroleum Resources Act No. 21 of 2021, the central government created the PDASL as an exclusive statutory body, vesting all mapping, licensing, and fiscal control over offshore blocks within Colombo¹. This statutory structure bypasses the Northern and Eastern Provincial Councils, stripping regional elected bodies of their constitutional right to participate in coastal development, oversee environmental management, and claim a share of resource revenues generated within contiguous waters¹.

Direct Interrogatories & Demands

This dossier presents targeted interrogatories to political, state, corporate, and civil society leaders, demanding public, legally binding answers regarding their actions and silences¹.

Interrogatories to Tamil Political Parties (ITAK, TNA, TNPF, TELO, TMTK)

1.     On Maritime Omission: Why have your political manifestos, parliamentary submissions, and international advocacy campaigns historically limited the definition of the "Tamil Homeland" to terrestrial landmasses, omitting the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf⁹?

2.     On Legislative Inaction: Why did your parliamentary representatives fail to file petitions in the Supreme Court or launch international legal challenges against the passage of the Petroleum Resources Act No. 21 of 2021, which centralizes all offshore hydrocarbon ownership in Colombo¹?

3.     On Foreign Energy Concessions: What is your formal political and legal position regarding the August 2026 international bidding round for four major Mannar Basin natural gas blocks⁹? Will you commit to seeking an injunction against non-consensual offshore licensing in domestic or international courts²?

4.     On Fiscal Devolution: Why have you not demanded that a minimum 50% statutory royalty share from any commercialized offshore hydrocarbon or renewable energy project in Northern and Eastern waters be allocated directly to a Regional Development Trust managed by elected regional representatives¹?

Interrogatories to Sinhala Political Leaders & Central State Authorities (President, Ministry of Energy, PDASL)

1.     On FPIC Compliance: Can the PDASL produce any public documentation or formal records proving that Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) was obtained from Northern coastal fishing communities prior to launching international tenders for Mannar Basin blocks²?

2.     On Constitutional Devolution: How does the absolute centralization of petroleum licensing and revenue collection under Act No. 21 of 2021 comply with the administrative devolution mandates established under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution¹?

3.     On Environmental Safety: What specific, publicly audited oil spill response mechanisms and environmental impact safeguards exist to protect the fragile marine ecosystems of Palk Bay and the Mannar Basin from deep-water blowouts or industrial drilling accidents²?

Interrogatories to Foreign Corporate Entities & Foreign States (Government of India, Adani Group, International Bidders)

1.     On Community Consultation: Has your enterprise conducted independent, transparent socio-environmental impact assessments with local fisher cooperatives in Mannar, Jaffna, and Kilinochchi prior to executing energy MoUs or submitting offshore exploration bids²?

2.     On International Law Compliance: Do you recognize that acquiring energy concessions in post-conflict, militarized regions without the consent of traditional historical populations violates international human rights norms regarding indigenous resource rights and local self-determination²?

Conclusion & Actionable Demands

The investigation conducted in this dossier establishes that the offshore waters and subsurface energy reserves of Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka—specifically the Mannar Basin—are being systematically commercialized and geopolitically enclosed through executive centralism and foreign corporate participation¹. This regime of "Ocean Grabbing" proceeds largely because Tamil political leaders have operated under a land-biased paradigm that ignored maritime jurisdiction⁹. To halt this ongoing dispossession and secure the resource rights of coastal communities, the following actions are demanded:

1.     Formation of a Northern Maritime Legal Task Force: Regional civil society, fisher alliances, and legal experts must establish a dedicated task force to initiate legal proceedings—utilizing UNCLOS Dispute Settlement mechanisms, UN Special Procedures, and ICJ advisory mechanisms—demanding an immediate freeze on offshore licensing until FPIC protocols are fulfilled².

2.     Legislative Reform Demands: Tamil political entities must present a unified legislative package to amend the Petroleum Resources Act No. 21 of 2021, requiring statutory provincial representation on the PDASL Board and establishing a binding 50% regional revenue-sharing allocation¹.

3.     Enforcement of International FPIC Standards: Foreign corporate entities, multilateral development banks, and international bidding conglomerates are formally put on notice that any energy contract, wind concession, or hydrocarbon lease executed without the explicit consent of local coastal rights-holders will be treated as legally contested and subjected to international litigation².

Works cited

1.     Petroleum Resources Act - 2021 | Sri Lankan Legislation - paralegal.lk, https://www.paralegal.lk/legislations/legislation_P_57

2.     The Unsung Heroines Of Sri Lanka's Coastal Fishing Communities - The Pearl Protectors, https://pearlprotectors.org/heroines-of-coastal-fishing-communities/

3.     Sri Lankan fishermen pushing for a north-south alliance to save environment and resources, https://www.asianews.it/en/south-asia/sri-lanka/sri-lankan-fishermen-pushing-for-a-north-south-alliance-to-save-environment-and-resources

4.     Osvaldo Zavala Giler sworn in as the new ICC Registrar, https://jfjustice.net/osvaldo-zavala-giler-sworn-in-as-the-new-icc-registrar/

5.     “The Existence of the ICC Is Largely Due to the Traditions and Experiences of Latin American Countries” - Verfassungsblog, https://verfassungsblog.de/interview-icc-registrar/

6.     United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982) - UNTC, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?Temp=mtdsg3&chapter=21&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&src=TREATY

7.     Unlocking the hydrocarbon potential of the Mannar Basin (Sri Lanka) based on new data and new ideas - PDASL, https://pdasl.gov.lk/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/fb2022060_published.pdf

8.     PDASL - World Energies Summit, https://www.worldenergiessummit.com/government-participant/pdasl-the-upstream-oil-gas-regulator-of-srilanka

9.     Sri Lanka to invite international bids later this month - Breaking News - Daily Mirror, https://www.dailymirror.lk/breaking-news/Sri-Lanka-to-invite-international-bids-later-this-month/108-348163

10.  Page 13 - dbsjeyaraj.com, https://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/?paged=13

11.  Vaddukoddai Resolution Overview | PDF | Sri Lanka | Sovereign State - Scribd, https://www.scribd.com/document/128240833/Vaddukoddai-Resolution-May-14-1976

12.  Exploration wells drilled in Sri Lanka | Download Scientific Diagram - ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Exploration-wells-drilled-in-Sri-Lanka_fig1_243963635

13.  PDASL, https://pdasl.gov.lk/

14.  Sri Lanka's Mannar basin holds untapped gas potential, https://www.ogj.com/exploration-development/article/55131910/sri-lankas-mannar-basin-holds-untapped-gas-potential

15.  Returning exploration to Sri Lanka - GeoExpro, https://geoexpro.com/returning-exploration-to-sri-lanka/

16.  finance - Ceylon Today, https://ceylontoday.lk/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/CT-29-09-2024-CT.pdf

17.  Sri Lanka's Northern Province fishermen leaders favour India - SL joint patrolling to curb 'poaching' in Palk Bay region - The Hindu, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/sri-lankas-northern-province-fishermen-leaders-favour-india-sl-joint-patrolling-to-curb-poaching-in-palk-bay-region/article69289442.ece

18.  Final Report SRI: Northern Province Sustainable Fisheries Development Project - PPTA, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/49325/49325-001-tacr-en.pdf

19.  Sustainability Transitions in Fisheries Global Value Chains: Insights for Tackling Overfishing from the Sri Lankan Context, https://insights.aib.world/article/155273-sustainability-transitions-in-fisheries-global-value-chains-insights-for-tackling-overfishing-from-the-sri-lankan-context

20.  Osvaldo Zavala Giler - Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osvaldo_Zavala_Giler

21.  “The Court has gone through a step change.” An interview with the Registrar of the International Criminal Court, Osvaldo Zavala Giler - EJIL: Talk!, https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-court-has-gone-through-a-step-change-an-interview-with-the-registrar-of-the-international-criminal-court-osvaldo-zavala-giler/

22.  Osvaldo Zavala Giler - Verfassungsblog, https://verfassungsblog.de/author/osvaldo-zavala-giler/

23.  Sri Lanka seeks to attract deep-water investors for Mannar gas discoveries - Energy Voice, https://www.energyvoice.com/oilandgas/asia/369375/sri-lanka-seeks-to-attract-deep-water-investors-for-mannar-gas-discoveries/

24.  Offshore Oil and Gas In Sri Lanka - The Way Forward - Features | Daily Mirror, https://www.dailymirror.lk/features/offshore-oil-and-gas-in-sri-lanka-the-way-forward/185-61647

25.  The Mannar Betrayal: Why Sri Lanka's Energy Sovereignty Is Stranded While The World Moves On - Colombo Telegraph, https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/the-mannar-betrayal-why-sri-lankas-energy-sovereignty-is-stranded-while-the-world-moves-on/

26.  Petroleum Resources Act, 2021 - Laws of Sri Lanka, https://www.srilankalaw.lk/revised-statutes/alphabetical-list-of-statutes/1961-petroleum-resources-act-2021.html

27.  Historic and Artisanal coastal and marine rights of traditional fishing communities : conflicts and the way forward - WORLD FORUM OF FISHER PEOPLES, https://wffp-web.org/historic-and-artisanal-coastal-and-marine-rights-of-traditional-fishing-communities-conflicts-and-the-way-forward/

28.  PDASL, https://pdasl.gov.lk/investment-opportunities

29.  Sri Lanka's Fishers Face a Tangled Future - New Lines Magazine, https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/sri-lankas-fishers-face-a-tangled-future/

30.  ADB-49325-003 Northern Province Sustainable Fisheries Development Project (PDA) - Early Warning System, https://ewsdata.rightsindevelopment.org/projects/ADB-49325-003/

31.  Mannar Basin: South Asia's overlooked energy play - Daily FT, https://www.ft.lk/opinion/Mannar-Basin--South-Asia-s-overlooked-energy-play/14-793198

 

 

     In solidarity,

     Wimal Navaratnam

     Human Rights Defender |Independent Researcher | ABC Tamil Oli              (ECOSOC)

      Email: tamilolicanada@gmail.com

Intended audience and use Audience: Policymakers, international legal bodies, human rights investigators, forensic researchers, advocacy organizations, and affected communities. 

Use: Executive Summary and timeline for rapid briefing; consolidated legal framework for legal assessment; appendices for source verification and methodological transparency.